EU Approaches the G-20 Summit

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 BRUSSELS 000330

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EEB/OMA/WHITTINGTON AND EUR/ERA
TREASURY FOR IMB/MURDEN, MONROE, BEASLEY AND EUR/MEYER, KOHLER
WHITE HOUSE FOR NEC/HENNESSEY-NILAND AND NSC/KVIEN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN ECON KSUM EUN
SUBJECT: EU Approaches the G-20 Summit

REF:
A) State 17502
B) USEU Brussels 290
C) USEU Brussels 264
D) USEU Brussels 226
E) USEU Brussels 112
F) 08 USEU Brussels 1744
G) 08 USEU Brussels 1657

This cable is Sensitive and limited to official U.S. government use
only. Not for internet or other public dissemination.

Introduction and Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) The European Union and its 27 member states have been hard
hit by the global financial crisis and economic downturn, with the
economy in recession and some of the world's largest financial
institutions under stress. The EU has responded actively to this,
with strident calls for action from EU President Barroso,
Commissioners McCreevy and Almunia and the EU Presidency in Czech
Prime Minister Topolanek adding to the cacophony of statements from
such member state leaders as Brown, Sarkozy, Merkel and the heads of
the worst affected Central European member states - notably Hungary
and Romania.


2. (SBU) Despite the profusion of high level meetings and sometimes
contradictory statements (epitomized by the Sarkozy-Topolanek
exchange on aid to the auto sector),the Europeans are taking a
number of steps to respond to the crisis:

-- common EU principles on fiscal stimulus were announced in
December; the Commission claims that the total stimulus now exceeds
3 pct of GDP, double the originally expected 200bn or 1.5 pct of
GDP;
-- EU debt and deficit limits will be applied leniently, while
member states plan to return to fiscal stability in the medium
term;
-- EU and member state funds are supporting some member states
facing balance of payments difficulties, especially in Central
Europe;
-- the Commission and member states are (now) generally united
against measures that would undermine the internal market, or erect
protectionist barriers; -- the Commission is minimizing trade
distorting effects of financial institution bailouts and state
aids;
-- proposals to strengthen financial sector supervision and
regulation are being considered, including on: the De Larosiere
recommendations on improving micro- and macro-level supervision;
strengthening bank and insurance fund capital requirements;
regulating credit rating agencies and credit default swaps; and
increased deposit guarantees and investor protections (additional
proposals on hedge funds and private equity are expected next
month); and
-- on the international front, the EU as a whole supports the G-20
process and has called for doubling IMF resources and strengthening
the IMF and Financial Stability Forum's role in financial
governance.


3. (SBU) Many of these financial reform initiatives, which EU heads
of State and Government will review and may expand at their March
19-20 European Council meeting, cause difficulty for the industry
and for us, in particular as they inject EU "localization"
requirements into a global financial industry. Indeed, many EU
leaders (notably McCreevy, Sarkozy and Merkel) openly blame lax
regulation in the United States (and United Kingdom) for the crisis,
and will come to the London Summit in an assertive and at times
combative mood. They understand, however, that the Summit needs to
succeed to rebuild confidence among investors and consumers, and are

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likely to yield more easily on the details of the substance in
exchange for the political messaging they want. End Introduction
and Summary.

The Effects of the Crisis on the European Economy
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) The global financial and economic crisis has hit the EU and
its 27 member states hard. The latest European Commission forecasts
(Ref E),released January 19, expect GDP to fall sharply (-1.8% in
the EU and -1.9% in the 16-member euro area) in 2009, before growing
0.5% in 2010. Dramatically underscoring the scope of the problem,
industrial orders in the EU27 as a whole fell by 6.4% in December
2008, after declining by 5.1% in November; orders were 23.3 percent
below their level in December 2007. As a result, unemployment in
the euro area has reached 8.2% in January, the highest level for two
years, and is expected to rise to 8.7% in the EU in 2009 (9.2% in
the euro area),with a further increase in 2010. Deficits will also
grow in 2009 from 2% of GDP to 4.5% in the EU and from 1.7% to 4% in
the euro area. Inflation is set to fall rapidly, from 3.7% in 2008
in the EU (3.3% in the euro area) to 1.2% in 2009 (1.0% in the euro
area) and just below 2% in 2010 in both regions. Even with this bad
news, EU Economic and Finance Commissioner Almunia last week warned
that the forecast may be revised downward.


