Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRUSSELS1666
2009-12-11 15:40:00
SECRET
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR BELGIAN DEFENSE MINISTER PIETER DE

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR MNUC BE AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0017
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #1666/01 3451540
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY-ADEB6B23-MSI9027-413)
R 111540Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9802
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
S E C R E T BRUSSELS 001666 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT0

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, ISN, S/GC, AND AF/C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MNUC BE AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR BELGIAN DEFENSE MINISTER PIETER DE
CREM'S DECEMBER 15-16 MEETINGS WITH SECDEF, DOS AND
CONGRESS IN WASHINGTON

REF: A. BRUSSELS 1498

B. BRUSSELS 1493

Classified By: Ambassador Howard Gutman, reason 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T BRUSSELS 001666

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT0

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, ISN, S/GC, AND AF/C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MNUC BE AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR BELGIAN DEFENSE MINISTER PIETER DE
CREM'S DECEMBER 15-16 MEETINGS WITH SECDEF, DOS AND
CONGRESS IN WASHINGTON

REF: A. BRUSSELS 1498

B. BRUSSELS 1493

Classified By: Ambassador Howard Gutman, reason 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Belgian Defense Minister Pieter De Crem has
been in office since March 2008 and is one of the United
States' strongest friends in the Belgian government. Under
his leadership, Belgium has returned its focus to NATO as the
orienting factor in its defense policy. Now, Belgium is
poised to take a leading role in Europe -- the former Prime
Minister, Herman Van Rompuy, has just been named as the first
European Council President under the new circumstances of the
Lisbon Treaty, and the Belgian government is preparing itself
to hold the rotating presidency of the EU Council for the six
months beginning July 1, 2010. Embassy Brussels believes
that properly motivated, Belgium and its government,
including De Crem, can be leaders in mobilizing Europe to
assist the United States in meeting two of the key challenges
faced by the Transatlantic community -- Afghanistan and
Guantanamo. The Embassy has thus urged in repeated meetings
with the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister and the Foreign
Minister to become more vocal in callingfor Europe to ally in
its support fot U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and in European
joint efforts in closing Guantanamo. Hopefully, neither
coalition politics nor long-simmering tensions between the
Flemish and francophone regions and linguistic communities
will not distract Belgium from this opportunity. Other
opportunities for cooperation exist on Africa policy, nuclear
disarmament in Europe and Iran. End Summary.

TAKING A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN EUROPE
--------------


2. (C) For the past few months, Embassy Brussels has been
working to set the stage for a change in Belgium's
self-concept as a small, meek country living in the shadow of
France and Germany, to a country that can show leadership in
Europe in spite of stretched financial and material

resources, mainly by becoming more vocal on the need for
Europe to support America's new Afghanistan strategy and to
assist in the closing of the Guantanamo detention center.
This is a theme the Ambassador has been stressing to De Crem
in Brussels. De Crem's visit to Washington is a chance for
DOD, DOS and Congressional officials to forge a closer
personal relationship with De Crem and to foster and
encourage this transformation. In fact, of course, the
transformation began at home in Belgium in March 2008 when a
new government, made up of a motley coalition of Christian
Democrats, Socialists, Liberals and Humanists from both sides
of the linguistic border, came to power. The Prime Minister
then, and now again with the departure of Van Rompuy to the
EU, was Yves Leterme, a Flemish Christian Democrat.
Formation of the government was delayed for nearly a year
because of difficult issues of power-sharing between the
French and Flemish communities, many of which still remain to
be solved.

