FOREIGN MINISTER LAJCAK RAISES RED FLAG ABOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 000240

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2019
TAGS: PREL LO HU
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER LAJCAK RAISES RED FLAG ABOUT
KOSOVO PRECEDENT AS HUNGARIAN ISSUES CONTINUE TO ROIL
SLOVAK POLITICS

REF: A) 09 BRATISLAVA 221 B) 08 BRATISLAVA 524

Classified By: Keith A. Eddins, CDA, a.i., for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (U) This message has been coordinated with Embassy
Budapest.


2. (C) Introduction and Comment: Foreign Minister Lajcak
recently raised his deep concerns with Charge about Hungarian
opposition party Fidesz's intended citation of the Ahtisaari
plan as a model for the treatment of ethnic minorities.
According to Lajcak, this would be interpreted here as
support for broad autonomy or even independence for ethnic
Hungarians in Slovakia. Furthermore, it would cement
Slovakia's refusal to recognize Kosovo's independence
throughout the term of the next government. Lajcak asked if
the U.S. could deliver a strong message to Fidesz leadership
that such a platform would be counter-productive.


3. (C) Meanwhile, against a backdrop of almost daily
revelations of corruption involving the governing coalition,
and, in particular, the Slovak National Party (SNS),the
so-called "Hungarian Card" has been brought out of its very
brief retirement in some interesting ways. Following initial
reports that a new group advocating ethnic-Hungarian
autonomy, "Harmonia AT," had been formed in southern
Slovakia, media disclosed that documents outlining the
group's aims had been produced on the computer of a former
intelligence officer with close ties to Jan Slota and SNS.
Separately, reacting to comments by Hungarian politician
Viktor Orban's May 23 statement that the upcoming European
Parliamentary elections would determine the influence of
Hungarians throughout the Carpathian Basin in Brussels, PM
Fico and his coalition partners pledged a united response
because Slovakia's "territorial integrity and sovereignty"
had been threatened.


4. (C) While Lajcak's analysis of Slovak reactions may be
well-founded, the heated rhetoric and false flag operations
seem a transparent attempt to distract from scandals and
serious domestic issues. And, as usual, the distinct but
overlapping political agendas of SMK leader Pal Csaky and his
colleague on the other side of the Danube, Viktor Orban,
provide the perfect foils for Slovak nationalists. End
introduction and comment.


Fears of Ahtisaari Precedent in Slovakia
--------------


5. (C) Slovak FM Lajcak pulled Charge out of a diplomatic
corps event May 23 to request active U.S. engagement as
Hungary's Fidesz party drafts what Lajcak described as its
foreign policy platform for the 2010 elections. According to
Lajcak, Fidesz is in the process of finalizing an election
platform that will characterize the 2007 Ahtisaari Plan for
Kosovo (particularly the rights it offered ethnic Serbs in
Kosovo) as a model for the treatment of ethnic minorities
throughout Europe. Lajcak anticipated that virtually all
Slovak political parties -- and by extension the Fico
Government -- would interpret this as support for autonomy or
even independence for ethnic Hungarians in southern Slovakia.


6. (C) Given the widespread assumption here that Fidesz will
win next year's Hungarian elections, Lajcak believes that
such a formal endorsement of the Ahtisaari model would become
a major issue in the 2010 Slovak elections as well, and thus
cement Slovakia's refusal to recognize Kosovo's independence
throughout the term of the next government. Moreover, Lajcak
argued that it would inflame existing tensions within Slovak
domestic politics and in Slovak-Hungarian relations. He
asked, therefore, if the U.S. could deliver a strong message
to the Fidesz leadership that such a platform plank could and
would prove counterproductive. Lajcak subsequently made the
same approach to the British Ambassador. Lajcak again raised
the issue with us during a May 27 one-on-one meeting (ref a),
this time providing a non-paper (sent to EUR/CE) of relevant
statements by Fidesz leaders. He reiterated his request for
U.S. intervention, emphasizing that he was much more
concerned about the use of the Ahtisaari plan as precedent
than about Orban's pan-Carpathian rhetoric.


7. (C) One of the most vexing statements, according to
Lajcak, comes from a document that Embassy Budapest
identified as a recent policy paper entitled "Europe Can do
Better! Fidesz's Approach on the Foreign and Defense policy

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of the EU." While the paper rules out the applicability of
Kosovo's independence as a precedent for resolving
territorial disputes, it states that: "From the perspective
of the further development of the international standards of
minority protection, the wide-ranging autonomies as outlined
by the Ahtisaari plan must become a precedent for similar
action."

Orban and Csaky Threaten Slovak Sovereignty
--------------


8. (C) For months -- even before the demise of the Gyurscany
government -- Slovak politicians have spoken of the danger to
Slovakia of a Orban/Fidesz return to power. Any statements
made by Orban regarding the Hungarian minority are widely
reported and analyzed. On May 23, Orban appeared jointly
with Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) Chairman Pal Csaky at a
European Parliament campaign event along the Slovak-Hungarian
border. According to the press, Orban stated that the
upcoming EP election will decide "how many MEPs will
represent the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin in
Brussels...Do not forget, for every Hungarian voting at home,
there will be another Hungarian watching from abroad."


