SLOVAKIA AGREES TO RESETTLE THREE GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000470


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/5/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER LO HU PHUM
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA AGREES TO RESETTLE THREE GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

CLASSIFIED BY: Simon R. Hankinson, Consul.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



1. (C) Summary: In a November 4 meeting with Special Envoy for
Guantanamo Closure Dan Fried, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico
agreed to accept three Guantanamo detainees for resettlement in
Slovakia. After further discussion of details and logistics
with Foreign Minister Lajcak and Interior Minister Kalinak, it
appears likely the conclusion of the entire process, i.e. actual
arrival of detainees in Slovakia, could occur before January 20,

2010. End Summary.


2. (C) Special Envoy Fried came to Bratislava November 4 at the
invitation of the Slovaks to discuss possible Slovak acceptance
of Guantanamo detainees. Fried and the Charge met with Prime
Minister Fico, Foreign Minister Lajcak, and Interior Minister
Kalinak at the Prime Minister's office. Fico unambiguously
confirmed his approval of Slovakia accepting three detainees,
commenting that taking only one would be a mere "token" while
three would be a "substantive" statement. He was confident that
the decision was right politically; given Slovakia's criticism
of Guantanamo in the past, helping President Obama close it was
now Slovakia's moral duty.


3. (C) Fried explained that the USG would be able to provide
modest assistance with resettlement costs for the former
detainees. Fico replied that -- at this point -- he believed
taking money would send the wrong political message
domestically, but he reserved the right to change his mind in
the future. Fico also asked that the U.S. avoid any public
announcement or press play until later in the process, with
which Fried concurred. Fico and Fried also agreed that prior to
the public announcement the U.S. would engage with Slovak
opposition leader Dzurinda to discourage any use of the issue in
the 2010 Slovak election campaign. Having given the green
light, Fico then turned the meeting over to his Foreign and
Interior Ministers to work out the details.


4. (C) In the follow-on discussion, which U.S. Consul and S/GC
officer Michael Williams joined, there were no Slovaks present
other than the two ministers. Lajcak said that the decision is
still close-hold and no civil servants or other professional
staff had yet been brought in (although Kalinak confirmed that
Slovak intelligence chief Magla is on board and supportive of
the plan).


5. (C) The Slovaks were aware that there had been some detainees
from the former Soviet Union and suggested that they might be
more easily integrated in Slovakia, but Fried explained that the
remaining available detainees were either Uighurs or North
African or Syrian Arabs. The Foreign Minister preferred not to
take Uighurs, seeking to avoid problems with China;
interestingly, he asked Fried for his opinion on what those
problems might be, indicating that this fear is not rooted in
specific anticipated retaliation of any kind. Kalinak preferred
to take Uighurs, because they would present fewer security
issues. Fried outlined potential advantages of the Uighurs
(e.g., lower security risk). But in the end, Lajcak asked that
the files sent to Slovakia not include any Uighurs. Both
ministers thought it would be easier to work with three
different nationalities/ethnicities rather than three from the
same country. (Note: Slovakia has a miniscule Muslim population
-- mostly students -- in the low hundreds.)


6. (C) Fried explained the process in general: within two
weeks, the U.S. will send the Slovaks files on selected
detainees to consider; the Slovaks will review the files and
then, if they wish, visit Guantanamo to interview candidates;
they select their three; the U.S. Administration will notify the
U.S. Congress; Diplomatic Notes will be negotiated and exchanged
regarding re-settlement conditions; and, finally, the detainees
are flown via U.S. mil-air to Slovakia. Fried added that
additional questions following review of files and/or interviews
could be handled through appropriate liaison channels. The two
ministers had no objections to this process. Kalinak said he
would want to bring in the Director of his Migration Office and
experts from the Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS) and security
service, and that they would want to visit Guantanamo (as they
also did recently before re-settling 10 Cuban refugees in 2008).
It was agreed that the USG would send files on 10 possible
candidates, not including Uighurs, to the Slovaks as soon as
possible, through the Embassy [Note: the files were provided and
transmitted to the Slovak MFA and MOI on November 6]. Fried
added that the US would eventually provide Schengen-releasable
versions of the detainee files to the Slovaks to allow them to
comply with EU arrangements on this issue.


7. (C) In response to Fried's offer of help with the media,
Lajcak said that they might ask, but not yet. He admitted that
everything the Fico Administration would do from now until the
national parliamentary elections in June was going to be
"political," and said they would decide later how to release and
present the decision on accepting detainees. He also requested
that Fried not talk to opposition politicians or anyone else in
Slovakia at this stage. Kalinak added that the GoS had
experienced practically no negative reaction to the Cuban
resettlement or their temporary hosting of around 100
Palestinians (currently on their way from Iraq to the U.S. as
refugees). Neither anticipated this being a domestic political
problem if handled properly.


8. (C) Kalinak thought that the Slovaks could have their part
(review of files, visit to Guantanamo, final selection of
detainees, re-settlement logistical arrangements) done in time
for a decision on which detainees to accept by late December.
Both Kalinak and Lajcak -- and Fico, in the earlier meeting --
understood the importance of the U.S. transferring the detainees
by January 20.


9. (C) Embassy Comment: Fico told Fried he was motivated by
principle in deciding to accept detainees; having harshly
criticized the detainee policies of the Bush Administration, he
felt a responsibility to help President Obama close the
facility. Perhaps. But the Slovaks also recognize they are
accumulating chits that they may want to use at some point. And
they may hope to out-shine Hungary, which has publicly offered
to take one detainee (and with whom Lajcak noted they need help
addressing Hungarian efforts to engage the U.S. Congress in
passing an anti-Slovak-language-law resolution). But whatever
their motivation, taking three detainees for resettlement helps
move the U.S. closer to its goal of early closure of Guantanamo.
End Comment.


EDDINS