5. (SBU) The ten Central European EU member states are currently
suffering their worst economic recession since the Second World War,
with Hungary, Latvia and now Romania requesting international
assistance. Western investors have been selling assets from the
region, pushing the Polish zloty down by 28% against the euro in the
past six months. Hungary's forint has fallen by 20%, Romania's leu
by 17% and the Czech koruna by 12% during the same period. A
Hungarian document calculates that Central Europe's refinancing
needs for 2009 could total 300bn, or 30% of the region's gross
domestic product (GDP). This regional problem has significant
EU-wide effects, as several Western European financial institutions
are heavily exposed to the region. According to UBS estimates,
Austria's financial system is exposed to Central and Eastern Europe
as a whole for 67% of Austria's GDP, followed by Belgium (27%) and
Sweden (22%).

The EU Domestic Economic Policy Response
--------------


6. (SBU) As the first major response to the dramatic downturn, EU
Heads of State and Government meeting in the European Council in
December adopted the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) as a
coordinated fiscal stimulus plan worth approximately 200bn or 1.5%
of EU GDP. The burden is shared between national budgets
(approximately 170bn or 1.2% of GDP),and EU and European
Investment Bank budgets (around 30bn, 0.3% of GDP).


7. (SBU) Member States are free to decide the mix of measures they
intend to adopt to stimulate demand in their economies. In doing
so, however, they remain bound by the Stability and Growth Pact
rules on excessive deficits (which set nominal ceilings for budget
deficits and government debt of 3 and 60 pct. pct. of GDP
respectively). As such, their fiscal policy room for maneuver is
limited to some extent by their current budgetary position. The
Commission intends to apply the Stability and Growth Pact rules
flexibly in light of the crisis, but member states are expected to
spell out how they intend to reverse excess deficits over the medium
term.


8. (SBU) Member States in early January reported the details of the
national measures they will take in their Stability and Convergence
programs for 2009. In a study submitted to the February meeting of
the Economic and Monetary Affairs Council, the Commission reported
that planned stimulus measures actually exceed the EERP, with the

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total at about 3.3 percent for both the 16 Eurozone members and for
the EU 27 as a whole. This includes, at the EU level, 2.8
percentage points of GDP added to the fiscal deficit (1.1 percentage
points in consolidated annual budget measures and 1.7 percentage
points from "automatic stabilizers" such as increased unemployment
benefits); 0.3 percentage points for additional debt (generally
raised fro equity injections into private sector institutions,
mainly banks); and 0.2 percentage points in measures outside the
budget, including by state-owned enterprises. However, analysts
have argued that many of the measures member states have put forward
were already planned and thus should not be viewed as new stimulus.


9. (SBU) At the EU level, the Community is unable to provide
aggregate fiscal stimulus since it must by law run a balanced budget
on an annual basis. Further, EU revenues are limited as a portion
of GDP, so that declines in economic activity will lead directly to
a decrease in expenditures. That said, the Community can alter
expenditure patterns, and the Commission has proposed that the
Community contribute to the EERP by accelerating payments of up to
6.3bn under the structural and social funds and by mobilizing 5bn
of unspent money from the 2008 budget over the period 2009-10 to
improve energy interconnections and broadband infrastructure. This
last initiative, the brain-child of Commission President Barroso
(Ref D),may not gain sufficient member state support to be approved
by the March 19-20 European Council, as member states see it as
largely political (in fact, that is its main selling point),too
slow on disbursements, too incoherent in choice of projects, and too
difficult to finance from the EU budget. Also at the EU level, the
European Investment Bank will also increase annual lending,
particularly to SMEs, by some 15bn in 2009 and 2010.


10. (SBU) In an attempt to build support for an EU wide response to
the particular crisis in Central Europe, in January, Austrian banks
pressed the European Union to organize financial aid for countries
on its eastern fringes like Romania and Ukraine. That call was
followed by the Austrian government's attempt to seek support for an
EU initiative to mobilize additional resources for the region's
banking system, which would include funds from the European
Investment Bank, the European Central Bank and the EU Cohesion Fund.
The EU rejected that plan. A second proposal put forward by
Hungary at the March 1 extraordinary leaders' summit called for the
establishment of a fund worth 160-190bn to provide liquidity and
debt rescheduling for Central European states. Poland, Slovakia and
the Czech Republic all resisted such a regional approach, as they
want to distinguish themselves from their more imperiled neighbors.
Leaders opted to help the region's troubled economies on a
country-by-country basis.