9. (C) For Csaky, a polarizing politician whose party appears
to be on the brink of a decisive and damaging split, a
campaign appearance with Viktor Orban must be a welcome
respite. It's also a way to show his base that, when the
going gets tough, Slovakia's Hungarians have a powerful (or
soon-to-be powerful) ally on the other side of the border.
Were it not for the anti-Hungarian rantings of Slota, and
more importantly, the myriad efforts of the government to
shape the state's approach to language and education in ways
that are more Slovak-centric and less minority-friendly,
Orban might not have the same allure.


10. (C) The reaction from Slovak officials to Orban's words
was swift, harsh and hyberbolic. Emerging from a meeting in
which the coalition was starkly divided on the fate of the
Slovak Special Court (ref a),the PM and leaders of the two
other ruling parties made statements on the need for unity
and decisiveness in response to the "threats" posed by Orban
and Csaky's campaign statements. PM Fico said that the two
were speaking about the Carpathian Basin as if it were a
territorial entity, and characterized Orban's statements as a
threat to Slovakia's integrity and sovereignty. Would ethnic
Hungarians elected to the EP represent Slovakia or Hungary,
he wondered? SNS Deputy Chairwoman Belousovova claimed that
Slovakia's 500,000 ethnic Hungarians would thus have more
representation in the EP than the rest of Slovakia's (Slovak)
citizens.


11. (C) Ratcheting up the cross-border shoot-fest, the
Chairman of the Hungarian Parliament's Foreign Affairs
Committee, Zsolt Nemeth, commented that "it is a malicious
misreading of Orban's comments by Robert Fico to suggest that
FIDESZ wants to establish any kind of territorial
Hungarianstate/union in the Carpathian Basin." Deputies from
PM Fico's party Smer have scheduled an extraordinary session
of parliament on June 3 to discuss Orban's statements. We
agree with Embassy Budapest that the notion that Orban is
calling for the creation of some sort of supra-national
Hungarian territory in the Carpathian is risible (but a rise
is exactly what Slovak politicans are seeking).


12. (C) Notorious ex-PM Vladimir Meciar, in a touching show
of concern for Slovakia's ethnic minorities, stated that
"ethnic Hungarians should not be held hostage to the growing
radicalism and extremism of the politics of the Hungarian
state." Meciar was repeating a theme we have begun to hear
from GOS officials with great regularity: Hungary is
exporting extremism and cannot manage the phenomenon, which
manifests itself, e.g., in attacks against Roma, within its
borders. Slovakia, by comparison -- they explicitly state --
is doing a much better job on both counts. We have heard
this refrain more frequently since the March incident
involving police abuse of Roma boys in Kosice captured
international attention.

Autonomy Threat: Just in Time for the Elections
-------------- --


13. (C) In mid-May, the daily Sme reported that a new group
called "Harmonia AT" had been created in the southern Slovak
town of Dunajska Streda (which was the site of the
controversial Slovak police action against Hungarian

BRATISLAVA 00000240 003 OF 003


hooligans at a November 2008 soccer match). The group was
reportedly advocating for full autonomy for ethnic
Hungarians. According to Dunajska Streda officials and SMK
reps, however, this group was an unknown entity. We asked
former SMK Chairman Bela Bugar about the group during a
recent meeting. Bugar told us that the "founder" of the
group has a long criminal record and that it would evaporate
quickly once this became known. On May 25, Sme reported that
the manifesto of the group had been typed on a computer
belonging to Igor Cibula, a former Slovak Intelligence agent.
When questioned by reporters about this odd coincidence,
Cibula gave three conflicting and risible explanations
regarding how this might have happened. Cibula is known to be
close to SNS and Jan Slota. As discussed in ref B, Cibula is
also believed to have played a role in the Hedviga Malinova
case.


Comment and Conclusion
--------------


14. (C) While we are not in a position to know how accurately
Lajcak described the state of Fidesz's platform-drafting
process, attempts to promote the Ahtisaari plan's provisions
for minorities as a template would rile the political
situation in Slovakia. As the above examples demonstrate,
not only Jan Slota but the entire Slovak political spectrum
have manipulated the Hungarian card, not to mention the
Kosovo issue, to their own ends. But, as Slovakia's own 2010
elections approach, we are seeing some signs that PM Fico is
seeking to marginalize Jan Slota and the SNS (while co-opting
its voters). If the question of autonomy for ethnic
Hungarians were to become a major campaign issue, it would
complicate the equation significantly, making it much more
difficult to tamp down the sort of mischief that produced
"Harmonia AT" and the harsh rhetoric we have heard of late.


15. (C) Perhaps more significantly, it would make it much
more difficult for SMK to join any future governing
coalition. And it is precisely SMK's presence in the next
government that holds the greatest potential to dampen
Slovak-Hungarian tensions and provide a greater sense of
security to Slovak Hungarians. While Lajcak may have cause
to be concerned about Fidesz's intentions, Embassies
Bratislava and Budapest believe that the USG should avoid
being drawn into Slovak-Hungarian bilateral disputes.
Instead, we should urge both sides to pursue continuous and
constructive dialogue on highly sensitive minority rights
issues. Embassy Budapest will also engage with Fidesz to
clarify its positions and highlight misunderstandings and
tensions likely to be created by referencing any part of the
the Ahtisaari plan as a "precedent" or standard for
addressing other minority questions.
EDDINS