Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRASILIA196
2009-02-13 19:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

BRAZIL RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES ABOUT VIEWS ON NUCLEAR

Tags:  AORC CDG ENRG KNNP PARM UNGA IAEA NPT BR 
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RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
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RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2-I/J5/HSE/DIA REP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000196 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MNSA
GENEVA FOR CD
UNVIE FOR IAEA
USNATO FOR POL
UESEU FOR POL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP PARM UNGA IAEA NPT BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES ABOUT VIEWS ON NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske, Reason 1.4 (b)
and (d)

REF: STATE 6970

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000196

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MNSA
GENEVA FOR CD
UNVIE FOR IAEA
USNATO FOR POL
UESEU FOR POL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP PARM UNGA IAEA NPT BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES ABOUT VIEWS ON NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske, Reason 1.4 (b)
and (d)

REF: STATE 6970


1. (C) SUMMARY. Brazilian Ministry of Exterior Relations (MRE)
Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies,
Minister Santiago Mourao, to stressed that Brazil would like to see a
consensus document come out of the 2010 Review Conference concerning
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). To avoid the failure of
the 2005 RevCon, this time there must be a balanced approach, not
just focused on nonproliferation, but also on the other two NPT
pillars: disarmament and peaceful uses. While concerned about
issues of noncompliance, universality of NPT membership, and
discouraging withdrawals, Mourao had to balance the sovereignty
concerns. He envisioned that Brazil will be expanding its enrichment
and reprocessing capabilities as it became a major producer and
supplier of nuclear fuel. Brazil is not looking to agree to an IAEA
Additional Protocol and will oppose efforts to make it a universal
requirement (absent carving out an exception for them). Detailed
answers to the NPT questions raised in REFTEL are provided below.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On February 12, 2009, Environment, Science and Technology,
and Health (ESTH) Counselor and Political Officer met with Brazilian
Ministry of Exterior Relations (MRE) Director of the Division for
Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, Minister Santiago Mourao, to
discuss issues concerning the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
and the third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting in May of this
year leading to the Review Conference (RevCon) in April-May 2010.
Per REFTEL, EmbOffs raised the questions about the NPT per REFTEL.
Mourao was expansive, and described at length his views about nuclear
nonproliferation, nuclear energy, and disarmament. The answers to

the NPT questions in REFTEL are provided below, keyed to the
questions. SEPTEL will report on the other aspects of Mourao's
remarks.


3. (C) Answers keyed to REFTEL's NPT questions:

QUESTION A. What are Brazil's objectives for the NPT in general,
and for the current review process in particular?

ANSWER A. Given the failure of the 2005 RevCon to agree on a Final
Document, Mourao believed that the most important objective for this
NPT review cycle would be to reach consensus on such a document this
time around. While acknowledging that many problems remain from the
previous cycle, Mourao saw reason for optimism because of what he
termed "new approaches" to key NPT issues by key states, including
the nuclear weapons states (NWS). In addition, Mourao believed that
all three NPT pillars - disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful
uses - should be addressed strengthened to "preserve the balance" of
the Treaty. He said that in 2005 there was a lack of balance, with
the majority of the attention on nonproliferation, while leaving
disarmament and peaceful uses to the side. This imbalance, he
opined, contributed to the failure to reach consensus.

QUESTION B. What policies or actions regarding the NPT does Brazil
hope to see from the United States?

ANSWER B. Mourao believed that the most important step the United
States could take at this point would be to join with the other NWS
to reiterate their disarmament commitment contained in the Treaty.
The NWS had done this in the past and he saw this as a prerequisite
for any effort to reach a consensus. He also pointed to what he
considered helpful USG signals on the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty(CTBT) and potential agreement on a cutoff of production of
fissile material as positive indicators for the PrepCon. While

BRASILIA 00000196 002 OF 003


Mourao noted the substantial progress made by the USG on dismantling
weapons stockpiles, he stated that disarmament was more than reducing
stockpiles. Revising defense policies to reduce the role of nuclear
weapons is also a part of disarmament. He called attention to U.S.
military doctrines that still allow for the use of nuclear weapons as
undermining overall disarmament goals.

QUESTION C. What does Brazil believe would represent a successful
outcome to the current NPT cycle ending with the 2010 Review
Conference? How important is it for Parties to reach consensus on
substantive matters?

