Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRASILIA95
2009-01-22 20:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

BRAZIL'S PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR ON

Tags:  PREL ETRD KSUM ENRG EFIN BR CU OAS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000095 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC, WHA/EPSC, AND USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2019
TAGS: PREL ETRD KSUM ENRG EFIN BR CU OAS
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR ON
RELATIONS WITH NEW USG

REF: A. 2008 BRASILIA 1636

B. 2008 BRASILIA 1637

C. 2008 BRASILIA 1638

Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000095

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC, WHA/EPSC, AND USOAS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2019
TAGS: PREL ETRD KSUM ENRG EFIN BR CU OAS
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR ON
RELATIONS WITH NEW USG

REF: A. 2008 BRASILIA 1636

B. 2008 BRASILIA 1637

C. 2008 BRASILIA 1638

Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a January 21 meeting, Brazilian
Presidential Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio
Garcia told Ambassador Sobel that the GOB is very optimistic
about relations with the Obama Administration. He stressed
that President Lula is eager to meet President Obama.
Energy, climate change, and addressing the regional effects
of the economic crisis are all potential areas for
Brazil-U.S. cooperation in Garcia's view, but trade is not.
Describing U.S. relations with Latin America and the
Caribbean as "complicated," he cautioned that good regional
relations would depend on a more collaborative style from the
USG and, in particular, on an opening by the U.S.
Administration toward Cuba. Garcia thought energy would be
the most promising area for cooperation at the upcoming
Summit of the Americas. He dismissed the Organization of
American States (OAS) as largely irrelevant to solving the
region's problems. End summary.


2. (C) Garcia opened by saying how pleased he was that both
Ambassador Sobel and WHA A/S Tom Shannon are staying on.
"This ensures good relations with the United States," he
said, adding that relations had been excellent with the
previous U.S. Administration because President Lula and
President Bush "knew how to respect each other even when they
disagreed." Relations with the United States, he said, "are
fundamental" for Brazil, and the GOB wants to maintain and
increase the good relations built during the Bush
Administration. Lula is not always the most diplomatic in
the way he speaks, he said, but he has a great fondness for
President Obama, and this has been enhanced by his sense that
President Obama's views toward collective security,
multilateralism, and the ways to address the economic crisis
"coincide with ours." Although personal relations with

President Bush were always "warm and personal," Lula is now
"very optimistic."


3. (C) The Ambassador asked where Garcia saw possibilities
for cooperation, particularly with the Summit of the Americas
coming up in April. Garcia said that energy is a natural
basis for cooperation and should be deepened. He also said
that Lula is committed to helping the smaller and poorer
countries of the region withstand the economic downturn,
explaining that they are especially vulnerable because they
are dependent on the U.S. economy, U.S. remittances, or oil
(which, he added, is the key to Venezuelan President Chavez's
success). He suggested that one possibility for cooperation
in this area would be to expand our "triangular" cooperation
on biofuels, in which the United States provides capital,
Brazil and the United States provide technical expertise, and
recipient countries provide the labor and land to develop
their own biofuel production. On climate change, Garcia said
that an early discussion between the United States and Brazil
"could change the world."


4. (C) On the political side, Garcia began, "the two
presidents will need to speak frankly." Relations between
the United States and Latin America are not easy, he said,
and are as complicated with U.S. friends in the region as
they are with those countries hostile to the United States.
With regard to complications with U.S. friends, Garcia
mentioned Colombia with a knowing nod, but without providing
any details. (Note: GOB officials are cultivating relations
with Colombia in advance of an upcoming visit by President
Uribe to Brazil. End note.) He then cited Mexico,
highlighting the surprise announcement made by President
Calderon at the December summit of Latin American and
Caribbean countries in Bahia, Brazil, at which Calderon

BRASILIA 00000095 002 OF 003


proposed a LAC regional organization (reftels A, C). On the
"hostile" side, Garcia said that Bolivia's Morales wants to
"re-establish" relations with the United States after the
January 25 referendum, and that Brazil wants to help him do
that. Venezuela's Chavez, likewise, will be ready to engage
after the February 15 vote. "Until then," he counseled,
"silence is best" on the part of the United States.


5. (C) With regard to cooperation specifically aimed at the
Summit of the Americas, Garcia cautioned that Brazil "can't
appear to be a country that wants to be the leader in the
region." (Comment: This is an odd assertion in the wake of
the Bahia summits (reftels),which have been widely
interpreted as a not so subtle attempt to do just that. End
comment.) Garcia thought energy held out the greatest hope
as an issue around which the hemisphere could agree, but
added that it will be difficult because each country faces
different conditions and problems. The most important thing
for the United States, he said, will be to change the method
and approach of engagement with the region, toward a more
collaborative and consultative style.


