Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRATISLAVA455
2009-10-26 16:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

ASD VERSHBOW'S MEETING WITH SLOVAK FOREIGN MINISTER LAJCAK:

Tags:  PREL NATO MARR BIH LO AF 
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSL #0455/01 2991603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 261603Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0223
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA 0263
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRATISLAVA 000455 

SIPDIS

DOD PASS TO OSD/P
STATE PASS TO EUR/CE, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR BIH LO AF
SUBJECT: ASD VERSHBOW'S MEETING WITH SLOVAK FOREIGN MINISTER LAJCAK:
GOOD NEWS ON AFGHANISTAN, CONCERNS ABOUT BOSNIA

BRATISLAVA 00000455 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Keith A. Eddins, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., State.

REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRATISLAVA 000455

SIPDIS

DOD PASS TO OSD/P
STATE PASS TO EUR/CE, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR BIH LO AF
SUBJECT: ASD VERSHBOW'S MEETING WITH SLOVAK FOREIGN MINISTER LAJCAK:
GOOD NEWS ON AFGHANISTAN, CONCERNS ABOUT BOSNIA

BRATISLAVA 00000455 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Keith A. Eddins, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., State.

REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1.(C) SUMMARY: In an October 22 meeting prior to the opening of
the Bratislava NATO defense ministerial, FM Lajcak told ASD
Vershbow that the Slovaks would use the ministerial to announce
a 150-soldier increase in their troop strength in Afghanistan
(to 400),as well as the lifting of most -- but not all -- of
the caveats under which their forces now operate. Lajcak also
reviewed a laundry list of European security issues, expressing
deep personal concerns about the situation in Bosnia, citing a
`window of opportunity' on Macedonia, and expressing the hope
that the preparation of the Alliance's new Strategic Concept
would be transparent and inclusive, giving countries such as
Slovakia a real voice in the drafting process. Vershbow
welcomed the Slovak decisions on Afghanistan, reassured Lajcak
that the U.S. was committed to all NATO allies contributing to
the new Strategic Concept, and agreed with the Slovak foreign
minister on the importance of managing NATO-Russia relations
well. END SUMMARY.




2. (C) Slovak Foreign Minister Lajcak opened his October 22
meeting with visiting Assistant Secretary of Defense Vershbow by
expressing Slovakia's appreciation for Vice President Biden's
ongoing trip to Central Europe; he said that the Vice
President's public statements -- including the speech he had
just delivered in Bucharest -- were sending `all the right
messages' to the region. He particularly welcomed Biden's
recognition that the CEE countries are no longer transitional,
but have now become solid, `normal' members of the western
community. Lajcak said `it's now our turn to demonstrate that
you made a good investment' in Central Europe. He added that
this was the message he was hearing from both President Obama
and the Vice President Biden, and Slovakia took this message to
heart.




3. (C) In this regard, Slovakia intended to use the NATO defense

ministerial to announce an increase in its troop commitment of
approximately 150 soldiers, raising its total contribution to

400. The Slovaks also intended to lift most (albeit not all)
caveats on the deployment of those troops. Defense Minister
Baska would discuss the details on October 23, but Lajcak said
the increase would include creating a Slovak-led OMLT, as well
as providing patrol units and "multi-task" troops who could
provide protection for Slovak engineering units, who will now be
allowed to leave the bases to which they had previously been
restricted. Lajcak said Prime Minister Fico was not yet
prepared to allow "combat units" (meaning Special Forces acting
independently from support of Slovak engineers) until after the
June 2010 Slovak parliamentary elections, fearing that such a
move would be used against him by the opposition. Vershbow
welcomed the immediate Slovak decision, and also urged them to
continue to expand both the size and scope of their mission once
a new government was in place in 2010.




4. (C) With regard to NATO's next Strategic Concept, Lajcak
welcomed new SYG Rasmussen's approach, but emphasized that the
preparation and drafting of the documents needs to be
"transparent and inclusive." Given that not all NATO members
are represented on former-Secretary of State Albright's team of
experts, he said it would be unwise simply to present the NAC
with a "final" document for approval. The entire NAC -- meaning
all NATO Allies -- needs to be fully involved in the development
of the new Strategic Concept throughout the process; otherwise
he feared that NATO would face the same problems the EU did when
it presented its ill-fated European Constitution to member
states, many of whom did not feel they had been adequately
involved in the drafting. Vershbow responded that ex-Secretary
Albright well understood the needs of Central Europeans, and he
said the U.S. agreed that all Allies should have a hand in
preparing the new Strategic Concept. He said the U.S. also
supported SYG Rasmussen's overall approach to reforming Alliance
structures, which we hope will lead to budgetary savings.




