BELGIAN VIEWS ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000250

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, PM AND ISN/MNSA
NVIE FOR IAEA
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION
USUN FOR POL
USNATO FOR POL
USEU FOR POL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA
IAEA, NPT, BE
SUBJECT: BELGIAN VIEWS ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

REF: STATE 6970

Classified By: Acting DCM Richard Eason, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Belgium's main objective for the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference is
making progress not only on non-proliferation but also
disarmament, showing concrete results. The GOB would like to
see the United States engage Iran on a bilateral basis. The
USG should abandon its "aggressive" stance in the NPT and
find the proper tone for advancing its arguments. It should
make every effort to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
before the 2010 Review Conference. Belgium wants the Review
Conference to reach a consensus, and fears that a second
failure will doom the NPT process. A successful outcome
would include clearer rules for failure to comply and
statements of rights and responsibilities of parties. It
would also advance disarmament with reductions in nuclear
weapons and implementation of the "thirteen practical steps."
Belgium supports "deepening" of sanctions on noncompliant
countries through more effective targeting of existing kinds
of sanctions. It believes sanctions can be effective in
changing Iran's behavior. It believes that non-members like
India and Pakistan can be drawn into the NPT through deals
like the recent U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement.
U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would
put pressure on other countries to ratify the agreement and
create a positive atmosphere for the 2010 Conference, it
says. Belgium is willing to continue diplomatic pressure on
Iran to give up uranium enrichment and reprocessing.
Creation of a multilateral fuel bank would be helpful in that
regard as well. Because of its own doubts about nuclear
power, Belgium is not eager to use the NPT to promote
peaceful development of nuclear power in other countries.
End Summary.


2. (C) On February 9, Poloff met with Werner Bauwens,
Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Office of
Non-Proliferation and Export Controls, to discuss the
questions raised reftel regarding the NPT review process.
Bauwens said that he was familiar with informal ideas on
nuclear non-proliferation coming out of Washington in recent
articles by experts such as Henry Kissinger and Max
Kampelman. He said that Belgium is eager for consultations
with Washington on NPT issues. Summarizing, Bauwens said
that Belgium seeks a results-oriented approach addressed to
both state and non-state actors. Progress in all areas
covered by the NPT is desirable. In addition, the root
causes of conflicts that generate non-proliferation concerns
should be considered as policy is formulated. Belgium will
help to create and support common EU positions to increase
Europe's impact on the process and will continue to promote
implementation of the EU's action plan based on its strategy
announced in 2003.


3. (C) On Iran, Bauwens said that a workable plan of action
is needed. Such a plan cannot include bombing, he said, but
must be based on diplomacy. He said that the Iranians should
be offered a dialog on regional security if they drop their
enrichment program. Additionally, the Iranians must be
pressured to stop their cooperation with terrorists. The
tools to accomplish these ends include both dialogue and
sanctions. Belgium is willing to support sanctions in both
the EU and UN contexts. It is also willing to support
sanctions implemented by the USG in coordination with those
bodies. Bauwens believes that sanctions have a reasonable
chance of success in Iran. While others in the EU are
reluctant to press forward with sanctions, Bauwens said
Belgian officials are ready to promote a consensus among EU
member states, which will be important to obtaining a
consensus in the UN. When Bauwens speaks about sanctions, he
prefers to talk about "deepening" them, rather than
"widening" them. In Bauwens's view, "widening sanctions is
too off-putting for some NPT signatories (such as Austria),
while "deepening" refers to ensuring that sanctions hit the
right entities and transactions, which is more palatable.
For example, although a bank may be named by the UNSC for
sanctions, it is necessary to target other banks to which
funds may be shifted after the first bank is publicly
identified.


