Counter-Narcotics on our Eastern Caribbean Third Border:

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BRIDGETOWN 000219

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR WHA/CAR AND INL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR KCRM ECON PGOV XL
SUBJECT: Counter-Narcotics on our Eastern Caribbean Third Border:
Drug Flows Rise as Resources Decline

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) The countries of the Eastern Caribbean are seeing a steady
increase in narcotics trafficking and the attendant problems of gun
and gang violence in their communities. Trafficking is on the rise
as drug runners look for alternate routes to compensate for
successes under Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative. Local law
enforcement, while receptive to training and aware of the growing
threat, is under-resourced and plagued with antiquated legal codes
and corruption in the ranks, sapping their ability to fight the
growing problem. At this critical juncture, the donor community
seems to be retreating in the face of competing priorities elsewhere
-- despite the fact that the drugs are bound for their own shores.
Additional resources for the thinly-stretched law enforcement
agencies in the region, to include a robust regional maritime entity
-- possible under the Regional Security System, will be a
pre-requisite for gaining any real ground against narco-traffickers
along the Third Border. End Summary.

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AWASH IN A SEA OF DRUGS
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2. (SBU) The island nations that make up Embassy Bridgetown's area
of responsibility -- Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica,
Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines - have seen a steady increase in the volume of narcotics
transshipment in recent years. The drugs, destined for both the
North American and European markets, have begun to flow through the
Caribbean at greater levels, as the launch of Plan Colombia and the
Merida Initiative appear to have pushed traffickers to seek
alternate routes. Last year, local law enforcement with the help of
DEA and other international partners interdicted some 5,291
kilograms of cocaine, 35,297 kilograms of marijuana, and 3,302 units
(pills) of MDMA (ecstasy),along with approximately $1.8 million in
currency. Local law enforcement made over 200 trafficking-related
arrests. These volumes are large -- especially for a region that is
home to only about one million people -- but they represent, by DEA
estimates, less than five percent of the flow through the region.


3. (SBU) According to JIATF and DEA intelligence estimates and
projections for drug flows through the region in 2009, approximately
1450 metric tons of cocaine will flow from South America. Roughly
one third of that will transit from Venezuela, with over 220 metric
tons predicted to flow through the Eastern Caribbean. These
projections are a significant increase from past years.


4. (SBU) These expectations for increased flow through the Eastern
Caribbean are based on the assumption that continued counter drug
successes in the Eastern Pacific, Mexico and Western Caribbean will
continue to force traffickers to find paths of lesser resistance.
They also are predicated on the assumption that drug runners do not
feel threatened by interdiction efforts and capabilities by regional
law enforcement. Some also believe that political ties between some
Eastern Caribbean islands (notably St. Vincent and Dominica) and
Venezuela may facilitate narcotics trafficking through the region.
Already, DEA has seen evidence of increased use of these islands as
stash and distribution locations by Venezuelan Trafficking
organizations. More disturbingly for these small, thinly-stretched
police forces, increasing demand in Europe and sustained U.S. demand
is starting to be matched with developing local demand due to
"spillover" from trafficking operations.

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INTERDICTION CAPABILITY LAGGING
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5. (SBU) While the senior leaders in all these countries recognize
the threat posed by narcotics trafficking, they face several hurdles
to mounting a robust defense: lack of funding and equipment,
corruption within the ranks and among some in government, and
competing demands from the need to project a tourism-friendly image
all sap at the political will needed to admit to and tackle the
trafficking problem.


6. (SBU) All the countries in the region have a basic level of
competence in regards to Counter Drug (CD) interdiction capacity,
and have demonstrated willingness, even an eagerness, to engage in
training to build capacity. However, the lack of basic
investigative, prosecutorial and judicial tools, coupled with a lack
of equipment and training for the equipment, are impediments to
better interdiction. These deficiencies have limited complex
conspiracy investigations and prosecutions necessary to dismantle
modern Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) (i.e. surveillance, use
of undercover and informants, recorded calls, controlled buys and
deliveries, judicial wire intercepts, plea bargaining, the

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establishment of cooperating defendants, financial analysis, asset
forfeiture). Training to date by U.S. and international partners to
mentor and train the local agencies in these skills has been
somewhat effective, but hampered by lack of funding for follow-up
and lack of coordination within the donor community.