-- Industrial Supports


11. (SBU) The EU rightly prides itself on having established a
single market among its 27 members, and the Commission zealously
guards this from state aid and other measures that might distort
internal competition. That said, the EU has not yet adopted state
aid frameworks targeted at particular sectors of the economy other
than the financial sector (below). To soften the effects of the
credit squeeze, and to help the real economy in general, on December
17 the Commission adopted a temporary framework which allows Member
States to grant, under certain conditions and until 2010, a lump sum
of aid up to 500,000 per company for the next two years, state
guarantees for loans at a reduced premium, subsidized loans, in
particular for the production of green products, and risk capital
aid up to 2.5 million per SME per year (instead of the current 1.5
million) in cases where at least 30% (instead of the current 50%) of
the investment cost comes from private investors.


12. (SBU) Over the past few weeks, member states have submitted for
Commission approval support schemes targeted at industries with
particular national relevance, such as the automotive industry for

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Italy, Germany and France. The latter sparked accusations of
protectionism from newer Member States, the Czech Republic in
particular, as it tried to link aid to the relocation of production
within France's borders. The Commission finally authorized this
scheme on February 28, after the contentious conditions were
removed. On March 1, the 27 EU Leaders meeting in an informal
European Council reaffirmed their commitment to the single market
and warned against letting protectionism slip through the back
door.

-- Labor Market Measures


13. (SBU) In 2007, the European Union launched the European
Globalization Adjustment Fund, to help workers made redundant as a
result of changing global trade patterns to find another job as
quickly as possible. The fund provides up to 500 million a year in
support, and it will be used to reduce the broader social impact of
the crisis and support vulnerable populations across the EU. In
parallel, the Commission is working with Member States to re-program
the European Social Fund to help keep people in employment.


14. (SBU) On February 25, the "Social Partners" (industry
federations and labor unions) met with the Commission to start
preparing proposals for an extraordinary summit on employment to be
held in Prague in May. The March 19-20 European Council will
discuss these issues in more detail.

The EU Domestic Monetary and Financial Regulatory Response
-------------- --------------


15. (SBU) The strains caused by the crisis have led some to question
whether the Eurozone may break up. Some Euro area Member States
such as Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal have seen the spreads
on their debt over German Bund widen significantly over the past
weeks. This has triggered a debate on whether or not a default of
one or more Euro area Member States is possible, especially since
current EU rules do not allow for bailing-out a Euro area member.
While a default is possible, it is unlikely and the advantages of
EMU are such that it is unlikely to break apart. As Commissioner
Almunia said on March 3, "If a crisis emerges in one euro area
country, there is a solution. Before visiting the IMF, you can be
sure there is a solution and you can be sure that it is not clever
to talk in public about this solution".


16. (SBU) The EU financial sector has been hard hit by the financial
crisis: according to the Commission's latest report of national
measures to support the banking sector, member states have taken
action to support nearly 20 specific institutions since September
of last year, including Northern Rock, Royal Bank of Scotland, ING,
and Fortis, and almost all member states have sought Commission
approval for general schemes to support the sector.


17. (SBU) The European response to the financial crisis began in
October 2008, focusing first on recapitalizing banks, issuing loan
guarantees to sustain lending activities and raising deposit
guarantees. The Commission also proposed a number of legislative
actions to increase deposit guarantees, to strengthen bank and
insurance companies' capital requirements (the Capital Requirements
Directive and Solvency II),and to register and regulate credit
rating agencies (CRA). It has also announced further legislative
proposals to regulate hedge funds and private equity firms,
executive compensation, and the disclosure requirements of mutual
funds. Further, last Fall the Commission created an independent
group to make recommendations on how to strengthen cross-border
financial supervision; the De Larosiere Group's report was released
in late February; on March 4 the Commission adopted proposals
largely tracking its recommendations. Specifics follow.

-- Guidelines on Support for Financial Institutions

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18. (SBU) From October 2008 to February 2009, the Commission adopted
three guidelines to ensure that member state assistance to the
banking sector does not distort competition. On October 13, the
first document included guidance to help Member States design rescue
packages for distressed financial institutions and state guarantee
schemes that were to be non discriminatory, limited in time and
scope, and with adequate compensation for capital and guarantees by
the receiving institutions and protection against abuse. On
December 8, the Commission published further guidance on temporary
support for "fundamentally sound banks", to help them restart credit
flows. Capital injections must be based on base rates set by
central banks to which a risk premium is added to reflect the risk
profile of each bank and the type of capital. The pricing mechanism
must be such as to keep public involvement to a minimum. Finally,
on February 25, the Commission further refined its guidance with
guidelines on how Member States should deal with impaired assets.
The guidelines leave the design of asset relief schemes up to the
Member States, which can use several approved methods (asset
purchase, including "bad bank" scenarios or asset insurance
schemes),and indicate the budgetary and regulatory implications of
such measures. The Commission will grant approval for these
measures for a period of six months, conditional on the commitment
to present details of the valuation of the impaired assets.