STEPPING UP IN AFGHANISTAN
--------------


3. (C) Nevertheless, the new Defense Minister, Pieter De
Crem, with sometimes grudging support from Leterme and others
in the cabinet, reoriented Belgium's defense policy. Where
his predecessor had promoted a mainly humanitarian, EU and UN
support role for the Belgian military, De Crem sought to
re-establish Belgium as a small but reliable NATO ally. As a
result, Belgium's troop commitment to NATO ISAF operations in
Afghanistan has increased from about 250 troops to nearly
540, with further increases, perhaps to 680, in the offing.
Belgians provide security for Kabul airport, operate and
maintain six F-16's in Kandahar, run one Operational
Mentoring and Liaison Team in Kunduz with a second due to
arrive in January, and participate in a German-run PRT. This
increase has been achieved against a background of declining
resources which have required a thoroughgoing restructuring
of the armed forces and recall of peacekeeping troops in
Kosovo and Lebanon. The government has also bucked critics
inside and out of government who prefer a more pacifist, less
NATO-oriented approach and are ever ready to make political
hay out of possible casualties. Minister De Crem moreover
has reacted positively to suggestions from the Ambassador
that he become more vocal in his support of America's
Afghanistan strategy as a way to help shore up the support of
other European partners. Belgium deserves appreciation and
praise for its efforts. Further increases in military


contributions to Afghanistan will occur, but Belgian military
resources are reaching their limits.


4. (C) De Crem stands up well to criticism he receives for
the government's Afghanistan policy from the main opposition
party, the Flemish Socialists (Sp.a),which is small but
vocal, as well as some individual members of Parliament from
other parties. The Sp.a's leader, Dirk Van Der Maelen, has
termed Belgium's participation in ISAF "stupid and costly".
De Crem's response: "Belgium is not an island in the middle
of the ocean and the international community counts on our
country when it comes to operations abroad." De Crem has
otherwise vigorously defended the ISAF mission and Belgium's
role in it, both in the Belgian press and on the floor of the
Belgian Parliament.


5. (S) De Crem played a critical role during the recent NATO
Ministerial and Secretary Clinton meetings in
behind-the-scenes calls and contacts. In order to help him
advance Afghanistan policy within the Belgian government, he
provided the Ambassador with three specific requests which
the Secretary could make to Prime Minister Leterme. These
were to extend the Belgian deployment until 2011, add another
20% to the Belgian deployment (the Secretary requested an
additional 150 troops),and add a substantial police trainer
presence. The Secretary made all three requests of Leterme.
Having the requests come from the Secretary will help the
government move to adopting the three policies and overcome
opposition within the government coalition.


6. (C) On the other hand, Belgium's contributions to civilian
development in Afghanistan have not kept pace. This
responsibility and authority does not rest with Minister de
Crem, but with Belgian Interior Minister Turtleboom. In
April 2009, the GOB announced that it was doubling its
financial assistance to the country to 12 million euros a
year. This figure is only about 0.75 percent of its global
budget for official development assistance. After hesitating
for more than a year because of security concerns, the
government has finally decided to send 2-4 police trainers
and a magistrate to Afghanistan. De Crem's colleague and
Minister of Development Cooperation, Charles Michel, has said
that Belgium will increase its assistance to Afghanistan but
only with sufficient "advance guarantees from the Karzai
administration of good governance and the fight against
corruption." Although De Crem has direct influence only over
the military, he participates in cabinet discussions of other
issues, including development assistance. He hQ always
fought for greater civilian assistance but further urging of
more civilian assistance to Afghanistan with Minister De Crem
may help equip him in his effort to increase civilian
resources devoted to Afghanistan as well as military.

SPURRING ON CLOSURE OF GUANTANAMO
--------------


7. (C) Again, although De Crem has no direct authority to
order resettlement of Guantanamo detainees, his support in
the matter will be helpful. In general, the Embassy has been
encouraging Belgium to take a leadership role in Europe in
the closure of the Guantanamo detention center by being more
vocal in urging Europe to work together to bring about the
closure now. In October, Belgium resettled one detainee. We
are discussing the transfer of two Tunisian detainees who
have already been convicted of crimes in Belgium, not as part
of the "placement" of detainees, but instead as part of our
Department of Justice ongoing cooperation with the Belgian
Ministry of Justice. Our hope is that that process will make
it easier for Belgian society to accept the return, and also
allow us to ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs separately to
take others. We have also begun to suggest the possibility
of Belgium stepping forward from the chorus line and up to
the footlights on Guantanamo. Helping solve the USG's -- and
Europe's -- problem with Guantanamo is a low-cost way for
Belgium to attain prominence in Europe. There are signs that
Belgium's reticence is beginning to chafe its leadership.
Complaints about Belgium's exclusion from G-20 membership,
and opposition to perceived influence of a "directoire" of
large countries in the EU are examples. It is a matter of
convincing Belgium that not only does it have self-interest
in a more assertive role, but it also has a uniquely trusted
character within Europe that permits it to be effective.
Embassy Brussels suggests the time is right to ask Belgium to
take more than a handful of detainees and ask in coordination
with others (as led by Belgium),so that Guantanamo -- which
Europeans always so roundly condemned -- is closed once and


