AFGHANISTAN: CAN THE EU BE A STRONGER PARTNER IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 000132

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SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, INL, INL/AP, EUR/FO, EUR/ERA,
EUR/RPM, DOD FOR USD(P),DOD FOR ASD/ISA, USAID, CENTCOM
FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SNAR NATO MARR AF AID BE EAID
EUN, IO
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: CAN THE EU BE A STRONGER PARTNER IN
AFGHANISTAN?

REF: A. 2008 BRUSSELS 348

B. 2008 BRUSSELS 54

C. KABUL 133

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRS CHRISTOPHER W. MURRAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (
b) AND (d).


1. (C/NF) Summary and comment. We currently have a window of
opportunity to lay the groundwork for more EU contributions
in Afghanistan. The current window may close as soon as
April 3-4, 2009 -- the dates of the NATO Summit. It is
unlikely that the 21 out of 27 EU member states who are also
NATO Allies will make decisions about NATO contributions in
isolation from their decision-making about EU and bilateral
contributions. The 27 EU Political and Security Committee
(PSC) Ambassadors will discuss Afghanistan on February 10,
with EU Police Mission for Afghanistan (EUPOL) Head of
Mission Kai Vittrup and ossibly UN Special Representative
Kai Eide prsent. The 27 EU Foreign Ministers will likely
discuss Afghanistan at their February 23 Genera Affairs and
External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting in Brusels or on
the margins of the European Council meeting March 19. EU
contacts have told us that the Foreign Ministers' Afghanistan
discussion -- originally scheduled for the January 26 GAERC
-- was intentionally postponed because many member states
wanted to hold the discussion at a date closer to the NATO
Summit and when EU Foreign Ministers have more information
about the new U.S. Administration's intentions regarding
Afghanistan.


2. (C/NF) The European Union has participated in
Afghanistan's development since 2002, and it has the
potential to do much more. We should show an early political
interest in the EU by consulting with it soon and at a high
level. One opportunity for dialogue will be the Secretary's
dinner with EU leaders in Brussels March 4, on the margins of
the NATO Foreign Ministerial. In this and other
consultations, we should ask the EU to tell us how we can
help the EU help Afghanistan. If the EU views itself as
successful in Afghanistan, its confidence will increase, and
it will be better-positioned to respond the next time we call
upon it for collaboration. Success in Afghanistan can also
provide concrete models for the EU to use in future
engagements. In order to help the EU succeed in Afghanistan,
we should encourage it to focus on specific, targeted areas
that can help it shore up European public support while
simultaneously helping to achieve broader goals in
Afghanistan. Such areas could include boosting election
support, improving rule of law and policing, and increasing
regional links while strengthening border security. End
Summary and comment.

Already a Major Player in Afghanistan
--------------


3. (SBU) THE FIGURES: The European Commission (EC) is a
large donor to Afghanistan and is one of the few that
provides a multi-year commitment (REF A). This is on top of
the support that individual EU member states provide to
Afghanistan. The EC provided approximately EURO 1.3 billion
for the period from 2002-2006, overshooting its pledged EURO
1 billion. For 2007-2010, the EC pledged EURO 610 million
(e.g. approximately EURO 150 million/year). This figure
still holds in EU planning. There will likely be additional
funding from the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid
Department (ECHO) and other areas of the Commission that
could bring the total figure closer to EUR 750 million, but

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that cannot be confirmed at this point. The Commission is
committed to funding assistance to Afghanistan through at
least 2013, and Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner recently told
the press that the current financial crisis will not deter
the Commission's commitment to Afghanistan. The EC's funding
target for the entire 2007-2013 period is at least EURO 1.3
billion. The EC's Paris conference figure of EURO 500
million was a pro-rated calculation, plus ECHO funds and some
thematic programs that the EC already knew about when the
conference was held in June, 2008. The EC's assistance
strategy reflects the priorities laid out in the Afghanistan
Compact and the Afghan National Development Strategy. EC
assistance for 2008-2010 focuses on three areas: reform of
the justice sector; rural development including alternatives
to poppy production; and health.


Room to Grow: Election Support and Rule of Law
-------------- -


4. (C/NF) The EC has told us that it will provide at least
the same level of assistance as it did for the previous
elections in Afghanistan (approximately EURO 15 million) and
possibly more. The EC has also said it plans to support
election-focused training programs. The EC will send an
assessment mission to Afghanistan in March to make a
recommendation on whether it should send an observation
mission; security concerns are the biggest obstacle to a
positive recommendation. We could suggest the EU take the
lead in supporting Afghan elections this year. It could do
this in many ways: send an observation mission, as it did
for Pakistan in 2008; train election workers; re-focus the EU
Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) to play a bigger role
in election support, as Afghan Minister of Interior Atmar has
requested of EUPOL; increase EC election support funding
beyond the EURO 15 million it gave for elections in 2005;
coordinate member state and NGO support for elections and
future governance; and use money from its EURO 10 million PRT
fund to support small PRT contributors in holding
election-related events. Helping ensure successful elections
would be a way for the EU to build European public support
for continued engagement there. Lagging public support is
the obstacle EU leaders most frequently cite as preventing
them from doing more in Afghanistan (REF B). We note a
Financial Times polling survey, published on January 19, that
showed majorities of people in the UK, France, Italy, and
Germany believe that their governments must not send more
forces to Afghanistan.


