Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRUSSELS227
2009-02-18 10:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:
CENTCOM'S GEN. PETRAEUS MEETS WITH BELGIAN FOREIGN
how-toVZCZCXRO5301 OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW DE RUEHBS #0227/01 0491048 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 181048Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8591 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000227
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2029
TAGS: BE IR MARR MOPS PREL IQ
SUBJECT: CENTCOM'S GEN. PETRAEUS MEETS WITH BELGIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER DE GUCHT
Classified By: CHG WAYNE BUSH, REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000227
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2029
TAGS: BE IR MARR MOPS PREL IQ
SUBJECT: CENTCOM'S GEN. PETRAEUS MEETS WITH BELGIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER DE GUCHT
Classified By: CHG WAYNE BUSH, REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: CENTCOM Commander David
Petraeus gave Belgium's Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht a
tour d'horizon of political-military challenges in the
CENTCOM AOR, engaging De Gucht on Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Petraeus contrasted the situation in Iraq with
that in Afghanistan, noting that trends in Afghanistan were
moving in the wrong direction, and that prevailing in
Afghanistan, as NATO must, would require a sustained
military, civilian, and economic development commitment. De
Gucht was very interested in Petraeus' assessment of
Afghanistan and noted that he had met most of the leaders in
the region surrounding Afghanistan, including those of Iran.
De Gucht said he did not trust Iran's leaders but felt there
was popular support among Iranians for Iran's nuclear
program. Petraeus concurred with many of De Gucht's
assessments of regional leaders and of the challenges ahead.
Visits such as that of Petraeus are invaluable in building
political capital with the Belgians, and to the Embassy's
efforts to press for greater Belgian support for the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and
our policies and initiatives in the Middle East, South Asia,
and beyond. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) During a meeting on February 12, visiting CENTCOM
Commander David Petraeus told Belgium's Foreign Minister
Karel De Gucht that Afghanistan and Pakistan present
difficult challenges. He noted that Iraq had been extremely
challenging in 2006 but is now "vastly better" than it was.
He judged the recent Iraq elections were successful from both
a security perspective and in terms of the outcome. The
level of attacks had dropped from 180 attacks/day in mid-2007
to only 10/day now, including criminal activity and tribal
justice. There were still elements of Al Qaida and Sunni
extremists and elements of Iran-supported militias operating
in Iraq, but he noted the Jaysh Al-Mahdi had been defeated in
April 2008. In response to De Gucht's inquiry, Petraeus
explained the successful tactics of the March-April 2008
Battle of Sadr City that caused the leadership of the Jaysh
Al-Mahdi to flee, primarily to Iran. When asked whether
there had been progress in developing the Iraqi Army,
Petraeus said the Army was greatly improved and the Iraqi
Special Forces were the best in the region. There are now
over 600,000 Iraqi security forces.
3. (C) Petraeus said car bombs and suicide vest attacks
remain a concern in Iraq but their numbers have dropped
substantially as have the numbers of civilian deaths.
Nevertheless, the situation is Iraq is still fragile: Al
Qaeda in Iraq is down but has not given up and there are
still malign influences from Iran in the country. However,
elections are well under way, with provincial elections
completed and district and federal elections coming over the
next year. He offered that Iraqi President Al-Maliki
deserves a lot of credit for the progress.
4. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Petraeus said that the
campaign there would have to be done differently than in Iraq
but that the principles were the same as had animated the
surge. He described how key counterinsurgency concepts,
particularly that of protecting and serving the people,
should be operationalized in Afghanistan with the additional
forces--NATO must be seen as helping the Afghan people and as
a guest in the country. Unlike in Iraq, he noted, the
security trends in Afghanistan are spiraling in a negative
direction. In 2008, violence there worsened, although still
at a level generally lower scale than that until recently in
Iraq. Growth in the Afghan National Army has been slow.
Afghan President Karzai does not have the same level of
central control over his country as does the government in
Iraq. Karzai does, nonetheless, have gravitas, presence, and
is well-educated. Outsiders also cannot overlook the
progress in health care, education, and roads. Also, the
narco-economy went down in 2008, and 70% of attacks occurred
in 10% of the districts, mainly in the south and east of the
country. Petraeus thanked De Gucht for Belgium's deployment
of an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) to
Afghanistan.
