Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRUSSELS1359
2009-10-09 11:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

EU VIEWS ON KENYAN POLITICS AND DADAAB REFUGEE

Tags:  PREF PREL KE UNHCR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #1359/01 2821146
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P 091146Z OCT 09
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001359 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019
TAGS: PREF PREL KE UNHCR
SUBJECT: EU VIEWS ON KENYAN POLITICS AND DADAAB REFUGEE
CAMPS

REF: STATE 100710

Classified By: USEU Deputy POL M-C Mary Curtin, for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001359

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019
TAGS: PREF PREL KE UNHCR
SUBJECT: EU VIEWS ON KENYAN POLITICS AND DADAAB REFUGEE
CAMPS

REF: STATE 100710

Classified By: USEU Deputy POL M-C Mary Curtin, for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The EU shares USG concerns about the
political situation in Kenya and the Dadaab refugee camp
complex. On both topics, there is a sense of urgency about
the need to act to avert a coming crisis and that the window
of opportunity for doing so is closing. POLOFF met with the
Commission's Kenya desk officers from the DG for Humanitarian
Aid and from the DG for Development. Both were pessimistic
about the possibility for political progress in Kenya. END
SUMMARY

--------------
ECHO'S VIEW - NOWHERE FAST
--------------


2. (C) On 1 October, POLOFF met with Maureen Philippon, the
Kenya desk officer at the Commission's DG for Humanitarian
Aid (ECHO),to discuss reftel demarche and her previous
meeting with the UNHCR's Kenya representative. Ms. Philippon
painted the same picture (as reftel) of an impending
humanitarian disaster in the Dadaab complex of three camps,
with severe overcrowding and continued inflows. If the World
Food Program pulls out of Somalia, flows into Kenya will
increase rapidly. The water and sanitation facilities in
Dadaab, she said, simply cannot expand further as there is no
room to put in additional boreholes or latrines. Philippon
said that, based on her observations and those of the UNHCR
Representative, the Somalis in the camp were being unusually
patient in waiting for a resolution on the disputed land set
aside for a fourth camp. She was surprised they had not yet
just moved there of their own accord. She described the
political wrangling over the land, and quoted the Kenyan
Deputy Speaker Farah Maalim as threatening "war and
bloodshed" if the refugees move there. (COMMENT: This may
explain the current patience of the Somalis.)


3. (C) Diplomatic efforts so far have made no progress. The
EU sent a letter to the GOK in May 2009, signed by 14
Ambassadors, but received no reply. Suggestions of obtaining
a different location for the fourth camp have met with a GOK
response Philippon characterized as, "Don't even dream about
it." She said the EU, along with the U.S., the Dutch,
Germans and Swedes, raised Dadaab in an intervention at

UNHCR's Executive Committee meeting in Geneva 28 September -
2 October. However, according to USMISSION Geneva, the EU
intervention consisted of a single line: "We note with
appreciation the promises of the Kenyan Government to provide
additional land in the area of Dadaab." This underscores an
EU reluctance to push Kenya on this, as the Kenyan
government's cooperation is seen as so vital for regional
stability, Somalia piracy, and other topics As an
indication of the wide-spread pessimism about a resolution,
Ms. Philippon pointed out that HCR Gutteres recently
authorized improvements inside of Dadaab, instead of
continuing to wait to use those resources for setting up
facilities at the new site.


4. (C) Asked what might prompt a resolution, Ms. Philippon
mentioned that a current camp verification process is
revealing some refugees are missing from the Dadaab complex,
and the GOK is noting more refugees showing up in Nairobi.
She felt this dynamic could change the GOK calculus. She
noted that attempts to address the GOK's stated security
concerns had fallen flat. This is because, she opined, the
real reason is ethnic conflict and domestic political games -
Odinga needs the Deputy Speaker's support and so will not
cross him on this. However, she predicted the floods
expected in December will cost lives and may prompt the
refugees to move themselves, thus changing the game on the
ground.

-------------- --------------
DG DEVELOPMENT - NO BRIGHTER OUTLOOK ON KENYA REFORM

BRUSSELS 00001359 002 OF 002


-------------- --------------


5. (C) On 6 November, POLOFF met with Aloysius Lorkeers, the
Kenya desk officer at the Commission's DG for Development.
Mr. Lorkeers expressed grave concern about the current
political situation in Kenya and felt time was running short
to make enough of a difference before the next election in

2012. He said the EU's Africa Working Group (COAFR) had
discussed Kenya recently, with a focus on four issues:
achieving electoral reform before the 2012 elections,
constitutional reform, police reform, and impunity. He
stated the multi-donor Governance, Justice, Law and Order
Sector (GJLOS) Reform Program had failed miserably, given
lack of GOK commitment and a tension between its political
and technical aspects. He cited the findings of South
Consulting, the firm contracted by Kofi Annan's office to
monitor government reform, which highlighted three areas of
concern: slow progress, continued patronage, and increased
insecurity. Given the timing of the elections, Mr. Lorkeers
predicted that unless there is real progress on political
reform within the next year, chances were very high that we
would see considerably greater violence in 2012 than occurred
in 2008. If Kenya comes apart, he opined, it will affect the
whole region.



6. (C) Discussing options for external influence to foster a
resolution of the problem, Lorkeers said that Kofi Annan's
October 4-7 visit to Kenya is key, but he did not express
optimism about the outcome. He said development aid was not
a useful lever in Kenya, particularly given that the GOK
knows its help is needed on other issues. Mr. Lorkeers said
that the U.S. approach of making public statements about the
officials being targeted for pressure "would be
counterproductive if it had not come from a country with a
president with links to Kenya." For the EU, next steps will
involve the upcoming mid-term review of the five-year
(2008-2013) European Development Fund, which will focus on
governance questions, economic and social issues, and
implementation of effective development cooperation. The EU
is not likely to cut aid to Kenya, he said, but may choose to
move it out of governmental budget support into areas such as
civil society or climate change. If things still do not
improve, the EU will look at "smart sanctions" targeting
individuals for travel restrictions and then perhaps asset
freezes, but this would still be a long way off.


7. (C) Asked about the crisis in Dadaab, Mr. Lorkeers said
the EU was sending a migration mission to Kenya in December
to look at the situation of Somali refugees as part of a
larger look at migration, brain drain, remittances, and so
on. The mission would examine the situation of refugees in
Kenya, internally displaced people in Somalia, and border
openings with a possibility that a Regional Protection
Program could be instituted (septel). Mr. Lorkeers views the
Kenyan arguments about security concerns as real, and
therefore sees a value in continuing attempts to address
them. But on this as well, he is not optimistic. He says,
"Odinga was supportive of a Dadaab solution, but has made a
trade off based on internal politics."

MURRAY
.