5. (SBU) RULE OF LAW: The Commission is a large donor to the
Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) for Afghan police salaries,
having provided EURO 200 million to LOTFA since 2002. The
Commission also supports capacity building in local and
regional administration, aimed at increasing the focus on
rule of law in the provinces. The EC has launched a program
supporting the justice sector by funding contracted advisors
to improve qualification, recruitment, and career structure
for judges and prosecutors and to introduce an ethics code.
These activities were developed to complement EUPOL.

EU Police Mission: Should We Help Save It?
--------------


6. (C/NF) The simple fact that the EU agreed in 2007 to
deploy a civilian mission in Afghanistan was a quantum leap
for the EU. It showed that the EU acknowledged the need to
assume some risk in order to implement its foreign policy

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decisions. The decision was taken after strong U.S.
encouragement. Nobody in the EU disputes the fact that the
EU's Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) got off to a rocky
start, with extensive logistical problems and two successive
commanders widely viewed as ineffective. In recent months,
however, the mission has made significant progress. It is
now led by a well-regarded Danish Head of Mission, Kai
Vittrup, who is a former Chief Inspector of Police for
Copenhagen and a former Commander of UN policing missions,
and who is eager to work closely with the United States.
Vittrup has gained political approval from member states for
a long list of objectives for EUPOL, based largely on Afghan
Minister of Interior Atmar's recommendations. Among other
things, the EU agreed to help Atmar reform the Ministry of
Interior, combat corruption, and improve Kabul's security
forces. (USEU forwarded internal EU documents to SCA and EUR
on 12/19/08.) Furthermore, EU Foreign Ministers in May 2008
agreed to increase the size of the mission with a view toward
eventually doubling its size from 200 to approximately 400
personnel. In the same May meeting, EU Foreign Ministers
committed to work closely on police reform with the United
States and other actors. EUPOL is already deployed to
regional and provincial headquarters and to some districts,
in addition to Kabul, and Vittrup aims for a wider geographic
distribution. EUPOL is currently discussing with U.S.
leadership in RC-EAST the possibility of EUPOL deployment
there (REF C).


7. (C/NF) The biggest problem now for EUPOL is that member
states are not delivering the needed resources (mainly
personnel, but also budgetary support) to increase EUPOL's
size and thus enable EUPOL to implement Vittrup's plans and
objectives. Part of the problem is that when member states
decided to increase the size of the mission, they did not
know they would soon be standing up a mission in Georgia, and
reinforcing another one in Gaza. The experts for these
missions come from the same pool, so the demand for experts
is increasing without a corresponding increase in supply.
Aggravating the problem, the per diem rates for Afghanistan
are the lowest of any EU mission, which contacts acknowledge
makes it even harder to attract recruits, as those experts
have a choice between missions. Furthermore, some member
states, like Germany -- which pushed the hardest for EUPOL to
agree to double its size -- are now opting to give personnel
to the U.S.-led Focused District Development (FDD) program,
either in addition to or instead of EUPOL. EU Council
Secretariat contacts tell us that this is because some
countries, like Germany, face elections, and their leaders
want to be viewed by their populations as close to the new
U.S. administration to gain from President Obama's
popularity. These same nations view bilateral contributions
as preferable to EUPOL contributions for gaining "credit"
with the new U.S. administration.


8. (C/NF) In response to this problem, EU High Representative
Solana and some member states, such as the UK, have begun
pushing EU member states to contribute additional resources
to EUPOL. Part of the message that Solana and others are
delivering is that the EU itself risks being viewed poorly by
the new U.S. Administration if it does not "come through" on
Afghanistan. The UK, according to contacts at its permanent
representation in Brussels, is also concerned that a failure,
or perceived failure of EUPOL -- for example, if EUPOL is
unable to increase its size while member states are
simultaneously increasing their bilateral contributions to
police reform in Afghanistan -- could spell trouble for the
whole future of civilian European Security and Defense Policy

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operations. (Note: the UK has consistently pushed ESDP
toward an emphasis on civilian missions, as the UK views NATO
as the appropriate place for military cooperation.) Some
other contacts have conveyed concern that if the EU is seen
as not coming through on Afghanistan, it could have
consequences for the U.S.-EU relationship more broadly.