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WHAT'S IN THE CUPBOARD
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7. (SBU) DRUG SQUADS: Each of the countries in this area of
responsibility has its own police force with a designated drug squad
with primary responsibility for conducting drug investigations.
These drug squads tend to operate reactively rather than
proactively. Intelligence gathered is used solely to identify
when/where a load of drugs might be intercepted. When a vessel
containing drugs is intercepted, the only persons arrested are the
actual crew members on the vessel and the investigation typically
terminates at this point. The principals running the organizations
are not arrested. Cooperation by arrested crew members is rare due
in large part to a lack of plea bargaining tools and minimalist
penalties for trafficking offenses. Although some islands have
conspiracy, money laundering and asset forfeiture laws, the
prosecuting and judicial authorities have yet to use them - the
notable exception being St. Vincent, which in a landmark event made
its first arrest under such provisions in January, 2009. For the
most part, drug squads do not know how to marshal evidence against
those not found in "actual possession" of drugs.


8. (SBU) SPECIAL UNITS: In addition to drug squads, each island
may also have other agencies or units (i.e., Financial Intelligence
Units, Intelligence Units, and Special Branch Units) that support
the CD efforts of the drug squad. These specialized units operate
within the same criminal justice system that lacks the institutional
will or capacity to arrest or prosecute anyone other than the person
found in possession of drugs. Although many of those assigned to
the drug squads and specialized units are extremely dedicated, they
have inadequate facilities, and are poorly paid, trained and
equipped to carry out complex and long term investigations. There
also exists very little inter-island cooperation in terms of CD
targeting and/or coordination, unless carried out under the umbrella
of a U.S. DEA or British SOCA-led investigation.


9. (SBU) CUSTOMS AUTHORITY: Each of the seven island nations has a
Customs authority or ministry responsible for controlling the goods
and persons moving through the ports and airports. In addition to
uniformed officers, some agencies dedicate a small number of persons
(1-2) to conduct more in-depth investigations including illegal drug
importation. With the possible exception of St. Lucia, though, none
of the local Customs authorities have been significant contributors
to CD efforts in the region.


10. (SBU) PORTS: The consensus among CD partners, both local and
donor community, is that there is a very high probability that large
quantities of drugs are being moved through the maritime ports of
the island nations of the Eastern Caribbean (including Martinique
and Guadeloupe). Virtually no effort is made to verify what cargo
is passing through unless specific intelligence exists to conduct
further inquiry. The majority of the agencies lack the manpower,
technology and basic tools to perform their duties, such as
centralized databases and/or drug detector canines. Moreover,
corruption in the ports is believed to be rampant. Numerous customs
officers and guards working at the ports were arrested this past
year. DEA has identified drug sources of supply (SOS) who utilize
corrupt brokers at the port to aid in their trafficking efforts as
well as sources of supply who were actually brokers themselves.


11. (SBU) AIRPORTS: With the exception of Barbados, security at
airports in the Eastern Caribbean is lax, and the use of technical
support such as cameras, computer automation and centralized
databases is lacking. DTO's employ couriers or corrupt baggage
handlers to place bags containing drugs onto airplanes. Couriers
are also used to smuggle drugs into the U.S., UK and Canada.
Commuter airlines between the islands are frequently used to move
drugs and proceeds. DEA has provided examples of swallowers coming
from Jamaica or other mules with marijuana in their luggage on a
weekly basis to all islands in our AOR. Cocaine is also coming in
from Guyana and Trinidad, and cash is regularly transported from
Barbados to Trinidad. Investigations and intelligence have uncovered
airline employees putting drugs on inter-island flights that have
been transferred to U.S.-bound aircraft destined for JFK airport.
TSA has initiated a program in St. Lucia to improve airport security
at one of the country's two airports, but there are reports that
significant drug transshipment activity continues unabated at the
other airport.


12. (SBU) COAST GUARD/POLICE MARINE UNITS: Each island has either
a Coast Guard or a marine police unit or both for patrolling coastal

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waters and supporting CD interdiction efforts. Their effectiveness
has been minimal due to poorly maintained or inoperable assets, lack
of discipline, poor communication and/or operational protocols,
incompetence and/or corruption. The Barbados Coast Guard has the
best maritime assets in the region; however, concerns about
corruption have relegated the agency to being a virtual non-entity
in CD planning and operations. Recent evidence suggests that
persons within the agency actively assist the DTO's in their drug
trafficking activities, as reflected by the December, 2008 arrest of
a Barbados Coast Guard officer who was on board a vessel that was
returning to St Vincent after delivering approximately 423 pounds of
marijuana to Barbados. In that case, the Barbados drug squad
contacted the St Vincent Coast Guard, not the Barbados Coast Guard,
to intercept the transporting vessel.