for all.

ENHANCED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AFRICA COOPERATION
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Central Africa is a special interest of Belgium, as
the former colonial power in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC),Rwanda and Burundi. Belgian soldiers are
training Benin troops that participate in MONUC in the Congo,
and some Congolese troops as well. Belgium is negotiating in
the EU, over the reluctance of the French, to take leadership
of the EU's Atalanta anti-piracy mission off the coast of
Somalia in the second half of 2010. It has agreed to provide
a ship to the U.S.-led Africa Partnership Station, which
conducts internationally staffed, ship-based training
missions in West Africa. A Belgian officer will soon be
embedded at AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart. The GOB is
eager to cooperate with the United States on encouraging
security sector reform in the DRC, consolidating peace in the
Eastern DRC, promoting regional economic integration and
cooperation among states in the region on security issues.
In particular, Belgium is as interested in preventing sexual
violence as we are. It would like us to encourage continued
cooperation between Rwanda and the DRC to take a firmer hand
with rebel groups that operate in Eastern Congo and far too
often commit atrocities. In November, Belgium announced an
increase in assistance to Burundi, making it the largest
bilateral donor to that country. It plans to do the same for
the DRC.

MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT
--------------


9. (S) Belgium has a special interest in nuclear
non-proliferation issues because it participates in NATO's
nuclear forces at the Kleine Brogel air force base. It
rejected a recent overture from Germany to join with the
Netherlands, Italy and Germany to propose to the rest of NATO
that nuclear weapons be removed from those countries (ref B).
However, Belgian MOD and MFA officials apparently had to
rein in then-Foreign Minister and now Prime Minister Leterme
when he initially responded too positively to the idea.
Belgium's official policy rejects a unilateral approach to
disarmament and insists that the issue must be discussed
among all NATO members at one time, with due regard for
U.S.-Russian bilateral discussions and the NPT. The
government is also opposing a proposal from the floor of the
Belgian parliament to ban nuclear weapons from Belgian soil.

IRAN SANCTIONS IF NECESSARY
--------------


10. (C) Belgium shares our concern about Iranian efforts to
develop a nuclear capability. It supports strengthened
sanctions in the EU and UN if necessary. In that case, at
least at first, it prefers to see existing sanctions made
more effective, rather than extending them into entirely new
areas, with the possible exception of a conventional arms
embargo.

POLITICAL PITFALLS IN REGIONAL TENSIONS
--------------


11. (C) With three regions, three linguistic communities,
seven parliaments and a myriad of political parties, domestic
politics and the division of powers in Belgium require a
complicated and delicate series of compromises. Herman Van
Rompuy, though Flemish, was one politician who seemed able to
gain the confidence and trust of both Flemish and francophone
Belgians. His successor, Yves Leterme, is more identifiably
Flemish and does not share that reputation. One difficult
issue, Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, or BHV, symbolizes the
divisions and carries unusual emotional power in Belgium (ref
A). In essence, it is a question of whether residents of the
Brussels suburbs should live and vote under Flemish control
or have special francophone voting and social rights. The
issue impeded formation of a government after the 2007
elections and was kicked down the road ever since. A special
effort will have to be made before March 2010 to either once
again delay a solution or reach a final compromise. Failure
to do so could threaten Leterme's coalition in the first part
of the year. The fact that all Belgian politicians dearly
want to avoid embarrassment during Belgium's EU presidency
will motivate them to find the necessary compromises, but
there is no guarantee they can.


GUTMAN