6. (C) The Ambassador asked about the possibility of
addressing trade at a regional level. Garcia responded that
it is hard to ponder trade issues outside of Doha, as other
initiatives all have serious problems. The Ambassador asked
about trade facilitation measures. Garcia said that if the
United States had proposals, the region would listen, but was
clearly doubtful; he lamented that the last effort to
conclude Doha had failed, and expressed frustration that, in
the view of the GOB, the United States had thrown up the
final road blocks.


7. (C) Noting that Brazil is taking on the rotating
presidency of the OAS, the Ambassador asked how Garcia viewed
the possibility for initiatives in that forum and prospects
for its renewal. Garcia responded that the there is "enormous
doubt" in the region about the possibilities for having a
real "hemispheric policy." The relations are always
asymmetric, he said, adding that, "When I was young, the OAS
was known as the 'Ministry of U.S. Colonies,'" although, he
conceded, "this has changed a little bit." Garcia said that
the OAS has proved ineffective in addressing regional crises,
citing the Ecuador-Colombia dispute and Bolivia's internal
crisis which, he said, had been resolved outside the OAS, by
a few South American countries and by UNASUL, respectively.
(When the Ambassador noted that the United States had
purposefully not inserted itself in these instances, Garcia
remarked that "some of our best soccer players are those who
can contribute to the team without ever touching the ball."
Brazil will continue to participate in the OAS, Garcia said.
But, citing American "25th hour" support for SYG Insulza as
an error, he stressed that change in the OAS will depend on a
change in U.S. policy toward the region, and toward Cuba in
particular.


8. (C) The Ambassador asked how central discussion of Cuba
would be, in Garcia's view, to establishing relations with
the region. "You can't talk about Latin America," he
responded, "without talking about Cuba." It has become a
"sign" for the region. Garcia urged a "strong" U.S. overture
to Cuba "without conditions," such as removing the embargo.
It would be, he said, a small price to pay for a large gain.
On the one hand, he said, the Cubans would be astounded and
embarrassed, and the United States would gain the moral high
ground. On the other, he stressed that, on the basis of his
long relationship with Cuba and knowledge of Cuban history,
he was certain the Cubans would never agree to a proposal
that had explicit conditions attached. The Ambassador asked
if Raul Castro's proposal for a prisoner exchange, made
during his December 18 visit to Brasilia, was the Cubans' own
idea. Garcia said his impression was that it was Raul's
idea, that is was spontaneous and had not been vetted in

BRASILIA 00000095 003 OF 003


Havana. "Raul is a military man," Garcia said. "He
understands the correlation of forces."


9. (C) The Ambassador raised difficulties that had just
cropped up getting Brazilian visas for DEA agents in Bolivia
to move from La Paz to Brazil (see septel). Garcia knew
nothing of the issue, but used it to make a "general comment"
regarding U.S. policy in the region. The United States, he
said, has a longstanding resistance to foreign and
multilateral interference in its policies. For example,
President Bush had told Garcia how difficult it was for the
United States--and not just the Bush Administration--to deal
with the United Nations. This creates difficulties for both
the United States and Brazil, because it limits the way
cooperation can take place. There are many areas where we
all share interests. Bolivia wants to stem the drug problem
because if they don't, cartels will threaten Morales (just
look at the problems Mexico is having, he added). But "there
are ways and there are ways," he said, suggesting that DEA,
and the United States more broadly, are too heavy-handed and
need to be more consultative in our approach. "I'm not a
diplomat,though" he joked, "just an old leftist who has been
placed at the President's side."


10. (C) As the meeting ended, Garcia made a point of saying
that President Lula is greatly interested in meeting
President Obama as soon as possible, whether at the bilateral
CEO Forum in New York in March, the G-20 meeting in London in
April, or the mid-April Summit of the Americas. President
Obama would be welcome in Brazil, a visit which would be seen
as "a great success and signal" for the region.


11. (C) Comment: Garcia, who is Lula's closest foreign policy
advisor, was remarkably frank and expansive in this
discussion, sensing perhaps an opportunity to have an early
influence on the new U.S. Administration. Garcia is no
friend of the United States or U.S. foreign policy; Lula's
emphasis on South-South relations over those with the United
States and Europe is largely his brainchild. But unlike some
other senior GOB officials, Garcia has adopted Lula's
pragmatic approach to foreign policy. He values the close
relationship Brazil has cultivated with the United States and
enjoys comparing notes and working collaboratively with us on
regional issues, which are generally his domain. Garcia's
care to note Lula's affinity for President Obama and his
interest in an early meeting echoes similar statements by
Lula's chief of staff, Gilberto Carvalho, Strategic Planning
Minister Roberto Mangabeira Unger, and other senior GOB
officials. At the same time, in a regional context, GOB
officials including Garcia continue to view relations with
the United States through a "spheres of influence" prism.
This makes them wary of working through the OAS or the SOA,
and will likely make it challenging to work with them in
defining concrete proposals for the hemisphere.
SOBEL