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RSS: UNDERUTILIZED POTENTIAL
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13. (SBU) The sole aviation asset in the region with capacity to
provide aerial support of CD interdiction operation is the Regional
Security System (RSS) Air Wing, based in Barbados. The RSS is the
common military defense force that is shared and in theory
contributed to by all seven of the Eastern Caribbean partner
countries. The primary mission of the RSS air wing is to provide
detection and monitoring capacity with their two Fairchild C-26 twin
engine turbo-prop aircraft that were manufactured in 1989 and
donated by INL to the RSS in the 1990's. Unfortunately, since that
time the avionic and navigational systems of these aircraft have
become dated or obsolete, and resources to repair or update them has
dwindled with the continued reduction in INCLE assistance funds.
The staff is extremely professional, experienced and generally
successful in detecting and monitoring suspected trafficking
vessels, especially during intelligence-driven CD operations.
Unfortunately, they must rely upon inept, incompetent or corrupt
local coast guard or marine police units to conduct the actual
interdiction. The predictable result is that the RSS is far more
likely to watch a drug runner sail off into the sunset than to
coordinate an apprehension. A competent and capable surface
interdiction capacity is necessary for the full benefit of their
services to be realized.

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DONOR COMMUNITY ACTIVITY
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14. (SBU) At present, the only consistent presence of international
or NATO CD capacity within the region is provided by the French, a
serendipitous byproduct of the proximity of the French island
departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe. In June, 2008, the
commander of the French forces in the French Antilles and the
Director of the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATFS)
signed a memorandum of agreement establishing a JIATFS counter-drug
task group and regional counter-drug coordination center under
leadership of the French in Martinique.


15. (SBU) Based on the ineffectiveness of maritime assets in the
region, international agencies (DEA and SOCA) have increasingly
sought to utilize French assets during maritime interdiction
operations. In coordination with JIATFS, the French will bring
additional assets into the region to participate in periodic CD
maritime interdiction surge operations, to include long range
detection and monitoring aircraft, interdiction helicopters and high
speed surface assets with special forces tactical support. During
these operations, the U.S. and NATO allies will also typically
divert some surface assets to the region to participate.
Unfortunately these operations are conducted on an infrequent basis
(bi-annually) and generally for a short period of time (2-3 weeks)
during which many of the DTO's quickly notice the beefed up LE
presence and cease operations with the knowledge that they will not
last long.


16. (SBU) Our British and Canadian partners have been subjected to
a reduction in manpower and funding. The British had traditionally
funded a marine training center in Antigua via the RSS for Coast
Guard members but were forced to close the project due to lack of
funding. On March 31, 2009, a UK program for vetting/polygraph of
police and coast guard personnel with whom they worked was also
terminated because of funding issues. In addition, the UK Security
Advisory Team, currently assigned to the British High Commission in
Bridgetown, will cease to exist on March 31, 2010, barring any
change of policy from their new Home Secretary. The Canadians are
in the process of re-deploying their RCMP assets in the region and
will be served by one officer in Jamaica, two officers in the
Dominican Republic and one in Trinidad. The European Union, with a
budget of approximately 6 million Euros for counter drug initiatives
in the region this coming year, is focusing their priorities towards
West Africa and their partners are not optimistic about an increase

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of funding for the Eastern Caribbean.

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COMMENT
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17. (SBU) The level of cooperation among the various international
partners involved in CD activities in the region (U.S., UK, and
France) as well as select elements within the regional partner
nations to include the RSS/Air Wing is outstanding. The quality of
intelligence being generated by the regional and international
partners regarding the DTO's is extremely high and generally
includes precise information regarding planned shipments. The
missing piece to achieve successful interdictions is competent and
non-corrupt surface asset interdiction support. A common solution
proposed by CD donor countries is to allocate funding to establish a
highly trained and vetted maritime interdiction strike force
equipped with one or more surface intercept vessels which would be
under the leadership of and directly coordinated with the RSS/Air
Wing. With an RSS surface group -- a regional coast guard -- to
complement the RSS air assets, the region could be a capable partner
for U.S. counter-drug efforts. As we move forward with the Security
Dialogue with the Caribbean, the development of an RSS Regional
Coast Guard should be a priority. Other donors, such as the EU,
recognize the need for such a force and may be willing to work with
us to explore how to move toward that goal.
HARDT