5. (C) Lajcak noted that the Strategic Concept drafters will be
hard-pressed to find the right balance between Article 5
commitments and NATO's out-of-area commitments and needs,
particularly given the divergent views of Allies (e.g., Poland
and the Baltic states vs. older members). He suggested that the
exercise might also provide a good opportunity to increase
cooperation and communications with NATO's international
partners, particularly the UN and EU. He opined that it was
`insane' not to have official communications channels between

BRATISLAVA 00000455 002.2 OF 004


NATO and the EU. Vershbow agreed and noted the renewed efforts
the U.S. was putting into seeking a Cyprus solution that would
-- by extension -- permit greater NATO-EU communications. On
Article 5, Vershbow assured Lajcak that the U.S. was equally
committed to finding the right balance between expeditionary
missions and core Alliance security requirements.




6. (C) On Russia, Lajcak suggested that the U.S. and NATO take
Moscow's actions at face value, not adopting policies that were
either reflexively pro-Russian or anti-Russian. The Alliance
needed to be open with and to Moscow, but without compromising
our core principles. We need Russian cooperation on difficult
issues such as Afghanistan, piracy, terrorism and Iran, and thus
we need pragmatic, open relations. But Russia cannot be given a
veto over NATO membership decisions, Lajcak insisted, nor can it
assume a renewed sphere of influence in the old Soviet space.
Lajcak noted that he had been in Moscow just before the U.S.
announced its new approach to missile defense (which, he added,
the Slovaks welcomed as addressing the needs of all Allies),and
found his Russian interlocutors in a relatively positive mood
vis-a-vis NATO and the U.S. Vershbow said the U.S. was
encouraged but realistic about the Moscow's response to the
President's decision on missile defense, and noted that we were
seeking to implement the Obama-Medvedev agreement to conduct a
common threat assessment with the Russians. The big question,
Vershbow continued, was whether the Russians would be able to
acknowledge that Iran presented a real threat; even now they
were offering mixed signals on sanctions. Lajcak agreed, noting
that the Russians wanted it both ways on Iran, but he opined
that waiting for Iran to actually create a nuclear warhead would
be much too late for all concerned.




7. (C) On NATO's `open door' policy, Lajcak suggested that the
recent Greek elections have opened a window of opportunity for
bringing Macedonia into the Alliance sooner than anticipated.
He said the Greek government was signaling that it was open to a
quick compromise on Macedonia's name as it begins its new term
from a position of relative strength; the longer we wait, the
more difficult it will be. On MAP for Montenegro, Lajcak was
also quite positive and said Slovakia supports it; Montenegro is
now a `normal' country, whose small size shouldn't matter.
Lajcak also leaned toward early MAP for Bosnia, even if the
country doesn't meet all the criteria, given the positive
political signal it would send to a number of different
audiences.




8. (C) Continuing on Bosnia, Lajcak -- the former UN/EU high
representative there -- noted that he had just returned from a
trip to the Balkans with Deputy Secretary Steinberg and Carl
Bildt. He opined that the political situation was worse than
when he (Lajcak) left Sarajevo in mid-winter to take over the
Slovak MFA. The Bosniaks were frustrated by the EU's position
on visa liberalization, and believe the Serbs are effectively
preventing them from getting NATO MAP status. The Republika
Srbska leadership is -- according to Lajcak -- generally
supportive of MAP, but the ethnic Serbian population is not.
Putting objective criteria aside, giving MAP to Bosnia would be
a powerful political signal that NATO should consider. And we
should be cautious, he added, about any linking of MAP for
Western Balkan states to the separate path Ukraine and Georgia
are following. To delay Montenegro and Bosnia because of
Ukraine and Georgia would, in effect, be giving the Russians
undue power over the Western Balkans and NATO's own
decision-making. Statements such as that by Ukraine's former
Acting Foreign Minister that MAP for Montenegro would be a
`hostile act' shouldn't be given undue weight; otherwise Ukraine
would be holding other prospective members hostage.




9. (C) Vershbow agreed that the former Soviet space --
particularly questions involving Ukraine and Georgia, but
extending eastward -- was `still scratchy' and problematic.
NATO needed to keep the "open door" open, and we were certainly
encouraging the Macedonians to make every effort with the Greeks
to reach an accommodation on the name issue. We need to keep
working on Ukraine and Georgia, with their `functional
equivalent' of MAP, but recognize how tricky the issues are
vis-a-vis Russia; Vershbow pointed to the Black Sea Fleet issue
as one example of a festering problem that Moscow seeks to
exploit.