5. (C) Turning to the tribal areas in Pakistan, De Gucht
noted that a Belgian citizen had been kidnapped in
BRUSSELS 00000227 002 OF 003
Baluchistan in 2007 but that the Belgians had negotiated his
release without paying a ransom and had been helped by the
Iranian government. De Gucht believed that much of
Afghanistan's opium production goes to Iran and that Europe,
the U.S., and Iran have a shared interest in eliminating that
trade. However, our targets should be the factories and
traffickers, not the peasants and small growers. Petraeus
acknowledged that there are shared interests with Iran as the
Iranians also do not want the Taliban to rule in Afghanistan
again.
6. (C) De Gucht, however, said he had doubts about a
regional approach to the problems in Afghanistan. He had met
Afghan President Karzai several times and found him
"erratic." Petraeus replied that a regional approach means
that there will not be progress in Afghanistan until there is
also progress in Pakistan. De Gucht then asked why the U.S.
had "let Musharaf fall." Petraeus stressed that Pakistan now
has a popularly-elected government which is still young but
gathering itself. Musharaf had made some efforts to gain
control over the tribal regions, but they were insufficient
and, as a a result, Musharaf had resorted to cutting too many
deals that allowed the extremists to expand into the settled
areas of Pakistan. The attacks in Mumbai also have had a
very negative impact on Pakistan as they drew Pakistani
focus, both military and diplomatic, away from Afghanistan
and back toward the more comfortable position of taking an
adversarial approach to India. Petraeus stressed that
Pakistan's position is made more difficult by the fact that
50% of its population is below the poverty line.
Nevertheless, Pakistani President Zardari has done better
than was expected: he has established himself and sidelined a
popular leader, Nawaz Sharif. When De Gucht said he saw
Zardari as a puppet, Petraeus responded that Zardari had
sacked his national security advisor and is asserting
himself. Petraeus added that the West must make a
substantial, sustained commitment to support Pakistan. The
West must also continue to pay attention to Central Asia and
find common ground with Russia, especially over the shared
challenges of extremism and the flow of illegal narcotics.
7. (C) With regard to Iran, De Gucht said he had met
Iranian Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani. Noting a
difference between Larijani's cleared, vetted public
statements, and his private conversations, De Gucht assessed
that Larijani is more moderate than other Iranian leaders and
is intelligent although there are, in effect, "no moderates
in Iran." However, he did think that Larijani had been
ousted for being too moderate but that he continues to become
more realistic over time. De Gucht said that Iran also has
common interests with the West with regard to narcotics. But
Iran continues to struggle with finding a balance to pursue
these common goals while continuing to make life harder for
the U.S. in the region.
8. (C) De Gucht believes that Iran will never give up its
nuclear weapons program. It is a regional power and both
Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons. He believes there
is broad popular support in Iran for the nuclear program.
Yet, he added, Iran remains an amazing place, an Islamic
state where only 5% of the population actually goes to the
mosque regularly.
9. (C) De Gucht returned to the issue of Afghanistan,
noting that it is not easy to find something to replace the
income from narcotics. He was in Kunduz a year ago visiting
the German PRT there and had been dismayed that at the 3,000
student girls' school there, all the students were wearing
chadors and birqas. Petraeus asserted that it remained vital
that Afghanistan not become a transit route for international
extremists again, and some crops such as wheat and
pomegranate may be viable alternatives to the poppy.
10. (C) De Gucht cautioned that the West should not
underestimate the tribal basis of the society in Afghanistan.
He asserted that the majority of the insurgency is Pashtun
but they are under-represented in government. The division
of power between the communities in Afghanistan must be
revisited. Petraeus agreed, saying the U.S. had a
clear-eyed view of the task ahead and was aware that it would
not be cheap, easy or quick. He noted that Iraq had been
hard too.
BRUSSELS 00000227 003 OF 003
11. (C) De Gucht said that the Afghan National Army must
also be strengthened and that the ANA soldiers must be paid
more than what the Taliban pays. Controlling the narcotics
trade and the borders are also crucial. De Gucht said that
Belgium supports a project focused on Iran's borders and that
the OSCE is carrying out similar projects in Tajikistan.
Europe's concern is that the drug trade from Afghanistan to
Europe passes through Iran. Petraeus concluded the meeting
by stressing that Belgium can be proud of what its soldiers
and airmen are doing in Afghanistan.
12. (C) COMMENT: Over the past year, there has been a sea
change in Belgian policies regarding Afghanistan. Belgium
has increased its military presence in the country and
deployed an OMLT and 4 F-16s. The Belgians are debating
sending another OMLT and perhaps participating in a PRT, all
this despite severe budget restrictions affecting the defense
budget in Belgium. The Belgians have also just lifted their
objections to expansion of the Afghan National Army trust
fund, an objection which had been based on fear of the
budgetary impact of such an agreement. This visit has helped
post build substantial good will with the Belgians and should
pay dividends down the road. Post hopes to continue to have
similar high-level exchanges in the coming months.
