BELGIUM: SECURITY EXERCISE TESTS POLICE RESPONSE

S E C R E T BRUSSELS 001725

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/NESS: JMENTZ AND DFENSTERMACHER
DOE/NNSA/NA-243 FOR MELISSA KRUPA

E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 12/09/2019
TAGS: ENRG KNNP TRGY TPHY EUN BE
SUBJECT: BELGIUM: SECURITY EXERCISE TESTS POLICE RESPONSE
TO MOCK ATTACK AT BR-2 NUCLEAR RESEARCH REACTOR

REF: A: STATE 65457

Classified By: ACTING DCM Richard EASON, reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (U) Information in paragraph 4 about the Belgian Design
Basis Threat for the BR-2 nuclear research reactor is
classified SECRET by Belgian authorities, and is transmitted
here to respect that level of classification.

SUMMARY
--------------


2. (SBU) Belgian local and federal police and officials
from the country,s nuclear research center (SCK-CEN)
successfully carried out an exercise on December 3 to test
the local police's ability to respond to an attack on the
country,s nuclear research reactor BR-2, and 'freeze' the
situation, thereby preventing the unauthorized removal of the
nuclear material (highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel rods).
An Embassy officer was invited to observe, along with
officials from the nuclear regulatory agency (FANC),federal
police, and an agent from the Belgian police CGSU--the
special forces unit which would be called upon to respond to
an attack. The exercise, the result of months of planning by
Belgian officials representing various government and law
enforcement agencies, was designed as part of an on-going
Belgian response to recommendation G (reftel) of the U.S.
physical protection team that visited the BR-2 reactor in
May, 2009. In embassy's view, the exercise came off as
well-organized, with 13 armed police units responding to
quickly to ring the facility to "freeze" the situation --
keeping the attackers within and being on the alert for
reinforcements from without. While this exercise was not
planned to have a CGSU unit respond, the agent said first
responders could arrive as early as 25 to 40 minutes
following notification. A police helicopter was alerted as
part of the exercise and reported that it could fly to SCK in
approximately 24 minutes, but did not actually fly to the
reactor site.


3. (SBU) Summary continued: Following the exercise, a FANC
security official indicated that the police arrived in
sufficient time to contain the attackers, according to the
Path Delay Timeline (i.e., the amount of time it is assumed
that attackers would take to reach their goal, calculated
step by step as they work through barriers) that had been
developed by police, SCK and CGSU leading up to the exercise.
FANC, police and SCK believed improvements could be made,
however, and FANC, the overall coordinator of the exercise,
has asked all participating agencies to draw up
recommendations for lessons learned, and suggested
improvements. In Embassy's view, Belgian authorities have
made substantial progress since the May 2009 visit in taking
a good plan on paper and testing police response times, as
well as in creating administrative and communication support
that will enable the GOB to continue to improve physical
security at the BR-2 reactor in the months and years to come.
The nuclear regulator, FANC, has emerged as an important
coordinator of the GOB response, something that was not so
clearly defined in May 2009, and has shown strong commitment
to continue to strengthen coordination of the various
entities providing security to BR-2, and clearly sees the
physical security of the HEU as a continuous ongoing goal and
not something that can be set aside following the result of a
particular exercise or exercises. Thanks to the constructive
and positive relationship created with Belgian officials by
the U.S. physical protection team during the U.S. visit in
May, the Embassy considers the current state of physical
security at BR-2 to be stronger than it has ever been since
U.S. teams first began evaluations in 2003. End summary.