-- Financial Regulation (Ref C)


19. (SBU) Deposit Guarantees: Legislation to raise deposit
guarantees to 50,000 in 2009 and to 100,000 by 2011 was formally
adopted by the Council on February 27, following a vote by the EP on
December 18.


20. (SBU) Capital Requirement Directives (CRD): Last October, the
Commission put forward a proposal amending the CRD by (1) requiring
banking institutions to hold a higher amount of capital to protect
against the risk of default; (2) creating ad-hoc Colleges of
Supervisors that will supervise banks with cross-border operations;
and (3) requiring financial institutions that originate securitized
products to retain 5% of the securities (refs F and G). The 5%
securitization retention threshold seems to be generally accepted,
and there is agreement that Colleges of Supervisors, though not a
satisfactory end-solution, are an appropriate interim step towards
more integrated European supervision. A vote is expected by April.

20A. (SBU) Derivatives Trading: EU Internal Markets Commissioner
McCreevy has made no secret about his desire to regulate derivatives
trading. The Commission published a Communication on this last
fall, which indicated it believed that all derivatives should be
traded through an EU-based, registered and supervised Central
Clearing Party (CCP). When major traders were unwilling to accede
to doing this "voluntarily," McCreevy threatened to compel it
through legislation, and then encouraged the Chairman of the
European Parliament's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee to add
his proposal directly as an amendment to the CRD even though it had
not gone through the formal Commission process. On February 18,
nine influential member firms of the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA) agreed to commit to use EU-based
central clearing for Credit Default Swaps (CDS) on EU-reference
entities by end-July 2009. Given the industry's concession, it is
not clear whether this provision will be included in the final
version of the CRD.


21. (SBU) Solvency II: Solvency II aims at consolidating insurance
sector legislation. Although work started before the crisis hit
Europe, its provisions for group-wide supervision and support --
giving the supervisor of the State where the insurance group is
established a leading role in supervisory activity and coordination,
and allowing capital requirements to be met at a group level rather
than by individual subsidiaries on their own -- are seen as

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important in the current climate. It is not certain this
legislation will be completed before the EP recesses in April, given
strong Member State concerns about group support and group
supervision, both desired by the Commission and the European
Parliament. A compromise may be possible on both issues, however,
and a vote by the EP plenary is expected by the end of March.


22. (SBU) Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs): Last November, the
Commission proposed a new Regulation to harmonize EU rules on CRAs
to ensure that ratings are not affected by conflicts of interest,
that CRAs defend the quality of their ratings and rating
methodology, and that they act transparently. The proposal calls
for all CRAs whose ratings are used in Europe to be registered in
the EU and subject to European supervision under stringent corporate
governance rules; it also forbids financial institutions in Europe
from trading instruments that do not carry a rating from an-EU
registered CRA. The Parliament is modifying the Commission's
proposal to give primary responsibility for CRA registration and
supervision to the Committee of European Securities Regulators
(CESR),rather than to national regulators, and to allow
EU-registered CRAs - including EU subsidiaries of non-EU
headquartered CRAs - to endorse ratings prepared by
non-EU-registered CRAs for a transitional period of two to three
years, during which EU and third country regulators can work out
criteria to determine regulatory equivalence. A Committee vote is
expected by March 23, and completion of the first EP reading by the
end of April. In the Council, member states favor registration and
supervision of CRAs, and appear to agree on the "endorsement"
approach for instruments rated by non-EU-based CRAs, but have
misgivings about the EP's enhanced role for CESR and the need for
equivalence determinations for third country CRAs.


23. (SBU) Hedge Funds and private equity: Commissioner McCreevy
announced recently that a legislative proposal will be put forward
this spring, although at a recent Conference organized by the
Commission, no significant policy indications emerged.


24. (SBU) Review of the Prospectus and Transparency Directives: In
an effort to improve and simplify the Prospectus and Transparency
directives, which concern disclosure to investors for investor
protection purposes, the Commission has recently launched a
consultation to gather stakeholder views on issues such as
disclosure requirements and exemptions. A legislative proposal
could follow before the summer break.


25. (SBU) Review of the Investor Compensation Schemes Directive:
Following recent legal disputes over liability for losses sustained
in the Madoff case, the Commission recently launched a call for
evidence on the application of the Investor Compensation Schemes
Directive in Member States with a view to propose greater
harmonization. This Directive's aim is to protect investors against
losses if a firm is unable to repay money, or return assets, held on
behalf of their clients.