BUSH
.
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2029
TAGS: BE IR MARR MOPS PREL IQ
SUBJECT: CENTCOM'S GEN. PETRAEUS MEETS WITH BELGIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER DE GUCHT
Classified By: CHG WAYNE BUSH, REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: CENTCOM Commander David
Petraeus gave Belgium's Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht a
tour d'horizon of political-military challenges in the
CENTCOM AOR, engaging De Gucht on Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Petraeus contrasted the situation in Iraq with
that in Afghanistan, noting that trends in Afghanistan were
moving in the wrong direction, and that prevailing in
Afghanistan, as NATO must, would require a sustained
military, civilian, and economic development commitment. De
Gucht was very interested in Petraeus' assessment of
Afghanistan and noted that he had met most of the leaders in
the region surrounding Afghanistan, including those of Iran.
De Gucht said he did not trust Iran's leaders but felt there
was popular support among Iranians for Iran's nuclear
program. Petraeus concurred with many of De Gucht's
assessments of regional leaders and of the challenges ahead.
Visits such as that of Petraeus are invaluable in building
political capital with the Belgians, and to the Embassy's
efforts to press for greater Belgian support for the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and
our policies and initiatives in the Middle East, South Asia,
and beyond. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) During a meeting on February 12, visiting CENTCOM
Commander David Petraeus told Belgium's Foreign Minister
Karel De Gucht that Afghanistan and Pakistan present
difficult challenges. He noted that Iraq had been extremely
challenging in 2006 but is now "vastly better" than it was.
He judged the recent Iraq elections were successful from both
a security perspective and in terms of the outcome. The
level of attacks had dropped from 180 attacks/day in mid-2007
to only 10/day now, including criminal activity and tribal
justice. There were still elements of Al Qaida and Sunni
extremists and elements of Iran-supported militias operating
in Iraq, but he noted the Jaysh Al-Mahdi had been defeated in
April 2008. In response to De Gucht's inquiry, Petraeus
explained the successful tactics of the March-April 2008
Battle of Sadr City that caused the leadership of the Jaysh
Al-Mahdi to flee, primarily to Iran. When asked whether
there had been progress in developing the Iraqi Army,
Petraeus said the Army was greatly improved and the Iraqi
Special Forces were the best in the region. There are now
over 600,000 Iraqi security forces.
3. (C) Petraeus said car bombs and suicide vest attacks
remain a concern in Iraq but their numbers have dropped
substantially as have the numbers of civilian deaths.
Nevertheless, the situation is Iraq is still fragile: Al
Qaeda in Iraq is down but has not given up and there are
still malign influences from Iran in the country. However,
elections are well under way, with provincial elections
completed and district and federal elections coming over the
next year. He offered that Iraqi President Al-Maliki
deserves a lot of credit for the progress.
4. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Petraeus said that the
campaign there would have to be done differently than in Iraq
but that the principles were the same as had animated the
surge. He described how key counterinsurgency concepts,
particularly that of protecting and serving the people,
should be operationalized in Afghanistan with the additional
forces--NATO must be seen as helping the Afghan people and as
a guest in the country. Unlike in Iraq, he noted, the
security trends in Afghanistan are spiraling in a negative
direction. In 2008, violence there worsened, although still
at a level generally lower scale than that until recently in
Iraq. Growth in the Afghan National Army has been slow.
Afghan President Karzai does not have the same level of
central control over his country as does the government in
Iraq. Karzai does, nonetheless, have gravitas, presence, and
is well-educated. Outsiders also cannot overlook the
progress in health care, education, and roads. Also, the
narco-economy went down in 2008, and 70% of attacks occurred
in 10% of the districts, mainly in the south and east of the
country. Petraeus thanked De Gucht for Belgium's deployment
of an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) to
Afghanistan.
5. (C) Turning to the tribal areas in Pakistan, De Gucht
noted that a Belgian citizen had been kidnapped in
BRUSSELS 00000227 002 OF 003
Baluchistan in 2007 but that the Belgians had negotiated his
release without paying a ransom and had been helped by the
Iranian government. De Gucht believed that much of
Afghanistan's opium production goes to Iran and that Europe,
the U.S., and Iran have a shared interest in eliminating that
trade. However, our targets should be the factories and
traffickers, not the peasants and small growers. Petraeus
acknowledged that there are shared interests with Iran as the
Iranians also do not want the Taliban to rule in Afghanistan
again.