Exercise 'Archibald': Basic Elements
--------------


4. (S/REL BELGIUM) The exercise, designed to test SCK,s
security procedures, communications between SCK and police,
and the police response, started at 10 a.m. on Thursday,
December 3. For purposes of the exercise, it was assumed
that an attack occurred shortly before midnight on a Saturday
night was made by a team of assailants equipped according to
assumptions of the draft design-basis threat (DBT) which
Belgium expects to make official soon. Five attackers were
assumed to arrive in a 4x4 vehicle, armed with rifles and
carrying a sufficient amount of explosives to allow them to
enter into the inner area where the fuel rods are stored.
For purposes of the exercise, no vehicle was used, and two
role players were attackers, mainly involved in triggered an
alarm, one by going over the first of two fences on the
southwest section that ring the facility, the second by

staging a mock explosive device (it emitted smoke) on an
outer door of the BR-2 building. It was then assumed that
the five intruders continued towards the area where the HEU
fuel rods are stored, through an emergency exit airlock.


5. (SBU) The guard at the BR-2 noticed the initial intrusion
over the fence, alerting other SCK guard centers (four in
all) and local police by pushing a 'silent alarm' button that
also automatically locked all access points into BR-2. An
audio alarm alerted the guard, and video cameras on the
closed circuit system moved in response to the attacker,s
movements and zoomed in; these systems appeared to work as
designed (confirmed by authorities during the debrief). The
guard spoke loudly and clearly, first indicating simply that
he saw intruders at the fence wearing backpacks, possibly
armed. Shortly after the first attacker went over the fence
(with the aid of a ladder),a second attacker 'exploded' a
device to gain entry into the BR-2 building; the guard was
alerted to the smoke on his video screen and alerted the SCK
guards and police (note: once the guard hit the silent alarm,
the local police were able to hear everything said
subsequently. End note.) For safety reasons this
attacker, did not scale the second fence with concertina
wire. Once the local guard initially triggered the alarm,
the regional police dispatching service in Antwerp ("CIC")
was automatically notified and responded within one to two
minutes and began moving vehicles to the facility.


6. (SBU) After observing the initial alarm and subsequent
explosion, and the local guard,s responses, embassy and
FANC and SCK observers verified that doors and the regular
entry/exits into the building were locked (at one point, an
SCK employee not involved in the exercise came to the entry
system but could not gain entry, and another employee also
not part of the exercise but inside the building was not
allowed by the system to leave). Observers were then taken
inside BR-2 to one of the airlock entrances to the interior
of the reactor, and shown that that system also would deny
entry (by a SCK employee who had access normally but was
denied).


7. (SBU) Observers then went to the guard station at the
main entry gate to SCK at approximately 10:20 a.m., where
local police officers had already gathered and were
communicating with the CIC dispatcher and with the police
vehicles that were arriving at the 13 checkpoints that had
been identified before the exercise took place as being
critical checkpoints or observation points, based on input
from SCK, local police, and the CGSU. About 6 to 8 senior
police officers were already in place and communicating via
walkie-talkie with CIC Antwerp and arriving police cars going
to their 13 pre-planned checkpoints around the several
kilometers of road that ring SCK; the CGSU commando was also
there and observing. There were a great number of well-armed
police officers posted outside the main entrance (which was
shut down). In addition, the police had a mobile
command/communication vehicle (a very large van with
telecommunications equipment and extra seating space) ready
to be used as needed, although it was not used during the
exercise itself except to give a briefing to the exercise
observers. Some police officers had arrived in 8 to 10
minutes. Police were using maps and speaking on
walkie-talkies. Communication seemed organized. The local
police chief had alerted the mayor,s office very early on
after hearing an incident was taking place at BR-2.


8. (SBU) A SCK security official involved in the exercise
arrived in about 20 minutes (the amount of time it had been
previously determined it would have taken him to arrive from
his home) and began his role of passing information provided
by SCK guards to the police officials at the main entrance.
An additional SCK employee knowledgeable of the layout and
the possible radiation risks of the nuclear research facility
arrived in just over 20 minutes, called in to escort police
and/or CGSU special forces inside the facility in the event
needed. FANC informed the embassy observer that a police
helicopter was alerted shortly after the initial alarm by the
regional police center at CIC Antwerp and would have arrived
at the site in approximately 24 minutes of being notified.
The helicopter,s mission would be reconnaissance -- tracking
movements of the attackers should they have exited SCK, or of
any suspicious vehicles moving towards SCK, and the like.


