Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRUSSELS1071
2009-08-05 11:16:00
SECRET//NOFORN
USEU Brussels
Cable title:
SRAP HOLBROOKE, EU HIGH REP SOLANA DISCUSS
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001071
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2019
TAGS: PREL ENRG MOPS PGOV XD IR EUN
SUBJECT: SRAP HOLBROOKE, EU HIGH REP SOLANA DISCUSS
PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN
BRUSSELS 00001071 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Pol M-C Christopher Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001071
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2019
TAGS: PREL ENRG MOPS PGOV XD IR EUN
SUBJECT: SRAP HOLBROOKE, EU HIGH REP SOLANA DISCUSS
PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN
BRUSSELS 00001071 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Pol M-C Christopher Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S//NF) Summary: On July 28, SRAP Richard Holbrooke and
EU High Rep Javier Solana discussed their
respective trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan, further support
to the Pakistani government, the Afghan
presidential elections, and Solana's impressions of the
situation in Iran. During the meeting, SRAP Holbrooke
pressed the EU to support the Pakistani electricity sector,
and to do more to alleviate the humanitarian situation in the
Swat Valley. He made clear to Solana that a discredited
election in the mold of Kenya or Iran would deal a severe
blow to international support for the Afghan Government and
that pre-election speculation about fraud is not helpful. On
Iran, Solana warned that Ahmadinejad could
become a figurehead for a military dictatorship. He
anticipated a written response soon to the P5 1 and U.S.
offers to dialogue, but said the response would not answer
the critical questions about Iran's nuclear program or a
freeze-for-freeze. Despite Iran's public line on
Afghanistan, Solana said the IRGC was acting at odds with our
goals for the country. End Summary.
WILL PAKISTAN'S PM GAIN MORE POWER?
2. (C) Solana led off the
Economics David Lipton to
discuss Pakistan,s economy and
future EU support to the electicity sector. Solana said
this kind of technQcal support is not part of his remit as
forein policy chief, but said he would relay the request to
the relevant EU institutions and officials. Holbrooke also
encouraged the EU to povide further aid to alleviate the
humanitarian situation in the Swat Valley, beyond the 485
million euros pledged to Pakistan in Tokyo in April and
the boost in June of humanitarian funding to 72 million euros.
AFGHANISTAN: BEYOND THE ELECTIONS
4. (S) Turning to Afghanistan, Solana said he had met with
FM Spanta, who made "dramatic" accusations about Pakistani
support for the insurgency. He also met with President
Karzai, who he described as "very nervous" and agitated, and
who expressed concerns about U.S. military operations in
Helmand Province. SRAP Holbrooke cautioned against taking
Karzai at his word. He said Karzai had not expressed his
concerns about U.S. operations to the USG. Those operations,
Holbrooke said, had uncovered and destroyed large Taliban
drug caches. The U.S. no longer supports poppy eradication
efforts with military forces,
but is targeting traffickers, networks and bazaars. SRAP
Holbrooke also described Karzai's allegations that 30 percent
of Pashtuns will not be able to vote in the August 20
BRUSSELS 00001071 002.2 OF 002
elections as Karzai laying the groundwork to contest the
elections if he loses. Holbrooke described candidate Abdullah
as a figure who crosses ethnic lines and therefore seeks to
be a unifying force, but who may in fact be just the opposite.
5. (S) Solana said that the U.S. and EU should consider how
to react if the presidential election is discredited, sparks
protests, or results in the need for a runoff. Holbrooke
replied that our principal concern is an election that
results in a Kenya- or Iran-like situation, undermining the
legitimacy of the government. Such a situation would weaken
U.S. and international support for the government and deal a
blow to our efforts to strengthen governance. Solana said
that during his visit, the head of the EU election monitoring
mission, Philippe Morillon, suggested that a decisive
first-round election, oy against such pre-juon pollinid net on Qt the ShQm he
has
had the most contact, calling him "a moderate radical." He
said Larijni "despises" Ahmadinejad, but has not spoken /ut
since the election. Jalili, Solana said, does not seem to
have the same clout with the Supreme Leader as Larijani.
Holbrooke noted that Iranian officials at international
meetings in The Hague and Tokyo had been reluctant to
engage with the U.S. even briefly, perhaps, he said, because
they were caught off guard.
8. (S) Speculating on the Iranian response to the U.S. and
P5 1 offers to negotiate, Solana anticipated a response from
Iran in mid- to late-August. The response, he said, would
probably come in the form of a long document in Farsi, "which
will take a month for us to translate," and which would
address all issues except the P5 1 offer of a
freeze-for-freeze. When asked if Iran takes a September/UNGA
deadline seriously, Solana said they take December more
seriously, alluding to President Obama's expressed desire to
see progress before the end of the year.
9. (S) Describing Iran's role in Afghanistan, Solana said
Tehran's official line is that Iran opposes the Taliban,
combats the drug trade, and wants to cooperate with the West.