9. (C/NF) These concerns by officials in EU institutions as
well as by member states could lead them to scramble to find
ways to prevent EUPOL's failure and to ensure the EU does not
falter in the eyes of the new U.S. administration. Contacts
give us several arguments for why the United States should
approach individual member states to encourage more
contributions to EUPOL. They point out that EU missions,
backed by the force of agreement at 27, provide a more
stable, long-lasting commitment than bilateral contributions,
which can be retracted at any time. EUPOL's current mandate
runs until June, 2010, with the possibility of another
three-year extension. They also note that EUPOL can attract
contributions from smaller countries that would be less
likely to participate bilaterally (e.g., Estonia and
Slovakia).


10. (C/NF) The signals we send the EU regarding EUPOL could
set the stage for our future collaboration with the EU in
Afghanistan and other areas. Contacts' arguments in favor of
EUPOL are valid, but individual member-state contributions to
U.S.-led efforts are also valuable. We may be able to find a
way to maintain both, rather than accept the zero-sum game
toward which these options may lead for reasons of resource
constraints, aggravated by the financial crisis. If we are
able and willing to work out a new framework, we stand to
gain a greater degree of influence over European police
contributions as well as an increased EU role in Afghanistan
for the long-term. One option might be to propose to the EU
that EUPOL become a part of the overall U.S.-led police
training effort in Afghanistan - if we can find a workable
arrangement. Clearly, we would have redlines, and they would
have theirs. Europeans must be assured, if they so ask, that
EU command and control remains intact and that the EU retains
high visibility for its efforts. If both sides agreed to
such a proposal, we could help the EU energize EUPOL by
asking individual European member states to increase their
contributions to police training through the EUPOL mission
rather than directly to us. Such an approach conserves unity
of effort while better harmonizing U.S. and European efforts.

Regional Aspirations
--------------


11. (C/NF) Contacts have told us the EU is ready to help us
politically with Afghanistan's neighborhood -- particularly
in dealing with Iran and Russia. This is an idea worth
exploring further with the European Union. We may also wish
to consider ways in which they might be constructive partners
on selective tasks. On Pakistan, the EU is actively seeking
ways to increase its engagement -- hoping to hold a Heads of
State-level summit under the Czech or Swedish EU presidencies
and contemplating a free trade agreement. The EU is also
currently developing plans to support counter-terrorism
efforts in Pakistan. The Commission provided the only
international observation mission for the Pakistani elections
last year. The EU is also a partner in the Friends of a
Democratic Pakistan forum. On a more technical level, the EU
is already involved in a variety of regional projects. The
EU involvement in preparations for the Regional Economic
Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) is one example.

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The Commission will host an experts meeting in Brussels in
March to prepare for the RECCA. We should help lead them to
success in that endeavor: EU success there could pave the
road for further such EU leadership in the future. The EU's
still-developing Central Asia strategy is another area where
there is room to grow. They have so far been reluctant to
promote actively the links between South and Central Asia
that we have worked to build, but we can demonstrate to
member states the utility of fostering these links as a way
to boost the EU effort in Afghanistan. The EU could also
take the lead on regional projects related to water
management.


12. (SBU) Meanwhile, EUR 50 million of Commission aid has
been invested in the development of major border crossing
posts at the borders with Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and
Tajikistan. These facilities have improved customs and
border management and are already generating increased
revenue from customs duties to the Afghan budget, according
to the EC. Additional funding for 2009-2011 could be made
available for border security projects through the
Commission's Stability Instrument, a possibility we have
previously encouraged. The Commission wants border security
to be a main theme of the March experts meeting for the
RECCA.

Other Areas of EU Focus:
--------------


13. (SBU) There are many additional areas in which the EU is
engaged in Afghanistan. While the EC does not directly fund
counter-narcotics activities -- that activity falls primarily
to the UK -- the EC does support rural development programs
in northeastern and eastern Afghanistan to reduce poppy
dependence through alternative livelihoods. The EC claims
there are encouraging signs of sustained reduction of opium
cultivation in the northeast where they have been active.
The Commission is also one of the three key donors to the
health sector, along with the United States and the World
Bank. Commission programs focus on provision of primary
health services and secondary health care. The EC states its
aim as lifting the coverage of basic health services from
approximately 80% at present to near 100% by the end of 2010
through training of medical staff and rebuilding of health
clinics. Additionally, the EC supports action for children
at risk (including street children, exploitative child labor,
child trafficking, child victims of war, etc.) An EUR 24
million aid package has recently been approved by the EC to
sustain efforts and achievements in social protection of
highly vulnerable groups and persons.

Comment
--------------


14. (C/NF) The NATO Summit in April will be a defining moment
for our relationship with Europe -- including with the EU.
European countries will be making decisions between now and
the NATO Summit about whether and how they plan to increase
their contributions to Afghanistan -- bilaterall, through
NATO, and through the EU. The diffrent channels have
different strengths and limitations. There is value in
working now to maximize European contributions through all of
the different channels. If we wait until after the NATO
summit to turn our attention to the EU, member states may
have already exhausted their resources and political will to
do more in Afghanistan.


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MURRAY
.