Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRUSSELS1261
2009-09-18 14:54:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

BELGIUM MAY NOT BE READY FOR GUANTANAMO DETAINEE

Tags:  PREL PTER BE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9220
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHBS #1261 2611454
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181454Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9471
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T BRUSSELS 001261

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2029
TAGS: PREL PTER BE
SUBJECT: BELGIUM MAY NOT BE READY FOR GUANTANAMO DETAINEE
TRANSFER ON PROPOSED DATE

REF: DAO E-MAIL 9/15/2009

Classified By: POL/ECON Counselor Richard Eason, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

(1) (S/NF) SUMMARY: The Belgian government is not yet
certain it will be ready to receive the Guantanamo detainee
it accepted on the proposed date of September 25,2009.
According to a senior diplomat working the issue for the MFA,
Belgium will work with a non-government organization and
wants to take the time to ensure that the transfer goes well.
The Belgians also wants a written version of the DOD
guidance, "Detainee Movement Operations: General Procedures"
and to develop a coordinated plan on public/statements and
the press. The diplomat said that he was concerned about the
emotional and psychological state of the detainee who would
have flown from Cuba via another stop, in restraints and
blackout goggles. END SUMMARY.


2. (S/NF) On September 18, 2009, POL/ECON Counselor called
on Ambassador Marc VandenReeck regarding the proposed
transfer of the detainee Belgium has agreed to take from
Guantanamo. P/ECOUNS relayed the proposed transfer date of
September 25, of which VanDenReeck had just learned.
VanDenReeck said that his government could not yet commit to
such an early transfer date. He wondered why Special Envoy
Daniel Fried had not passed the date when he had met with the
Foreign Minister's Chief of Staff the day previously. He
said such little notice might cause Belgium problems because
Belgium would be working with a non-governmental organization
on the transfer and need time to coordinate the details with
that NGO. Belgium wanted to be certain that the transfer was
"done in a proper way." He did not, however, say that the
proposed date would be impossible, only that his government
needed time to review whether it would be possible to meet
such a date.


3. (S/NF) P/ECOUNS referred to the "Detainee Movement
Operations: General Procedures" relayed by ref e-mail.
VanDenReeck requested a releasable version of the document
(which was classified SECRET/NOFORN with no releasability to
Belgium). VanDenReeck had several areas of concern. He
wanted to know how the detainee would be restrained during
the entire flight and the length of the flight. He was
concerned that the length of the flight and whether the
restraints would cause the detainee to be highly stressed
upon arrival in Belgium. He also wanted to be able to
reassure the NGO of the state of the detainee upon arrival.
He wanted a written version of the Detainee Movement
Operations document also to be able to refer to in case there
were subsequent misunderstandings.


4. (S/NF) VanDenReeck also said that the public
statement/press arrangements would need to be coordinated and
that Belgium would make a proposal for the arrangements. He
was not certain Belgium would be able to agree that the DOD
upload a statement that the transfer had occurred immediately
afterwards. Belgium might need to have that wait for a day
or longer to publicly acknowledge that the transfer had
occurred. VanDenReeck was concerned that a U.S. release of
confirmation of the transfer before Belgium had done so could
cause very serious political reverberations in the governing
coalition.


5. (S/NF) VanDenReeck would be briefing the Foreign
Minister and will provide the Embassy with a coordinated
response as soon as possible.

.