BRAZIL ON U.S.-BOLIVIA DIALOGUE, ARGENTINA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001360

SIPDIS

FOR WHA, WHA/BSC, WHA/AND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR AR BR BL PY
SUBJECT: BRAZIL ON U.S.-BOLIVIA DIALOGUE, ARGENTINA,
PARAGUAY

REF: SECSTATE 114036

Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen M. Liston, reason 1.4(b) and
(d)


1. SUMMARY. In a meeting November 19 with PolCouns,
Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (MRE) South America
1 (Southern Cone) Department head Minister Joao Luiz Pereira
Pinto (protect) described Brazil-Bolivia relations as
frustrating and indicated a continuing interest in trilateral
counternarcotics efforts with the United States after the
elections. Pinto described Brazil's efforts to engage a
difficult Argentine government more intensely in light of
current trade disputes, and expressed no concern about the
recent changes of military chiefs in Paraguay. End Summary.

- - - BOLIVIA: BILATERAL FRUSTRATION, TRILATERAL INTEREST - -
-


2. (C) During a friendly discussion November 19, PolCouns
delivered points reftel to Pereira Pinto regarding our
continuing dialogue with Bolivia. Pinto was grateful for the
information and expressed continued interest in finding ways
to cooperate after the Bolivian elections. Pinto described
the current Brazil-Bolivia relationship as frustratingly
difficult to manage, noting Bolivia has no ambassador in
Brasilia, that Brazilian offers of assistance have gone
unanswered, and that where Bolivia has agreed to training or
consultations, it has sent unqualified candidates or
low-level officials with no authority to make decisions.


3. (C) PolCouns asked whether press reports of three recent
intercepts by the Brazilian Air Force (BRAF) of drug aircraft
coming from Bolivia into Brazil signaled greater intelligence
sharing. Pinto said that he did not believe so, but
acknowledged that information sharing between the BRAF,
federal police, and MRE was not good, and that there was no
systematic effort to collect statistics on what was coming
across the border.


4. (C) Pinto's principal preoccupation with Bolivia stemmed
from a Brazilian federal deputy's effort to block the
donation of four helicopters to Bolivia--Brazil's sole
response to a request by Bolivia for assistance after DEA was
expelled. The problem arose out of concern that the Bolivian
government was forcing Brazilians resident in Bolivia to
leave the country. According to Pinto, although Bolivia had
two years ago required the few hundred Brazilians to move out
of a fifty-kilometer band along the border, they had been
offered resettlement within Bolivia. However, Brazil's
"roving consulate" (a van that offers consular services to
the dispersed Brazlian population in the border area) has
recently found that, with the situation deteriorating, most
Brazlians now prefer to return to Brazil.


5. (C) Comment: Although we find that Brazilian diplomats
posted abroad are often much more amenable to working with
the United States than their counterparts in Brasilia, in
this case, it appears that there is broad and high-level
interest in working with the USG. Even the normally prickly
head of the MRE transnational crimes department has conceded
a need to work together on this issue. Nonetheless, we will
need to proceed carefully on the law enforcement side to
avoid activating Brazilian sensitivities over sovereignty and
any appearance of a less than fully equal partnership. End
comment.

- - - ARGENTINA: FOR A TROUBLESOME NEIGHBOR, MORE ATTENTION -
- -


6. (C) With Argentine President Kirchner having visited that
morning, Pinto told PolCouns that the visit had been
important to "reduce tensions." But the Argentines did not
understand that Brazil could not overlook in an election year
trade barriers that might not otherwise have been a
significant issue. Pinto did not have kind words for the
GOA, describing Kirchner's government as "authoritarian
without any of the tools of authoritarianism." He noted that,
whereas Brazilian polling showed Argentine media and academic
opinion had become much more positive with regard to Brazil
over the past year, government opinion--for which, he said,

BRASILIA 00001360 002 OF 002


read the Foreign Ministry--was still overwhelmingly
negative. Suffering from problems of its own making, he
said, the GOA was seeking to blame Brazil.


7. (C) For Pinto, the most notable development of the
Lula-Kirchner meeting had been the agreement to meet even
more frequently--every 90 days, with a commission of the
Brazilian ministers of foreign affairs, trade (MDIC),and
finance, and the Argentine ministers of foreign affairs,
economy, industry meeting every 45 days. Comment: The
strategy bears a remarkable resemblance to Lula's approach
with Venezuelan President Chavez, with whom he also holds
quarterly meetings. As the potential for conflict with
neighbors rises, Lula sees personal, presidential-level
contact, combined with more frequent ministerial-level
contacts, as the best way to reduce tensions and minimize
conflicts, particularly where resolution of the problems
might not be possible at lower levels or in the short term.
End comment.

- - - PARAGUAY: BUSINESS AS USUAL - - -


8. (C) Asked about how Brazil saw the recent replacement of
military chiefs in Paraguay, Pinto said that Brazil did not
see any cause for concern. Because the Paraguayan Minister
of Defense is not the most senior official in the chain of
command, he said, it frequently creates rivalries that need
to be managed. For Pinto, the issue of most concern
continues to be the handling of thousands of so-called
"Braziguayos," Brazilians who have settled, often illegally,
in Paraguay and whose status and rights are a constant
irritant in relations.
JACKSON