JRCC ASSESSMENT, EMBASSY BRIDGETOWN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRIDGETOWN 000187

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DHS FOR DIR NATL TARGETING CTR TGOYER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER KCRM CVIS EAIR PREL XL
SUBJECT: JRCC ASSESSMENT, EMBASSY BRIDGETOWN

REF: STATE 26743


1. (SBU) The JRCC has proven to be an incredibly useful tool for
this mission and in particular for our law enforcement community.
Originally developed to screen for potential terrorist threats
attendant to the 2007 Cricket World Cup (CWC),JRCC and the APIS
system have had the unforeseen benefit of also tracking travel of
dangerous fugitives, including a number of "most wanted" criminals
from the U.S. and several INTERPOL targets. As STATE 26743 notes,
97 fugitives have been identified by JRCC since its inception in
April, 2007 (note: our figures show 99, but may include more recent
data),along with 894 "ties to terrorism" hits (our data: 1,226
hits). We have not had a mechanism to track specific cases to their
conclusion, as DHS stops tracking once the notification is made and
LEGAT and RSO at the mission do not have the time or resources to
keep methodical record on success stories. However, we are
confident that some three dozen fugitives have probably been
extradited as a direct result of JRCC/APIS information.


2. (SBU) JRCC has also been beneficial in bringing together
security professionals from 10 countries and territories in the
Caribbean to share security information at a level of intimacy not
previously achieved. This information sharing has also extended, in
a far more limited fashion, to relations between Caribbean JRCC
staff and DHS staff assigned to the unit, helping broaden our
security dialogue with these countries and deepen trust among the
partners.
There continues to be some tension locally over "ownership" of JRCC,
with both Trinidad and Tobago (holding the IMPACS seat) and Barbados
(housing the actual JRCC platform) each desiring to keep "control"
of the facility. But aside from that turf battle, all the
participants have acknowledged and praised the usefulness of the
JRCC without exception.


3. (SBU) JRCC members also complain, as do our own law enforcement
agencies, that the limitations on sharing information between the
USG and local JRCC members is an impediment to better cooperation.
This may be an insurmountable obstacle in the short term for
intelligence reasons, but anything that could be done to increase
the amount of information sharing without compromising sources or
operational effectiveness would gain substantial political capital.


4. (SBU) While the broad success of the JRCC is acknowledged, two
main problems impede the overall efficiency of the unit. The first
is the fact that many of the airlines that would be of primary
concern for terrorism purposes, i.e. those flying into Dominica and
St. Vincent from Venezuela (with connecting travel to Iran and
Syria),do not submit passenger information to the JRCC. This is a
glaring hole in the system - mitigated somewhat by the fact
traveling out of either St. Vincent or Dominica, provided it is done
via commercial air, would be entered into the APIS.


5. (SBU) The second weakness is not one that comes from JRCC, but
which hinders JRCC's effectiveness nevertheless: the judicial
bureaucracy in the United States cannot at present keep up with the
pace of information flow coming out of the JRCC. The process of
warrant notifications to local jurisdictions, confirmation of intent
to extradite, notification to DOJ's International Affairs
department, further notification to host country Justice ministries,
and determination of eligibility for extradition simply take too
long to make many of the JRCC findings actionable. Bridgetown RSO
estimates that at least 60 percent of the fugitives identified by
JRCC were ultimately lost or let go because the U.S. side could not
get the requisite paperwork together or a decision to extradite made
within the 48 hours that most local security forces will track or
detain an identified fugitive. In most of those cases, the U.S.
prosecutor in the case balked at the cost of the extradition and
decided not to pursue the case. We have excellent relationships
with local law enforcement, and they have generally been responsive
and cooperative, but they do not have the resources to track or hold
fugitives indefinitely.


6. (SBU) In addition to these external problems, JRCC's
effectiveness has been hampered by internal inefficiencies. The
current personnel structure for DHS, wherein a series of short-term
TDY officers staff the JRCC, is untenable. Those on 45-day
rotations spend much of their time ascending the learning curve, and
don't reach full effectiveness until they are due to depart. Those
who stay longer are somewhat more effective, but we lose time and
opportunity costs, especially in our RSO office, in training these
staff and integrating them into the law enforcement community at the
mission. The Embassy has approved NSDD-38 requests to hire four
full-time DHS staff to man those positions - without permanent
staffing, the important job of coordinating tracking of fugitives
and TSDB hits will fall to our already overstretched RSO staff --
which is untenable. We have also learned that DHS is considering
cutting the staffing at the JRCC from four to two positions - this
would be disastrous, as the shift work that is necessary to properly
man the unit would be impossible on a two-person rotation.

BRIDGETOWN 00000187 002 OF 002




7. (SBU) In short, JRCC and APIS are excellent law enforcement
tools that are in some respects under-utilized, that are not
properly supported in the U.S. by law enforcement agencies to push
through the needed judicial bureaucratic processes, and that are not
properly serviced by DHS under the current TDY personnel profile.
It is essential that CPB staff the approved positions it requested
through the NSDD-38 process. Such permanent staffing is vital not
only to ensure adequate Embassy support for the positions, but also
to ensure cost effective use of U.S. government resources.
Permanent staffing would also allow the development of expertise and
key relationships with local law enforcement officials that will
strengthen our interactions with the JRCC and allow us to strengthen
our mission's ability to prevent terrorists and criminals from
exploiting the borders of Caribbean countries and territories.

HARDT