Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRATISLAVA303
2009-07-10 09:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bratislava
Cable title:  

NEW DOUBTS ON INTEGRITY OF SLOVAK SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS

Tags:  PREL PGOV LO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4027
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSL #0303/01 1910952
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 100952Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0025
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA 0047
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000303 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE, EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV LO
SUBJECT: NEW DOUBTS ON INTEGRITY OF SLOVAK SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS
ARISE

REF: A) BRATISLAVA 49 B) BRATISLAVA 122 C) BRATISLAVA 142

BRATISLAVA 00000303 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Susan M. Ball, CDA, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
Subject: NEW DOUBTS ON INTEGRITY OF SLOVAK SECURITY CLEARANCE
PROCESS ARISE



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRATISLAVA 000303

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE, EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV LO
SUBJECT: NEW DOUBTS ON INTEGRITY OF SLOVAK SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS
ARISE

REF: A) BRATISLAVA 49 B) BRATISLAVA 122 C) BRATISLAVA 142

BRATISLAVA 00000303 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Susan M. Ball, CDA, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
Subject: NEW DOUBTS ON INTEGRITY OF SLOVAK SECURITY CLEARANCE
PROCESS ARISE




1. (C) Introduction and Summary: Following months of
revelations drawn from archival files that the head of the
Slovak National Security Office, Frantisek Blanarik,
collaborated with the Communist-era Czechoslovak intelligence
services, new information has come to light casting further
doubt on the integrity of the Slovak clearance process. The
recently-appointed Ambassador to Moscow and a member of the
Slovak Security Council possess security clearances despite
compelling evidence of their cooperation with the Czechoslovak
secret services. The Slovak Government's reaction has been to
ignore the documentary evidence, and, in the case of Ambassador
Migas, to criticize the media for damaging his reputation and
that of Slovak diplomacy. End Introduction and Summary.




2. (C) As reported ref a-c, Frantisek Blanarik, the head
of the National Security Office, has a well-documented record
of collaboration with Czechoslovak Military Intelligence. Per
ref c, Charge on March 18 conveyed U.S. views on the need for
strict adherence to national laws regarding the issuance of
security clearances. Charge observed that the evidence
presented by the media strongly suggested that Blanarik is not,
according to Slovak law, eligible for a security clearance, let
alone to head the agency which grants them.




3. (C) MFA Director General Igor Slobodnik responded that
this was not an issue over which the MFA had jurisdiction, and
that it would be referred to the Prime Minister's office. Post
has not received any further response to the demarche. In a
subsequent meeting with Blanarik (at his request) Charge
reiterated that this was not about Blanarik, per se, but about
the need to maintain international commitments. A member of
Blanarik's staff told us that "everyone" in his generation had
to report on colleagues. She also added that as soon as the

press coverage subsided, the matter would be forgotten.



"Anyone Can Get a Clearance"

--------------




4. (C) On June 18, former Speaker of Parliament and
communist party official Josef Migas was named as Slovak
Ambassador to Moscow. In response to media reports detailing
Migas' work with the StB as a university student in Kyiv (also
drawn from archival records),the MFA spokesman protested that
the media had launched a political campaign to undermine Migas
and Slovak diplomacy. The statement also noted that: "
Ambassador Migas, like other Slovak Ambassadors, must before
leaving on assignment fulfill all of the requisite expert,
security and moral criteria. According to Slovak law, the pasts
of all candidates for the post of Ambassador, including possible
cooperation with the former state security services, must be
evaluated by several agencies which cooperate with the National
Security Office. Without a valid security clearance from the
NBU, the President could not have named Mr. Migas to the post of
Ambassador to Moscow. "




5. (C) A senior Slovak diplomat who was also appointed
Ambassador the same day told us that "the problem is that anyone
can receive a clearance now." Indeed, that appears to be the
case. Svatopluk Ratusky, a member of the Slovak National
Security Council since January 2007, served during the Cold War
as a member of the army unit guarding the Czechoslovak border
near Bratislava. It was his job to follow, arrest and
interrogate those who tried to flee to the West. Ratusky
received bonuses for his service as an army intelligence
official as late as October 1989. Although the organization
for which he worked is not among those listed in Slovak law as
automatically disqualifying for a security clearance, it is
clear that, like Migas and Blanarik, Ratusky "knowingly
cooperated with the security structures." According to Slovak
law, evidence to that effect is disqualifying.




BRATISLAVA 00000303 002.2 OF 002



6. (SBU) Ratusky's more recent past is troubling as well.
In the mid-1990's he moved to the Slovak Secret Services, where
he served in the counter-terrorism unit. Ratusky is among those
accused of involvement in the 1995 kidnapping of the President
Kovac's son.



Conclusion:

--------------




7. (C) The documentary evidence suggesting that Migas,
Ratusky and Blanarik collaborated with the communist-era
services is compelling. Slovak law prohibits the issuance of a
security clearance to any such individual. Yet, representatives
of the Slovak Government continue to state that each man
fulfills the necessary criteria for a clearance. Given the
sensitive and important positions each holds--head of the
National Security Office, Ambassador to Moscow and member of the
Slovak Security Council--we wanted to flag for Washington and
for USNATO these latest revelations.
BALL