9. (SBU) According to the CGSU representative, the first
CGSU agent/s could arrive at the facility in approximately 25
to 40 minutes, via road from Antwerp, with others to follow
via helicopter from either Antwerp, Ghent, or Brussels. CGSU
units train for crisis situations, including hostage-taking,
the CGSU agent said, and are trained and prepared to react

quickly to events and could respond to one at BR-2. (Note:
CGSU was involved in the planning of the Path Delay Timeline,
the December 3 exercise, and in the preparation of the
table-top exercise that preceded the December 3 event. End
note.)


10. (SBU) The police and observers then left the Main
Entrance to see the police units at the 13 pre-determined
strategic points around SCK that CGSU and police had
determined before the exercise as best for either observation
of the facility by police or deterring any unauthorized
incoming or outgoing vehicles. Each police car had at least
two agents, armed (with what appeared to be automatic or
semi-automatic weapons),and each also had devices to throw
across the road to puncture tires in the event an
unauthorized car attempted to enter or exit SCK grounds.
Vehicles were at locations where they could easily block
traffic in either direction. Police also monitored the BR-2
facility, as well as a bridge and a canal in the event the
attackers tried to get away via boat; a locked gate barred
passage under the bridge, and a police car was located just
outside the bridge, in the event a boat nonetheless somehow
made it through or a boat attempted to arrive from the
outside trying to go in. Once the observers saw all 13
units, the exercise was ended and participants and observers
returned to a room at SCK that was the designated operations
center for a debriefing.

DEBRIEFING
--------------


11. (SBU) In the debriefing, the local police chief indicated
that although he was overall basically satisfied with the
response of police vehicles/forces, he believed it possible
through improved communication to gain some more time in
bringing police assets to the SCK site. One policeman
reiterated that the police understood full well the critical
importance of responding/arriving quickly to SCK, under the
assumption that intruders would move fast to get inside BR-2.
(Note: in creating their projected Path Delay Time, officials
told embassy observer that they have added certain
unspecified features to increase the delay times, but are
continuing to evaluate additional actions to take to create
additional delays. End note). The federal police crisis
planner (a briefer to the U.S. team in May) said he thought
that local police did a good job in taking positions in an
organized and timely manner to 'freeze' the situation until
CGSU agents would arrive. FANC pointed out that based on how
the situation might develop, the CIC dispatcher in Antwerp
would be able to send more police units to SCK as needed,
having specialized software and information available to
track police resources and movements throughout the immediate
area and the region (including bringing reinforcements to
maintain public order to places where existing police had
been summoned to SCK). Embassy observer was told that police
vehicles coming to the BR-2 as part of the exercise for
public safety reasons observed regular traffic safety
precautions (i.e., did not drive at high-speed with sirens),
and that therefore some of the units would have been able to
get to the area even faster.


12. (SBU) A SCK security official indicated that the
facility's technical alarm, cameras and guards also appeared
to function well during the exercise. SCK will nonetheless
be studying possibilities of improvements based on a more
in-depth analysis of the equipment and guard responses to
take place following the exercise. (Note: FANC indicated
that all entities involved in the exercise will be preparing
reports and analysis of their participation to share and/or
submit to FANC. End note.) The SCK secuity official
involved in the exercise said once he was notified that an
incident was occurring, he had immediately called the SCK
Director General and FANC security (this was verified by both
FANC and the DG). FANC in turn verified that as part of the
exercise its safety and security departments were also
notified of an incident and put on alert (to deal with
possible of public health issues/response in the event of a
radiation-causing incident). The CSGU representative added
that he thought police did a good job of sharing
intelligence, specifically in informing that a dirty bomb
could be created if rods put in contact with water. While
this exercise was not designed to have hostages or sabotage,
he said CGSU was equipped to deal with those issues; SCK has
a system to identify the location of employees inside BR-2.
He said CGSU participation in designing the Path Delay Time,
in a table top exercise that preceded exercise Archibald, and
in the December 3 exercise itself would improve the ability
of the CGSU to respond to a threat to the facility, and
improve the response of the police (for example, in

determining where police units should go to secure the
perimeter of SCK).