The IRGC, however, which Solana described as a "state within
a state" that is awash in money, is acting at odds with our
goals in Afghanistan.
10. (U) This cable has been cleared by SRAP Holbrooke.
MURRAY
.
SIPDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2019
TAGS: PREL ENRG MOPS PGOV XD IR EUN
SUBJECT: SRAP HOLBROOKE, EU HIGH REP SOLANA DISCUSS
PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN
BRUSSELS 00001071 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Pol M-C Christopher Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S//NF) Summary: On July 28, SRAP Richard Holbrooke and
EU High Rep Javier Solana discussed their
respective trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan, further support
to the Pakistani government, the Afghan
presidential elections, and Solana's impressions of the
situation in Iran. During the meeting, SRAP Holbrooke
pressed the EU to support the Pakistani electricity sector,
and to do more to alleviate the humanitarian situation in the
Swat Valley. He made clear to Solana that a discredited
election in the mold of Kenya or Iran would deal a severe
blow to international support for the Afghan Government and
that pre-election speculation about fraud is not helpful. On
Iran, Solana warned that Ahmadinejad could
become a figurehead for a military dictatorship. He
anticipated a written response soon to the P5 1 and U.S.
offers to dialogue, but said the response would not answer
the critical questions about Iran's nuclear program or a
freeze-for-freeze. Despite Iran's public line on
Afghanistan, Solana said the IRGC was acting at odds with our
goals for the country. End Summary.
WILL PAKISTAN'S PM GAIN MORE POWER?
2. (C) Solana led off the
Economics David Lipton to
discuss Pakistan,s economy and
future EU support to the electicity sector. Solana said
this kind of technQcal support is not part of his remit as
forein policy chief, but said he would relay the request to
the relevant EU institutions and officials. Holbrooke also
encouraged the EU to povide further aid to alleviate the
humanitarian situation in the Swat Valley, beyond the 485
million euros pledged to Pakistan in Tokyo in April and
the boost in June of humanitarian funding to 72 million euros.
AFGHANISTAN: BEYOND THE ELECTIONS
4. (S) Turning to Afghanistan, Solana said he had met with
FM Spanta, who made "dramatic" accusations about Pakistani
support for the insurgency. He also met with President
Karzai, who he described as "very nervous" and agitated, and
who expressed concerns about U.S. military operations in
Helmand Province. SRAP Holbrooke cautioned against taking
Karzai at his word. He said Karzai had not expressed his
concerns about U.S. operations to the USG. Those operations,
Holbrooke said, had uncovered and destroyed large Taliban
drug caches. The U.S. no longer supports poppy eradication
efforts with military forces,
but is targeting traffickers, networks and bazaars. SRAP
Holbrooke also described Karzai's allegations that 30 percent
of Pashtuns will not be able to vote in the August 20
BRUSSELS 00001071 002.2 OF 002
elections as Karzai laying the groundwork to contest the
elections if he loses. Holbrooke described candidate Abdullah
as a figure who crosses ethnic lines and therefore seeks to
be a unifying force, but who may in fact be just the opposite.
5. (S) Solana said that the U.S. and EU should consider how
to react if the presidential election is discredited, sparks
protests, or results in the need for a runoff. Holbrooke
replied that our principal concern is an election that
results in a Kenya- or Iran-like situation, undermining the
legitimacy of the government. Such a situation would weaken
U.S. and international support for the government and deal a
blow to our efforts to strengthen governance. Solana said
that during his visit, the head of the EU election monitoring
mission, Philippe Morillon, suggested that a decisive
first-round election, oy against such pre-juon pollinid net on Qt the ShQm he
has
had the most contact, calling him "a moderate radical." He
said Larijni "despises" Ahmadinejad, but has not spoken /ut
since the election. Jalili, Solana said, does not seem to
have the same clout with the Supreme Leader as Larijani.
Holbrooke noted that Iranian officials at international
meetings in The Hague and Tokyo had been reluctant to
engage with the U.S. even briefly, perhaps, he said, because
they were caught off guard.
8. (S) Speculating on the Iranian response to the U.S. and
P5 1 offers to negotiate, Solana anticipated a response from
Iran in mid- to late-August. The response, he said, would
probably come in the form of a long document in Farsi, "which
will take a month for us to translate," and which would
address all issues except the P5 1 offer of a
freeze-for-freeze. When asked if Iran takes a September/UNGA
deadline seriously, Solana said they take December more
seriously, alluding to President Obama's expressed desire to
see progress before the end of the year.
9. (S) Describing Iran's role in Afghanistan, Solana said
Tehran's official line is that Iran opposes the Taliban,
combats the drug trade, and wants to cooperate with the West.
The IRGC, however, which Solana described as a "state within
a state" that is awash in money, is acting at odds with our
goals in Afghanistan.
10. (U) This cable has been cleared by SRAP Holbrooke.
MURRAY
.