Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRUSSELS205
2009-02-12 19:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

IRAN: FEBRUARY 6 EU DEBATE ON SANCTIONS AND U.S.

Tags:  PREL KNNC ETTC ETRD EFIN IR EUN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0519
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #0205/01 0431904
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121904Z FEB 09
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000205 

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR P, ISN, EUR/ERA, EEB, AND NEA/IRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: PREL KNNC ETTC ETRD EFIN IR EUN
SUBJECT: IRAN: FEBRUARY 6 EU DEBATE ON SANCTIONS AND U.S.
POLICY

REF: BRUSSELS 174

Classified By: Chris Davis, USEU Polmincouns for reasons 1.5(d) and (e)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000205

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR P, ISN, EUR/ERA, EEB, AND NEA/IRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: PREL KNNC ETTC ETRD EFIN IR EUN
SUBJECT: IRAN: FEBRUARY 6 EU DEBATE ON SANCTIONS AND U.S.
POLICY

REF: BRUSSELS 174

Classified By: Chris Davis, USEU Polmincouns for reasons 1.5(d) and (e)


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: On February 6, EU Political
and Security Council Ambassadors debated next steps on Iran
policy. Council Secretariat DirGen Robert Cooper briefed
the EU-27 on the P5 1 meeting earlier in the week. Given
U.S. reaffirmation of the dual-track policy and the fact of
the P5 1 consultation, Cooper believed new U.S. policy would
not be completely reinvented from scratch. He encouraged
member states to prepare to act to further reinforce the
dual-track approach. While the PSC viewed positively the
U.S. willingness to engage directly with Iran, some believed
US engagement could lead to an Iranian perception of the U.S.
"good cop" to the EU's "bad cop." Smaller EU member states
opposed moving forward on new EU autonomous designations of
Iranian entities and individuals until the U.S. completed its
policy review and made its sanctions policy known to the
EU-27. Neither Cooper nor EU-3 members (UK, GR, FR) pushed
back on this point.

2.(C/NF) Privately, several member state contacts have
relayed concerns to Poloff about the difficulty of gaining
EU-wide consensus for EU action on existing sanctions (such
as new designations under relevant UNSCRs) in the absence of
a clear signal of interest from the USG to the EU-27 to do
so. Based on our informal soundings in EU corridors, there
remains strong support for information-sharing on sanctions
(including recent U.S. designations). The Czechs have also
told us that they would be interested in placing Iran on the
agenda of the March 16 GAERC or, more likely, March 27-28
Gymnich should the U.S. policy review be completed by late
March. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

P5 1 Debrief
--------------

3. (C) On February 9 and 10, three friendly EU member states
provided detailed read-outs of the February 6 EU-27 Political
and Security Council (PSC) Ambassadors debate on Iran policy.
Topics included the P5 1 consultation, the U.S. policy

review process, and Iranian proliferation-related and
political developments. Robert Cooper, Council Secretariat
Director General (and Deputy to High Rep Solana on Iran
nuclear negotiations) briefed the PSC on P5 1 consultations
held in Wiesbaden, Germany February 3-4. Cooper indicated
that the participation of U/S Bill Burns in the meeting
signaled U.S. interest in continuing the P5 1 process and the
double track policy. Consequently, Cooper said he believed
the U.S. Administration's policy review on Iran would not
lead to an entirely new USG policy. U.S. thinking seemed to
be heading toward a "bigger carrot, bigger stick" approach,
which would mean a real dialogue with Iran with the
possibility of real pressure. Cooper thought the U.S. would
be using the existing framework and that they would want to
see others invest more in this framework, including
especially Russia and China.

4.(C) In response to questions from Italy and the
Netherlands, Cooper noted that for China and Russia, the
question of how far and fast we go on each track was still
problematic. Russia seemed not to have changed its attitude,
whereas China seemed to be taking into account a change in
the U.S. approach. Cooper also stressed the importance of
the fact that Iran's neighbors in the Gulf were uncomfortable
about Iran's evolution.

An "Important" Year
--------------

5. (C) Cooper also updated member states on developments in
Iran's nuclear program. The next IAEA report was due on
February 20 and it should state that Iran's production of low
enriched uranium had currently reached 700 kg (500 kg before
the end of December 2008). Iran seemed, therefore, to be
enriching at a very quick pace. Cooper pointed out that
Russia and China expressed diverging views from other members
of the P5 1 on the military aspects of the Iranian program.
In any case, the level of cooperation between Iran and the
IAEA had reached a new low; e.g., Iran had stopped answering
inquires and was refusing access to certain cites. These
developments, taken together with the new U.S. administration
and upcoming Iranian elections made it an "important year"
for Iran. Cooper pointed out that while Iranian elections
were important, they should not be a reason for the EU to do
nothing. While the EU's preference for sanctions within the
UN framework was well-understood, Cooper stressed that the EU
should prepare itself to look at other options, such as
strengthening its own (autonomous) sanctions. He encouraged

BRUSSELS 00000205 002 OF 002


the Council to be in a "state of readiness to act."

U.S. Policy Review: The Impact of Timing
--------------

6. (C/NF) Cooper told EU-27 member states that the U.S.
policy review would take "a couple of months" and he did not
expect the EU to move much until the U.S. review was
completed. Several smaller EU member states opposed moving
forward on new EU autonomous designations of Iranian entities
and individuals until the U.S. completed its policy review
and made its sanctions policy known to the EU-27. None of
the EU-3 states (UK, GR, FR) pushed back on this point. On
February 11, the UK PSC delegation maintained to us privately
that the FCO was taking the position that there would be no
further EU moves on sanctions during the U.S. policy review.
On February 10, a French contact told us he was surprised by
Cooper's comment on the U.S. review timeline. France had
understood that the review process would take four to six
weeks -- shorter than Cooper's indication to the EU. A Dutch
and French colleagues agreed that the difference of even a
few weeks could be significant as it would affect the Czech
Presidency decision (and EU member states' support for) a
Ministerial debate in March.

EU Members' Concerns
--------------
7.(C) Many member states, including Germany, the UK, and
France, stressed what they agree is te positive fact of U.S.
willingness to engge directly with Iran. On the other hand,
soe member states, including Germany, France, the K and
Portugal, recognized that the EU could be perceived as the
bad cop and the USG as the good cop. In this sense, France
noted the risk that the new positive U.S. approach could be
used by Iran against the EU. It was incumbent upon the EU,
therefore, to stress the dual character of its approach. The
UK also spoke of the need for a "symmetric" dual track.
Germany underscored the importance of showing EU willingness
to envisage further sanctions. Cooper disputed the
over-simplified "good cop" portrayal of the United States,
pointing out that the USG had no relations with Iran at all.
Furthermore, it was possible for the USG to engage Iran
without necessarily playing "the good cop" role. Sweden and
the Netherlands highlighted the need to discuss Iran in a
wider context, including Afghanistan (Sweden) and MEPP
(Netherlands). Denmark wondered aloud about the state of
play concerning the "freeze for freeze" initiative. The
EU-3, Italy, and Hungary underlined the urgency of the
Iranian issue throughout the discussion.
MURRAY
.