4. (C) Bauwens applauded USG intentions to engage the

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government of Iran and said that Belgium welcomes an
EU/Belgium/USG dialogue on how to make that successful. He
offered the good offices of the Belgian Embassy in Teheran to
assist. Bauwens believes Iran can be influenced by a prudent
sanctions policy. The clerics in Iran have many commercial
interests that would be affected by sanctions, he said. The
focus should not be on regime change, however, because that
risks turning the whole population of Iran firmly against the
West. The regime will change as it realizes it is creating
problems for itself, he predicted. Bauwens mentioned that
Belgium has purchased air time on BBC broadcasts to Iran to
inform the population that the EU is not opposed to Iran's
article 4 right to develop peaceful nuclear power, and
therefore Iran is wasting resources on uranium enrichment.
He continued that Iranians are not well-informed and need to
know there is an alternative to Ahmadinejad's way.


5. (C) The NPT conference should establish clear rules about
the costs of non-compliance, a clear statement of rights and
responsibilities and their linkages to each other, and the
price of quitting the NPT when a country is in
non-compliance, Bauwens said. His advice to the USG is that
the U.S. and Belgium should stick together as we have for
years. We have the right approach, he said, and we need work
hard together to convince others of that. The USG needs to
remain consistent and formulate a new and effective
presentation of its policies. Before, NPT states saw the USG
as "overly aggressive", hurting not only the U.S. but the EU
as well, he said. It is a question of finding the right
tone, not a change of message, in Bauwens's opinion.


6. (C) Belgium sees a need to advance disarmament with
reductions and caps on strategic nuclear weapons. Attention
is also needed to tactical weapons in Europe, Bauwens said.
At the conference in 2010, the nuclear weapons states need to
show progress on disarmament to blunt arguments by
non-nuclear states that they do not need to give ground on
non-proliferation issues. Bauwens said that it is important
not to repeat the failure of 2005, and it is important to
reach agreement. A second failure could kill the entire NPT
process, he believes. He hopes the outcome will be something
concrete on disarmament, in fulfillment of the 2000 document
"Thirteen Practical Steps," little of which has been
implemented, he said.


7. (C) Bauwens said that Belgium will be pleased if the
United States ratifies the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
The U.S. should act before the NPT conference, Bauwens said,
because it would have a desirable, concrete and immediate
effect on the conference's atmospherics Other countries
which have not signed would come under "immense" pressure to
join the CTBT and will not have the USG's refusal to ratify
to hide behind.


8. (C) Bauwens would like to see an innovative approach to
achieve universality of the NPT. Besides the usual
diplomatic persuasion, he sees deals like the recent
U.S.-India agreement on nuclear cooperation as useful
guidance. Bauwens was impressed by political assurances
given by India in that agreement. Similar efforts could pay
off with Pakistan, he thinks, and move that country closer to
NPT membership. However, he thinks it is almost impossible
to convince Israel to join the NPT. Bauwens suggests that
getting countries to work toward signature of the Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty is a possible way to bring the
remaining non-members into the NPT.


9. (C) Belgium and the United States share the same policies
regarding safeguards and the IAEA additional protocol,
Bauwens said. Belgium has successfully developed its nuclear
energy sector under the additional protocol and finds the
process non-controversial. It is necessary to keep pressing
countries that have not yet signed to do so, he added. At
the same time, Bauwens says that it is not correct or helpful
to accuse countries that have not signed of supporting
proliferation. He also doubts that it will be possible to
make signing the additional protocol obligatory at the 2010
conference. Efforts should nonetheless be made to discourage
countries to opt for enrichment and reprocessing of uranium,
he said. He applauds the idea of establishing a multilateral
fuel bank that would guarantee that countries get the fuel
they need at market prices and at the time it is needed.

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Such a program would strengthen oversight of where nuclear
fuel is going, he said. Care must be taken that it does not
undermine the market for fuel and increase prices. A
blueprint for a global fuel bank exists in EURATOM, according
to Bauwens. Alternative proposals by Russia to supply
nuclear fuel worldwide are not acceptable to Bauwens. He
worries that they would create an even stronger Russia and
raise issues of strategic concern.


10. (C) Finally, Bauwens said that Belgium is concerned about
using the NPT to promote nuclear energy projects in the
world. Belgium itself is divided on nuclear power and has
not decided about expanding its own nuclear power sector.
BUSH
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