Next Steps
--------------


13. (SBU) In a meeting with the embassy observer in the days
following the exercise, a FANC official indicated that the
agency has tasked SCK with drafting a follow-up report with
details on the various parts of the exercise. Each
participating agency, including the police force, is being
asked to provide recommendations for improvement. FANC has
also asked SCK to address the status of any open
recommendations from the U.S. recommendations following the
May 2009 visit, as well as from the table-top exercise from
Fall 2009.


14. (SBU) FANC will continue to focus on implementation of
further actions to increase delay times. FANC will also plan
additional exercises with SCK, and will work with CGSU
regarding involvement by the police special forces unit in an
exercise at BR-2 in 2010 or 2011.


15. SCK Director General Eric Van Walle indicated that in
2010 SCK plans to hold a high-level security seminar in which
the Prime Minister would be expected to take part, SCK having
already briefed him on the matter. Van Walle also said SCK
wishes to organize a high-level event with the USG to discuss
HEU-related issues.


16. (SBU) Participating agencies included:

SCK-CEN: BR-2 officials, Safety and Security Department, and
Public Relations

FANC: Observers (from Security and Safety offices),
Public Relations

Police: Local (from tri-town of Balen-Dessel-Mol); Federal
(based in Turnhout),CIC Antwerp (dispatcher),CGSU (Special
Forces--observer)


17. (U) The Director General of Belgium,s nuclear
regulatory agency, FANC, Mr Willy de Rooveere, attended a
luncheon/informal debriefing involving participants and
observers, in a signal of the importance FANC placed on the
exercise.

Comment
--------------


18. (SBU) Since the visit in May 2009 of the USG physical
protection assessment team, Belgian authorities have taken a
number of important steps, including the December 3 exercise
testing police response times, that are improving the
Government of Belgium,s ability to protect the highly
enriched uranium at the BR-2 facility. For one, the nuclear
regulator, FANC, has taken the initiative in coordinating the
overall GOB response to physical security at BR-2, improving
communication within the GOB and with the USG via the
Embassy. Besides coordinating the GOB interim response to
the May 2009 recommendations of the USG physical protection
team, FANC organized a multi-agency table-top exercise that
preceded Exercise Archibald and highlighted improvements to
be made as a result; it also coordinated input on the Path
Delay Timeline. FANC also participated in study and
elaboration of the Path Delay Timeline at BR-2. It is
overseeing the SCK,s evaluation of the December 3 exercise
and the multi-agency recommendations for improvements
( lessons learned,) and envisions additional exercises at
BR-2 on a regular basis. Senior SCK and FANC officials are
aware and fully supportive of the need for the increased
attention to security at BR-2.


19. (SBU) Given the importance of BR-2 in the supply chain of
global production of medical radio-isotopes, Embassy Brussels
is encouraged that the GOB has diligently taken steps to
strengthen the physical security of Belgium,s sole nuclear
research facility since the May 2009 USG physical protection
team visit by improving communication, planning and most
recently testing police response. FANC plans to build on the
December 3 event in future exercises, including at some point
the involvement of a CGSU unit. DOE may wish to consider
reminding Belgian officials of the open-ended invitation made
in May 2009 by the visiting DOE force-on-force expert to
observe a force-on-force exercise at a U.S. nuclear facility.
Embassy observer verbally reiterated that invitation at the
debrief of Exercise Archibald, but a more formal invitation,
to include a calendar of possible exercises in the United

States during 2010 and 2011, might be useful. Post believes
in particular that FANC, CGSU and SCK representatives would
most benefit from observing an exercise.
GUTMAN
.