Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRATISLAVA390
2009-09-08 16:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

LOW EXPECTATIONS IN ADVANCE OF FICO-BAJNAI BILATERAL

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM LO HU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA 0182
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000390 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/8/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM LO HU
SUBJECT: LOW EXPECTATIONS IN ADVANCE OF FICO-BAJNAI BILATERAL

BRATISLAVA 00000390 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Keith A. Eddins, CDA, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000390

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/8/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM LO HU
SUBJECT: LOW EXPECTATIONS IN ADVANCE OF FICO-BAJNAI BILATERAL

BRATISLAVA 00000390 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Keith A. Eddins, CDA, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1.(C) Introduction and Summary. Expectations for the September
10 meeting between Prime Minister Fico and his Hungarian
counterpart are justifiably low. What the two leaders can
achieve -- beyond salvaging battered reputations (particularly
among fellow EU members) -- is an open question. In a September
2 article in the Slovak daily SME, PM Bajnai stated that he
would like to intensify government-to-government cooperation on
a range of practical issues: infrastructure connecting the two
counties, the problems of Roma and energy. He urges the
creation of a non-governmental commission of respected Slovaks
and Hungarians. While GOS officials speak about the same sort
of "practical" cooperation, they reacted mainly to Bajnai's
criticism of the Slovak language amendment and the participation
of the Slovak National Party (which Bajnai likened to Jobbik) in
the Slovak Government. PM Fico archly noted in a subsequent
radio interview that, were it not for the presence of the SNS in
the government, Slovakia would not have been able to withstand
the pressure to which it has been subjected by Budapest.




2. (C) On this side of the Danube nationalist rhetoric and
policy, e.g., the language law, the propagation of myths about
"Old Slovaks," and a new-found enthusiasm for flag and anthem
are key features not of the Slovak National Party's platform,
but that of the Prime Minister's Smer party. Given that fact,
and the prevailing view here that Hungarian officials behave
arrogantly toward Slovakia, it's unlikely that Fico will
approach this meeting with an eye to genuine rapprochement.
That said, we sense that in this election season, the unwelcome
international spotlight on the language amendment and the
reactions among EU partners to the decision to declare President
Solyom unwelcome has unnerved at least some in the GOS in a way
that earlier dust-ups have not.




3. (C) From Embassy Budapest's perspective, PM Bajnai seems
sincere in his desire to decrease tension but is also limited in

his maneuvering. His attendance at the September 4 Slovak
Armed Forces Day event, along with an unusually large turnout of
senior Hungarian officials, was clearly meant to convey an
outstretched hand. But the highly emotional nature of the
issues in dispute means he must achieve some measure of success
in moderating Slovak positions or risk a deadly public
perception that he's incapable of protecting Hungarian
interests. While committed to the upcoming meeting, Bajnai
expressed concern to our Charge in Budapest that Fico is less
than sincere in his desire for a successful outcome. On the
flip side, however, the Slovak Ambassador in Budapest told us
that Fico was blindsided by Bajnai's Sme article over the
weekend, which he claims has not helped to create a positive
environment for the talks.




4. (C) We will continue to encourage open lines of
communication, practical partnership on common concerns, e.g.,
the condition of Roma, and support for a bigger role for civil
society in promoting responsible dialogue. Embassies Bratislava
and Budapest agree we should avoid being drawn into this complex
and neuralgic relationship, but also should be prepared for even
chillier relations in the run-up to the respective elections.
Even after the campaign rhetoric fades it will take a long time
for Slovak-Hungarian relations to normalize. End Introduction
and Summary.



Plus ca Change

--------------




5. (C) The negative interplay amongst the main protagonists in
the Slovak-Hungarian drama has varied little in the past few
years, even as the players themselves have changed. A few
months ago, there were signs that the new pairing of Foreign
Ministers Lajcak and Balasz might be more complementary than
that of former ministers Kubis and Goncz. Their first meeting
was marked by mutual pledges to focus on pragmatic dialogue, and
statements to the press about a "new chapter" in the
relationship.




6. (C) Fast forward a few months. The new Special Advisor for
Slovak-Hungarian relations, Juraj Migas (until recently the
Slovak Ambassador to Budapest),complained to us just as
bitterly as had Kubis about the alleged Hungarian penchant for

BRATISLAVA 00000390 002.2 OF 003


making "unreasonable" demands and for repeatedly sandbagging the
Slovaks in front of the media. Migas recounted how the
Hungarian side, only minutes before a press conference between
then-PM Gyurscany and PM Fico, handed over a copy of Gyurscany's
so-called "six points," requests that he then proceeded to
enumerate at the press conference. The Slovaks, particularly
Fico, felt blindsided, even betrayed.




7. (C) Migas detailed the myriad attempts, including by PM
Fico, FM Lajcak and President Gasparovic to turn off the
"private visit" of President Solyom to Komarno for the unveiling
of a statue of St. Stephen. Migas's account acknowledged the
Hungarians had notified the Slovaks of a potential Solyom visit,
at least verbally, some time ago. We inferred from his comments
that information may have fallen through the cracks during the
somnolent summer months, but that when the formal notice came in
mid-August, alarm bells went off on in high political, if not
diplomatic circles. (Comment: Solyom had infuriated Fico by
making a similar private visit to Komarno in late 2007, during
which he referred to Slovakia as "Felvidek," or the
"up-country." There was no way that Fico was going to permit a
Komarno redux in 2009.)