-- Financial Supervision (Ref B)


26. (SBU) The main building block for the EU position on financial
markets regulation going into the London G-20 is the publication on
February 25 of the report of the High Level Group on cross-border
financial supervision, chaired by former IMF chief Jacques De
Larosiere. The De Larosiere report lays out a proposal for a
framework which includes a new regulatory agenda (reducing risk;
improving systemic shock absorbers; reducing pro-cyclicality),
stronger coordinated supervision (both macro-prudential and
micro-prudential),and effective crisis management. The key
recommendations include a revision of Basel II to reduce
pro-cyclicality, a reform of mark-to-market and of the IASB
governance, and an overhaul of the European macro and micro
financial supervision. The Commission on March 4 adopted

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legislative proposals that closely track the De Larosiere
recommendations; these will be discussed by Economic and Finance
Ministers on March 10 and deliberated further by Heads of State and
Government at the March 19-20 European Council.

Approach to the G-20
--------------


27. (SBU) The EU and its member states generally support the G-20
process, although the Europeans often have difficulty dealing with
events at which the EU as a whole but only some of the member states
are participants. The March European Council meeting will attempt
to agree on an overall EU approach to the April 2 G-20 Summit, which
will limit to a certain extent the freedom of initiative of any one
EU member state - including the UK as host. This explains to a
large extent the internal EU maneuvering surrounding the
preparations for the Summit, including the February 22 meeting in
Berlin that Chancellor Merkel called of the EU Heads of State and
Government who will attend the G-20 Summit. (Note: The Commission,
traditionally not represented in the G-20 Finance Ministers process,
participates in the G-20 leaders process and will use this to work
toward a common EU position. It represents the EU in some of the
G-20 working groups.)


26. (SBU) Indeed, at the February 22 meeting, the EU G-20 leaders
pledged the EU will speak with one voice in London, stressing in
particular the need to:

-- strengthen supervision and regulation of financial markets, hedge
funds and rating agencies;
-- revise Basel II to reduce pro-cyclicality;
-- reform mark-to-market requirements in international accounting
standards, and improve the governance of the IASB;
-- clamp down on tax havens with increased capital requirements for
off shore centers;
-- obligate banks to implement counter-cyclical measures and
limiting bonus payments;
-- create a sustainability charter, to reduce economic imbalances
and stabilize financial markets;
-- give a mandate to the IMF and the FSF to implement the financial
action plan; and
-- double the financial resources for the IMF.


27. (SBU) All these issues are being fleshed out in this week's
Economic and Finance Council (see septels) and will be endorsed by
the European Council at the end of next week.

Broader Impact on US-EU relations
--------------


28. (SBU) The depth and breadth of transatlantic economic ties has
traditionally been seen as the bedrock for the overall US-EU
relationship, but the financial crisis has created cracks in that
foundation. Many prominent EU leaders have publicly blamed lax
financial regulation in the United States for the economic collapse,
and indeed for some of the tensions that have developed within the
EU as a result. And they were quick to criticize the United States
for what they perceived as "protectionist tendencies" in the Buy
America provisions of the stimulus package, although that has died
down with our assurance that we would implement Buy America
consistent with our WTO and other international obligations.


29. (SBU) As such, we expect some vinegar from the EU
representatives at the London Summit, including Commission President
Barroso, who will be accompanied by Economic and Financial Affairs
Commission Almunia and, we expect, Internal Market and Financial
Regulation Commissioner McCreevy. McCreevy in particular has made
no bones about how the EU, as the world's largest economy, "has the
right to regulate the financial industries as we see fit," or so he

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told last December's Transatlantic Economic Council meeting.


30. (SBU) That said, the EU's position will be tempered by three
things: the overall popularity of the Obama Administration in
Europe, the need for the London Summit to be perceived as a success
to help restore investor and consumer confidence, and the tendency
of the experts in the Economic and Finance Committee, who are
working on the Commission's proposal, to be more pragmatic when
dealing with the substantive details.


31. (SBU) The overall desire of the Europeans to be seen as the new
Administration's primary partner in addressing global challenges
will be a major factor in constraining EU criticism at the London
Summit; they are all aware they will see the President directly
afterward at the NATO 60th Anniversary Summit and at his meeting
with the 27 EU Heads of State in Government in Prague. They want to
be helpful. But the economic downturn has had substantial effects
on all member state budgets, imposing unwished for constraints on
member states' ability to increase spending on such things as
defense capabilities or the EU and the member states to plus up
foreign assistance, where they are together the world's largest
donors. Nonetheless, they will want to continue to work with us,
and will try to find creative ways to do so.

MURRAY