ANSWER C. For Brazil, a consensus agreement that reaffirms the
three pillars of the NPT is their desired outcome for this NPT cycle.
He recognized the myriad of complex, sensitive issues involved and
so was favoring something along the lines of a recommitment to
principles together with an overarching framework that would provide
a process for continuing the discussions. Brazil is prepared to work
with the United States and other NPT members, particularly the "New
Agenda" coalition - composed of Brazil, Sweden, Ireland, Mexico,
South Africa and Egypt - to reach consensus on substantive issues at
the RevCon. Mourao expressed his view that to gain consensus, the
Final Document would have to be "balanced" and not just "Iran
bashing." He also suggested that the NPT process could result in
better management of what he termed "a proliferation of
nonproliferation initiatives." Mourao made clear that reaching a
consensus at the RevCon is critical for Brazil, far more important
than concluding any particular substantive item.

QUESTION D. Does Brazil believe that NPT parties should take
action to address the NPT issues described below? If so, what
actions would it support?
-- Noncompliance with the NPT, e.g., on the part of Iran and North
Korea.
-- The prospect of Parties violating and then withdrawing from the
Treaty.
-- The lack of NPT universality.
-- The lack of universality of NPT safeguards agreements and the
Additional Protocol.
-- The spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to
additional countries.
-- Fulfilling the Treaty's obligation for the fullest possible
international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
consistent with the Treaty's nonproliferation obligations.
-- Fulfilling the Treaty's obligations to pursue negotiations
relating to nuclear disarmament.
-- Transparency on the part of nuclear weapon states with regard to
their nuclear weapons forces and policies.

ANSWER D.

Noncompliance - Brazil shares the United States' concerns about the
issues mentioned under this question but is not ready to endorse
specific actions in response. As noted above, Mourao stressed that
they did not want the RevCon to be an "Iran bashing" affair. Brazil
believes that the review process should include discussion of
noncompliance and these other issues, but longstanding Brazilian
concerns about the primacy of national sovereignty remain strong.
Mourao termed the issue of noncompliance "difficult" and supported
continued coordination on Iran and North Korea to keep them within
the NPT framework. He claimed that the U.S. agreement with India
could weaken efforts to urge noncompliant states to comply, even
though India is not a NPT member.

Withdraw - Brazil has no answer to the question of what should be
done in the case a state party withdraws form the Treaty and would
prefer to work to avoid such a situation. He said that he supported

BRASILIA 00000196 003 OF 003


making it more difficult to leave or more attractive to stay in,
especially if a country has benefited from cooperation and technology
under the peaceful uses pillar. Nonetheless, at the same time, he
concluded that a country was sovereign and would have the right to
withdraw.

Universality of NPT Membership- The lack of universality is an issue
that is not likely to be solved, according to Mourao. Brazil
supports outreach to non-NPT states but does not believe universal
membership is achievable in the short term. He did not want to amend
the NPT to allow them in because once the treaty was opened up for
amendments the balance would be upset and all sorts of changes would
be called for. In the long term, he could see that there might be
something along the lines of an NPT Plus Three (Israel, India and
Pakistan) structure.

Universality of Safeguards and Additional Protocol - This is a very
sensitive issue. Brazil's position is that at a minimum there should
be no measure that requires explicitly or implicitly Brazil (and
Argentina, is partner in the Quadpartite Agreement with the IAEA) to
take on additional safeguard obligations.

Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) Capabilities - With the expected
massive expansion of nuclear power in South America and the rest of
the world, Mourao said the current system of nuclear fuel supply and
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities would have to change. He
thought the RevCon could frame the issues, but wouldn't resolve them.
He identified several options, such as having regional fuel
suppliers (which would mean Brazil for South American),or an
international system, or something else. He stressed that Brazil was
determined to become self-sufficient in supplying nuclear fuel, which
would involve significant expansion of its ENR capabilities. Mourao
envisioned a Brazil-Argentine joint venture becoming the dominant the
supplier for at least South America. Mourao said that Brazil had
been willing to support an effort at the Nuclear Suppliers Group to
require recipients of ENR technology to have an Additional Protocol
in place (so long as Brazil and Argentina were understood to be
grandfathered in through their inspection system). However, he was
seeing internal reluctance to continuing support for that position.

Peaceful Uses - The RevCon needs to look at promoting peaceful uses
of nuclear energy, not just nonproliferation, according to Mourao.

Disarmament and NWS Transparency - It is important that the RevCon
address disarmament too, Mourao emphasized. He saw a need for the
NWS to once more confirm their commitment to disarmament. He would
like to see efforts to not just reduce numbers of weapons, but also
revising military policies to reduce the role played by nuclear
weapons. In support of disarmament and transparency, Brazil plans to
propose a listing of steps toward disarmament taken by NPT members.
This would include a range of activities, such as weapons reduction
by the NWS and non-NWS dismantling of weapons programs or elimination
of weapons, such as by Libya, South Africa, and Ukraine and
Kazakhstan.

SOBEL