Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRASILIA1038
2009-08-20 18:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brasilia
Cable title:  

VISIT OF WMD COORDINATOR SAMORE TO BRASILIA

Tags:  KNUP PARM PREL NPT IAEA MNUC BR 
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DE RUEHBR #1038/01 2321825
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201825Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4905
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1595
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0173
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0319
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001038 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, T AND ISN. NSC FOR SAMORE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019
TAGS: KNUP PARM PREL NPT IAEA MNUC BR
SUBJECT: VISIT OF WMD COORDINATOR SAMORE TO BRASILIA

REF: BRASILIA 725

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.4(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001038

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, T AND ISN. NSC FOR SAMORE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019
TAGS: KNUP PARM PREL NPT IAEA MNUC BR
SUBJECT: VISIT OF WMD COORDINATOR SAMORE TO BRASILIA

REF: BRASILIA 725

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.4(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. NSC WMD Coordinator Gary Samore visited
Brasilia August 6-7 to hold discussions with senior Brazilian
officials on North Korea, Iran and strengthening
international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts.
Samore approached the Brazilians as potential partners in
nonproliferation efforts, pointing out that Brazil,s
decision to forego its own nuclear weapons option and
concentrate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy gave it high
credibility as a counter example to Iran. Brazilian
interlocutors were receptive to Samore,s message and
believed that President Obama,s Prague speech was important
and opened the way for further dialogue; however, they
preferred to focus on the importnace of nuclear weapons
states (NWS) disarming rather than engage on
nonproliferation. The GOB responded positively to proposals
for a nuclear security summit and for consultations on the
2010 NPT revcon. Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco
Aurelio Garcia sounded a hopeful note by saying that the
Administration,s approach to disarmament would be helpful to
Brazil in addressing the question of signing an Additional
Protocol (AP) with the IAEA and that he thought a solution
could be reached. Prof. Garcia agreed to Samore,s proposal
that a U.S. team of experts would visit Brazil to discuss
implementation of the Additional Protocol. The visit
provided important clarification of the roles of various GOB
agencies on nonproliferation issues. Although there was no
indication that Brazil is prepared immediately to play a more
positive role on key nonproliferation issues, Samore's visit
opened the way to a more robust dialogue that would be
important to eventually encouraging Brazil to adopt a more
constructive approach. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Samore's discussions included meetings with the
Ministries of External Relations (MRE) and Defense (MOD),the
Presidency and the Office for Institutional Security, newly
designated to oversee security at nuclear installations. His


meetings on nuclear energy will be reported septel. While
responsibilities for energy are relatively clear cut, Brazil
is still developing its nuclear policy formulation process
with the MRE Under Secretary for Political Affairs playing a
coordinating role. Samore's meeting at the MOD confirmed
that protecting Brazil's enrichment program from greater
oversight will remain a component of Brazilian policy. All
GOB agencies, however, welcomed the opportunity for further
dialogue with USG counterparts.

North Korea
--------------

3. (C) Samore raised North Korea with Ministry for External
Relations Under Secretary Roberto Jaguaribe who pointed out
that working with the North Koreans was often difficult
because &they always stick to their script.8 Jaguaribe said
he believed the six party talks were the only way to proceed,
but urged the USG to also seek increased bilateral dialogue
with the DPRK. Samore,s statement that he did not see much
short term prospect for North Korea curtailing its nuclear
program led to a lengthy discourse from Jaguaribe on the
inefficacy of sanctions and the importance of dialogue,
particularly via the six party process as this would bring
the United States, Russia and China together.

Iran
--------------

4. (C) Samore encouraged Brazil to use its relatively good
relations with Iran to encourage a constructive approach to
the international community. Despite offers of dialogue from
Washington, Iran had not responded and had not halted
enrichment activities. If Iran does not respond soon, the
U.S. will have no choice but to turn to sanctions. Foreign
Minister Celso Amorim urged engagement with Iran and placing
Iran,s nuclear ambitions in the context of the larger Middle
East situation. He recommended that a way should be found
not to make Iran give up its enrichment activities, but to
avoid enriched uranium being used for weapons. Jaguaribe
said that Brazil had advised the Iranian government to
respond to President Obama,s proposals constructively and
believed that Iran,s internal problems might lead to a more
constructive approach to the international community. At the
same time, both Amorim and Jaguaribe raised Israel,s nuclear
program as a primary reason for Iranian behavior.
Presidential Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia went further,
citing Israeli disarmament as a precondition for addressing
Iranian proliferation. Garcia offered Brazilian assistance
in promoting dialogue with both Iran and North Korea, but he
would not commit to urging Iran to suspend enrichment
activity to allow time for dialogue on the issue.