BRATISLAVA 00000455 003.2 OF 004





10. (C) With regard to Bosnia, Vershbow acknowledge U.S.
worries, and asked whether Lajcak was serious about Dodik's
willingness to endorse MAP for Bosnia. Lajcak said that Dodik
was indeed in favor of MAP and eventual NATO membership, but his
constituency still was not. Nor was Dodik so committed that he
would put NATO ahead of other, domestic issues. Lajcak lamented
that the sides in Bosnia were now further apart than we left the
High Representative in March to become Slovak foreign minister.
We are without sticks or carrots, he suggested, and the status
quo suits the ethnic Serbs' needs at present. Taking something
-- like MAP -- away as a `punishment' was not going to have an
effect, and would only further isolate the country. He
therefore encouraged early MAP as a way to wrap Bosnia a bit
more closely into Europe, perhaps giving Dodik some additional
cover for further work within the ethnic Serb community.




11. (C) On Georgia and Ukraine, Lajcak said that in recent
meetings he found the Georgian foreign minister more realistic
than his (just replaced) Ukrainian counterpart, who seemed to be
seeking `something spectacular' in advance of the Ukrainian
presidential elections. Vershbow agreed that the Georgians were
more realistic and better understood the constraints, pointing
to their acceptance of a gradual step-by-step approach to
security assistance that started with training, doctrine
development and military education to promote reform of the
armed forces before weapons acquisition could be considered.




12. (C) Turning to Kosovo in response to Vershbow's query about
recognition, Lajcak confirmed that Bratislava would not be
granting formal recognition `within the next year or two' given
political realities in Slovakia. But he assured Vershbow that
Slovakia would be `practical and pragmatic,' noting that he had
taken a number of steps as foreign minister to make the
Slovakia-Kosovo relationship more normal (e.g., accepting Kosovo
passports, accepting IMF and World Bank membership). Lajcak
also noted that Slovakia actually wanted to slow down the
reduction of Slovak forces in KFOR; he said he thought a
drawdown from 140 to two was too precipitous and sent the wrong
political signal. Thus, the Slovaks would be working within
NATO to slow down their withdrawal so that they retained a more
appropriate proportion of forces there over the coming years.




12. (C) On Serbia, Vershbow explained that the Southern European
Defense Ministers (SEDM) had just agreed to accept Serbia as a
full member along with Montenegro, despite some concerns about
Belgrade blocking future Kosovo membership; the U.S. supported
this, however, as a step in encouraging Serbia's integration in
the Euro-Atlantic community. Lajcak welcomed the move, noting
that the Serbs could act pragmatically; he pointed to a recent
Visegrad Four event in Budapest at which the V4 found a formula
that permitted both Serbia and Kosovo to attend and sit at the
same table. The key Lajcak said, was to focus on substance, not
symbols, as well moved forward with reintegrating Serbia into
Europe.




13. (C) EMBASSY COMMENT: ASD Vershbow's October 21-22 bilateral
program -- prior to the formal opening of the Bratislava
informal NATO defense ministerial -- was an extremely useful
opportunity for us to engage with key Slovak international
security and foreign policy interlocutors. In addition to his
meeting with Lajcak, Vershbow saw Political Director Slobodnik,
Chief of Defense Staff General Bulik, and MOD Secretary General
Demetrian. He also met with an influential group of
non-governmental foreign and security policy experts (on the
margins of a Slovak Atlantic Commission conference at which he
also spoke),and effectively engaged with the press on issues
such as missile defense, Afghanistan, and the future of NATO.




14. (C) COMMENT, continued: Slovak officials such as Lajcak --
as well as Deputy Prime Minister Kalinak and Defense Minister
Baska (who met with Secretary Gates, septel) -- generally take a
solid, Atlanticist line in their dealings with U.S. and NATO
officials. And on many issues they cooperate closely with us.
But they often find themselves having to walk back Prime
Minister Fico's loose rhetoric, as they did October 22-23
following Fico's unsolicited statement to the press that he

BRATISLAVA 00000455 004.2 OF 004


would "never agree to locate any element of the missile defense
system in Slovakia." Lajcak, in his meeting with Vershbow,
shook his head wearily as he sought to explain his PM's comments
as referring to "sovereign prerogatives," while reiterating --
as did Kalinak with Secretary Gates -- that Slovakia fully
supported and endorsed the new U.S. scheme as a valuable NATO
project.




15. (U) This telegram was cleared by ASD/ISA Vershbow.
EDDINS