8. (C) The end result of this latest episode is that the level
of mistrust and antipathy toward Hungarian officialdom,
including among the diplomats, is higher than ever. During a
two-hour discussion which never strayed from the topic of
Slovak-Hungarian relations, Migas became quite exercised as he
described a litany of perceived slights and injustices. And,
as ex-Foreign Minister Demes told us September 7, Lajcak has
found himself back in the kind of ethnic politics he thought he
had left behind in Bosnia, and he's not happy about it.



Fico-Bajnai Meeting: No Cure

--------------




9. (C) In a summary of FM Lajcak's August 21 briefing to the
diplomatic corps, the MFA defended its decision to ban Solyom
with the following arguments: "the President is an active part
of the international defamation campaign against Slovakia~" and
the "Hungarian side refuses to have bilateral dialogue with
Slovakia." Furthermore, Solyom "ignored the sensitive date of
August 21: the anniversary of the invasion and occupation of the
then-Czechoslovakia by Soviet and other troops including the
Hungarian army." (Comment: as one Slovak commentator wryly
noted, perhaps a more "insensitive" coincidence was the presence
of a large delegation from the Russian Interior Ministry -- in
uniform -- at the celebration of Slovakia's recent Constitution
Day. End Comment.)




10. (C) We met with the MFA's action officer for Hungary after
the announcement of the September 10 Fico-Bajnai meeting. His
comments reinforce the perception that the upcoming meeting will
have little salutary effect on bilateral relations. At this
point, diplomats feel increasingly trapped by a dynamic which
they neither desire nor control. Our contact acknowledged with
resignation that the upcoming election seasons would exacerbate
strained relations further.




11. (C) The run-up to the Bajnai-Fico meeting has been as
fraught as the relationship: although each side states it wants
an open and constructive dialogue, perceptions of what that
entails differ widely. The Slovaks believe that raising issues
like the language law in institutions such as the European
Parliament, the OSCE and the COE is tantamount to an
"international defamation campaign," and that Hungarian attempts
to engage on such issues, even on a bilateral level, constitute
interference in Slovakia's internal affairs. Public comments
from both sides designed perhaps to placate internal critics,
e.g., Bajnai's erroneous assertion that ethnic Hungarians in
Slovakia will face fines for worshipping in their mother tongue
and Fico's denigration of St. Stephen ("let nobody pretend that
Stephen is some kind of Slovak king; we have our Svatopluk"),
further sour the atmosphere. In this context, virtually no one
has high hopes for the premiers' meeting.




BRATISLAVA 00000390 003.2 OF 003


Comment and Conclusion

--------------




12. (C) Simply put: it is not in this government's perceived
interest to improve relations with Hungary or with the Hungarian
minority in Slovakia. No meeting will change that. Seen in
the most sympathetic light, a nationalist- oriented government
has decided -- perhaps partly in reaction to a long history of
oppression -- that it is time to put the "state forming nation"
on a pedestal. A new version of history, Slovak (only) heroes
and fealty to Slovak (only) symbols are seen as a way to win
votes and perhaps, as well, to frame the impressive achievements
of Slovakia's recent past, as distinctly "Slovak."




13. (C) While pride in these achievements (NATO and EU
membership, Eurozone entry) is justified, the cynicism and
silliness of PM Fico's claim that the language law was a
response to the "winds of irredentism blowing across the
Danube," or Slota's recent warning that Hungary is attempting to
provoke armed conflict, are clear. This sort of rhetoric and
the attempt to raise one group (the state-forming nation) at the
expense of another for electoral purposes is undermining
relations among citizens and distracting from Slovakia's real
challenges (an unstated goal of the strategy).




14. (C) As one prominent ethnic Hungarian told us: "the mood
within the Hungarian community is really becoming more and more
`radical.' Everyone, even the most pro-Slovak Hungarian
intellectuals are simply fed up with the all of the
anti-Hungarian program which is pouring out of some corners of
the governing coalition." The irony, of course, would be if
the drumbeat of negative rhetoric toward Slovakia's Hungarian
minority put the wind in the sails of those relative few who do
talk about and long for, at least some sort of "autonomy."
From our standpoint, it's just a matter of time.




15. (C) Embassies Bratislava and Budapest urge an even-handed
USG approach that avoids taking sides and continues to encourage
the parties to address seriously the problems in the
relationship. In light of the rise in extremist activity and
rhetoric, it is essential that Slovak and Hungarian leaders make
a genuine effort to calm the waters. Given Slovak politicians'
expressed concerns about the ramifications of a FIDESZ victory
in 2010, they may be receptive to messages that working
constructively with the Bajnai government may provide the best
near-term opportunity to move the bilateral relationship
forward. We will monitor closely the implementation of the
new language law, and continue to stress the importance of
tolerance and respect for minorities. There are many Slovaks
and ethnic Hungarians who support this agenda; however, they are
often drowned out by the likes of Jan Slota and Robert Fico.
In this election year, the quieter voices of reason stand little
chance.




16. (U) This report was coordinated with Embassy Budapest.
EDDINS