6. (C) De Gucht, however, said he had doubts about a
regional approach to the problems in Afghanistan. He had met
Afghan President Karzai several times and found him
"erratic." Petraeus replied that a regional approach means
that there will not be progress in Afghanistan until there is
also progress in Pakistan. De Gucht then asked why the U.S.
had "let Musharaf fall." Petraeus stressed that Pakistan now
has a popularly-elected government which is still young but
gathering itself. Musharaf had made some efforts to gain
control over the tribal regions, but they were insufficient
and, as a a result, Musharaf had resorted to cutting too many
deals that allowed the extremists to expand into the settled
areas of Pakistan. The attacks in Mumbai also have had a
very negative impact on Pakistan as they drew Pakistani
focus, both military and diplomatic, away from Afghanistan
and back toward the more comfortable position of taking an
adversarial approach to India. Petraeus stressed that
Pakistan's position is made more difficult by the fact that
50% of its population is below the poverty line.
Nevertheless, Pakistani President Zardari has done better
than was expected: he has established himself and sidelined a
popular leader, Nawaz Sharif. When De Gucht said he saw
Zardari as a puppet, Petraeus responded that Zardari had
sacked his national security advisor and is asserting
himself. Petraeus added that the West must make a
substantial, sustained commitment to support Pakistan. The
West must also continue to pay attention to Central Asia and
find common ground with Russia, especially over the shared
challenges of extremism and the flow of illegal narcotics.
7. (C) With regard to Iran, De Gucht said he had met
Iranian Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani. Noting a
difference between Larijani's cleared, vetted public
statements, and his private conversations, De Gucht assessed
that Larijani is more moderate than other Iranian leaders and
is intelligent although there are, in effect, "no moderates
in Iran." However, he did think that Larijani had been
ousted for being too moderate but that he continues to become
more realistic over time. De Gucht said that Iran also has
common interests with the West with regard to narcotics. But
Iran continues to struggle with finding a balance to pursue
these common goals while continuing to make life harder for
the U.S. in the region.
8. (C) De Gucht believes that Iran will never give up its
nuclear weapons program. It is a regional power and both
Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons. He believes there
is broad popular support in Iran for the nuclear program.
Yet, he added, Iran remains an amazing place, an Islamic
state where only 5% of the population actually goes to the
mosque regularly.
9. (C) De Gucht returned to the issue of Afghanistan,
noting that it is not easy to find something to replace the
income from narcotics. He was in Kunduz a year ago visiting
the German PRT there and had been dismayed that at the 3,000
student girls' school there, all the students were wearing
chadors and birqas. Petraeus asserted that it remained vital
that Afghanistan not become a transit route for international
extremists again, and some crops such as wheat and
pomegranate may be viable alternatives to the poppy.
10. (C) De Gucht cautioned that the West should not
underestimate the tribal basis of the society in Afghanistan.
He asserted that the majority of the insurgency is Pashtun
but they are under-represented in government. The division
of power between the communities in Afghanistan must be
revisited. Petraeus agreed, saying the U.S. had a
clear-eyed view of the task ahead and was aware that it would
not be cheap, easy or quick. He noted that Iraq had been
hard too.
BRUSSELS 00000227 003 OF 003
11. (C) De Gucht said that the Afghan National Army must
also be strengthened and that the ANA soldiers must be paid
more than what the Taliban pays. Controlling the narcotics
trade and the borders are also crucial. De Gucht said that
Belgium supports a project focused on Iran's borders and that
the OSCE is carrying out similar projects in Tajikistan.
Europe's concern is that the drug trade from Afghanistan to
Europe passes through Iran. Petraeus concluded the meeting
by stressing that Belgium can be proud of what its soldiers
and airmen are doing in Afghanistan.
12. (C) COMMENT: Over the past year, there has been a sea
change in Belgian policies regarding Afghanistan. Belgium
has increased its military presence in the country and
deployed an OMLT and 4 F-16s. The Belgians are debating
sending another OMLT and perhaps participating in a PRT, all
this despite severe budget restrictions affecting the defense
budget in Belgium. The Belgians have also just lifted their
objections to expansion of the Afghan National Army trust
fund, an objection which had been based on fear of the
budgetary impact of such an agreement. This visit has helped
post build substantial good will with the Belgians and should
pay dividends down the road. Post hopes to continue to have
similar high-level exchanges in the coming months.
BUSH
.