Additional Protocol
--------------

5. (C) Samore cited the adoption of an Additional Protocol
to the NPT as an area in which Brazil can add to its
leadership role in the area of nonproliferation. He pointed
out that many countries, including the United States, had
concerns about protecting proprietary technology and had been
able to work out arrangements with the IAEA that allowed them
to sign APs. MRE Director for Sensitive Technologies
Santiago Mourao said that of the resistance in Brazil to an
AP has come from the MOD, which supervises Brazilian
enrichment operations run by the Brazilian navy as part of
its nuclear propulsion program. MOD Chief of Staff Murilo
Barbosa argued that an AP for Brazil was not necessary,
because Brazil already belonged to other nonproliferation
regimes and maintained that Brazil,s defense strategy (which
he helped write) prevented further discussion. Barbosa also
pointed out, as evidence of why an AP is not needed, that
Brazil (because of navy ownership of enrichment) is the only
NNWS with a military facility under safeguards. During
Samore,s visit to Rio de Janeiro, Nuclear Energy Commission
President Goncalves said that his organization had prepared
&technical documents8 on the AP but declined to discuss
them absent a political decision to consider an AP. Mourao
stated that steps toward NWS disarmament would be a
precondition for Brazil to consider an AP. Garcia was
slightly more positive on this point when he told Samore that
the Administration,s new openness to disarmament would be
helpful. &I think we can reach a solution,8 he said.
Defense Minister Jobim did not evince such optimism but
agreed that there was scope for work on possible technical
solutions to Brazil,s concerns. As a follow up to the
discussions, Brazilian officials agreed to host a visit by
U.S. experts to discuss the Additional Protocol.

Other Issues: NPT RevCon, Nuclear Safety, PSI, Fuel Bank,
Nuclear Suppliers Group
-------------- --------------

6. (C) In each of Samore,s meetings, the Brazilian side
praised President Obama,s Prague speech as opening the way
to a more successful NPT revcon in 2010. Amorim expressed
interest in discussing the revcon agenda with the P5 and
urged greater consultations with the NNWS. Similarly, Amorim
and Under Secretary for Political Affairs Machado pushed for
an increased Brazilian role in FMCT negotiations and
supported U.S.-Brazil bilateral consultations on disarmament
(without mentioning nonproliferation). Brazilian responses
to the proposed Nuclear Security Summit were positive, though
non-committal. Institutional Security Director Felix reacted
positively to future discussions on critical infrastructure
protection, a new responsibility of his office. Similarly,
Machado expressed interest in learning more about the PSI and
agreed to U.S. proposal for expert talks on PSI, but gave no
indication that Brazil was prepared to join PSI. The
Brazilian side indicated it would join consensus in support
of IAEA Director General El Baradei,s proposal for a nuclear
fuel bank but expressed reservations about discouraging
enrichment that could affect Brazil,s nuclear industry. The
Brazilian side also said they could &work with8 the
proposed Australian language for the Nuclear Supplier Group
guidelines for transfers of ENR.


7. (C) COMMENT. Post regards the Samore visit as producing
opportunities for further dialogue on nonproliferation
issues. Samore's Brazilian contacts expressed themselves to
be open to further discussions and were pleased to be
approached as an important partner on global issues. That
said, it is clear that Brazil's positions will not change in
the short term. Brazil will still champion the NNWS and
highlight disarmament over proliferation and will prefer to
cite Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy rather than
focus on the dangers of proliferation in the Middle East.
While further dialogue may not produce rapid improvments in
these positions, it will be key for developing a long-term
relationship in which Brazil becomes a more important global
stability partner.


8. (U) This cable has been cleared by WMD Coordinator Samore.
KUBISKE