CHIEF OF OFFICE CHARGED WITH GRANTING SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000049

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV LO
SUBJECT: CHIEF OF OFFICE CHARGED WITH GRANTING SECURITY
CLEARANCES MAY NOT BE ELIGIBLE TO HOLD ONE

Classified By: CDA Keith A. Eddins for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) Summary. Frantisek Blanarik, the Head of Slovakia's
National Security Office (NBU),is under pressure after the
exposure of archived files related to information he provided
to the Military Counterintelligence Service (VKR) when he was
a soldier in the mid-1980s. If Blanarik provided information
to a Communist-era intelligence service knowingly, he would
be ineligible for a security clearance, and thus ineligible
to run the office that judges the trustworthiness of others.
Blanarik's security clearance was granted in 2006, under the
government of Mikulas Dzurinda, when he was appointed Defense
Attache to Ukraine. Prime Minister Fico and Head of the
Parliament's Defense and Security Committee, Rudolf Pucik
(SNS),initially defended Blanarik, but have been silent
since the most incriminating stories were published on
January 16. The Parliamentary Committee responsible for
oversight of the NBU will meet again on February 12 to
discuss Blanarik's position. End summary.


2. (U) Slovakia's NBU is charged with granting security
clearances to government officials who come into contact with
information classified by Slovakia, NATO and/or the EU. The
Head of NBU is required to hold the highest level clearance.
According to the law on the protection of classified
information, a person is considered ineligible for such a
clearance if he or she "consciously cooperated" with the
Secret Police (STB) or an intelligence service of the
Czechoslovak People's Army.


3. (U) The center-right daily "Hospodarske Noviny" first
raised questions about Blanarik,s eligibility for a
Top-Secret clearance in April 2008, when his file was
uncovered in the archives of the VKR in Prague. Markiza
television re-opened the issue with a widely viewed report on
November 26, 2008, after references to information provided
by Blanarik were found in other files of the VKR. On January
16, 2009, the center-right Slovak daily Sme publicized
several records from the files of VKR kept in Bratislava in
the archives of the Nation,s Memory Institute (UPN).


4. (U) The sum of the information makes it clear that
Blanarik provided information that VKR deemed useful, but
leaves open to interpretation whether or not he did so
consciously. As recently as December 2008 Blanarik insisted
he did not. In his own file, however, it is written that he
"proved reliable during cooperation" and "took care to
maintain secrecy over his contacts, as well as in obtaining
intelligence," which Sme,s journalists and others have
interpreted to mean he must have cooperated knowingly.


5. (U) PM Fico (Smer) and the Chairman of Parliament's
Defense and Security Committee, Rudolf Pucik (SNS),both came
to Blanarik,s defense after the November 2008 reports. Pucik
said Blanarik is the first NBU Director who fulfills the
political and professional criteria for the position and
accused the media of engaging in a "moral striptease." Fico,
without commenting on the substance of the allegations, said
he could not imagine a "more beautiful combination for the
Prime Minister" than to have an NBU Chief whose security
clearance was granted by the previous government.


6. (U) In response to a question about Blanarik's security
clearance, former PM Mikulas Dzurinda responded by accusing
Jan Mojzis, who ran the NBU under Dzurinda's second
government from 2002 ) 2003, of "handing out stamps in the
interests of STB officers and various business interests
according to his own wishes." (Comment: Dzurinda's second
government nearly collapsed in 2003 when he moved to oust
Mojzis from the NBU. Mojzis was replaced by Aurel Ugor, who
was actually in charge of NBU at the time Blanarik received
his clearance in 2006. End comment.)


7. (C) Tom Nicholson, a Canadian-born reporter working for
Sme, told Poloff that a "Smer person" is pushing the negative
stories about Blanarik. Nicholson has no doubt that Blanarik
knowingly provided information to the VKR, and claims to have
evidence Blanarik may have personally ordered the destruction
of several tons of VKR records in 1996, when he ran the
Defense Planning Office under then Prime Minister Vladimir
Meciar (HzDS). Nicholson believes his informant's motive is
related to a business deal that is being contested by two
groups that have connections within the government. He does
not see the dispute as (another) between Smer and HzDS.
Nicholson has talked recently with both Blanarik and Mojzis,
and said both men seem to be honest, "straight shooters." He
said Mojzis speaks well of Blanarik.


8. (U) A December 11 report in the weekly Zurnal (Available
from FBIS: EUP20081225059011) cited two unnamed "high-ranking
officials of the military intelligence services", who secured
security clearances despite one admitting he worked for the

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STB on his resume, and the other having previously left the
service after losing secret materials. According to the
reporter, 90 percent of STB informers who have applied for a
security clearance have been granted one. She sees Fico's
attitude toward the Blanarik case as testimony to the
government's lack of interest in enforcing the law on
security clearances.


9. (C) Comment: Although there is no hard evidence that
Blanarik cooperated knowingly with the VKR, not even his
supporters deny the likelihood that he did. Blanarik was an
officer in the Czechoslovak People's Army at a time when most
answered the VKR's questions about colleagues' foreign
travels and contacts, and all certainly knew why such
questions were being asked. According to some, Blanarik is
an effective administrator who is being targeted because of a
venal dispute. Whether the charges against Blanarik provoke
sympathy, disgust or apathy depends on whom you ask. The
central issue remains, however, that few of Slovakia's
political elite seem concerned about ensuring that the NBU
Chief fulfills the legal requirements to hold this sensitive
position or about maintaining the organization's reputation
amongst its foreign partners.
EDDINS