Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BOGOTA614
2009-02-25 14:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

MONTES DE MARIA: RIPE FOR CONSOLIDATION

Tags:  PGOV PINR CO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHBO #0614/01 0561411
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P 251411Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7339
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1714
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ FEB 9940
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 7029
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 3066
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 7751
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 4837
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDTA/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1977
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000614 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR CO
SUBJECT: MONTES DE MARIA: RIPE FOR CONSOLIDATION

Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer
Reasons 1.4 (b and d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000614

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR CO
SUBJECT: MONTES DE MARIA: RIPE FOR CONSOLIDATION

Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer
Reasons 1.4 (b and d)

Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) GOC security efforts--coupled with the paramilitary
demobilization process--have transformed the Montes de Maria
region on Colombia's Caribbean Coast from the FARC's major
stronghold in the north and an important paramilitary zone
into an area ripe for consolidation and post-conflict
assistance. The GOC is now looking to build on this security
success by strengthening civilian institutions and promoting
a viable legal economy. The joint European-GOC Peace
Laboratory III recently approved 30 new projects in the
region aimed at strengthening civil society, human rights and
economic development. Similarly, the GOC recently started
new initiatives--led by the GOC's Center for Coordination and
Integrated Action (CCAI)--aimed at enhancing roads and
infrastructure. Still, communities in the area remain
vulnerable to armed groups, with high unemployment,
narcotrafficking and other criminal activities, weak or
corrupt local institutions, and the need to absorb a large
displaced population posing major challenges. End Summary

Successes Lay Groundwork for Consolidation
-------------- --------------

2. (SBU) Security has improved dramatically in Montes de
Maria--consisting of fifteen municipalities in the
departments of Sucre and Bolivar--which has traditionally
been a strategic corridor for both the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and narcotraffickers. The area
also has one of the highest rates of displacement and
suffered two notorious massacres in Chengue in 2002 and El
Salado in 2000. However, after the 2006 demobilization of
the roughly 600 fighters of the Heroes de Montes de Maria
bloc of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and
the death of 35th and 37th FARC Front leader Martin Caballero
in the fall of 2007--which led to record desertions and a
collapse of the FARC in the area--Colombian security forces
have retaken much of the territory. In a December 2008
visit to the community, President Uribe stated that he wants
Montes de Maria to be the first fully "consolidated" region.


3. (C) The FARC's 35th Front has collapsed entirely in the
wake of record numbers of desertions and captures in 2008,

explained Colonel Klaus Gutierrez, Commander of the Army's
1st Brigade in Corozal, Sucre. On January 28, Gutierrez told
us that only fourteen 37th Front members remained, but on
January 29 the Colombian National Police (CNP) captured three
additional FARC members in the municipality of Carmen de
Bolivar, bringing their total number down to eleven. Despite
this, Gutierrez admitted there could be 50-60 (or more) FARC
militia in the area.


4. (C) Admiral Roberto Garcia Marquez, Commander of the
Caribbean Navy, explained that the military's main focus is
what remains of the 37th Front in the region. He explained
that there is some concern about the FARC trying to retake
the area in the future. He believes the insurgents will
probably pull back to southern Bolivar and Antioquia--maybe
as far as Norte de Santander and southern Choco--to
strategize on how best (hLA(h occurred in the municipality of Carmen de
Bolivar alone. The problem now, explained Colonel Colon,
former director of the Fusion Center for Montes de Maria, is
that many want to return but cannot due to lack of access or
ongoing obstacles, like lack of potable water, electricity
and other public services. Garcia said much of the problem
is due to the conditions of roads, which will no longer be an
obstacle once the GOC completes current road projects. That
said, the Bolivar Governor Joaco Hernando Berrio Villarreal
opined that the number of those wanting to return is small,
while human rights organization CODHES reports that only 2-5
percent of IDPs in Colombia want to return.

Social/Economic Factors:
Development, Justice and Land
--------------

13. (C) The people of Montes de Maria are ready for
solutions, stated Sucre Private Secretary Fadul, and local
government is ready to help, but he argued they need
sustainable solutions. 1st Brigade Commander Colonel
Gutierrez explained that the people of Montes de Maria turned
to the FARC and narcotrafficking due to the lack of available
opportunities in the region. In many parts of Montes de
Maria there have been little or no government services,
water, electricity or jobs. Civil society leader Gonsalez
told us that Montes de Maria needs economic development--such
as employment possibilities, roads, infrastructure and
cooperatives--as well as justice in the region.


14. (C) Land appears to be the single most contentious issue
in the area, according to several experts. Oscar Herrera
argues that the lack of land reform in the region is an
obstacle to resolving the problems for the people of Montes
de Maria. Professor Amaranto Daniels, Director of the Montes
de Maria Observatory at the University of Cartagena, claims
that land conflicts could trigger the next round of conflict
in the region. Garcia and Colon concurred with this
assessment. Colon told us that GOC land institutions are not
flexible in responding quickly to solve problems over land.
Finally, speculation over the possibility of petroleum in the
region combined with large agricultural projects in the
region are inflating prices of land and pressuring some land
owners to sell without viable alternatives.



BROWNFIELD
Fusion Center is that the community views them purely as
extensions of the military. Castillo explains that CCAI not
only needs to build roads, but also to mend the social fabric
of the community, restore inhabitants' faith in government,
and consult more with the community.


6. (C) The EU-funded Peace Laboratory III began funding small
community programs in late 2008 and early 2009: six focused
on human rights, five on good governance and nineteen on
sustainable economic development. The Peace Laboratory
itself was initiated and began consulting with the community
in 2006, and in 2007 and 2008 began supporting community
leaders and building social networks focused on women,
indigenous, and Afro-Colombian communities. The Peace
Laboratory, whose main implementer is the Peace and
Development Foundation for Montes de Maria, works closely
with UNDP, Accion Social and private sector programs to
coordinate their assistance. Moreover, many of the projects
are overseen by community leaders and organizations. They
also have contracted with local university students to
undertake studies on human rights, strengthening local
institutions and enhancing private investment.


7. (C) The USG through the Office of Transition Initiatives
(USAID) is working with CCAI and the Fusion Center to support
their initiatives in the Montes de Maria region, in
particular with the construction of roads and a program to
assist in the return of IDPs to the region. They plan to set
up regional offices in Cartagena and Sincelejo. USAID's
demobilization program in Montes de Maria assists some 8,000
beneficiaries with resettlement projects, provides assistance
to victims of the conflict, and is implementing a child
soldier prevention program. USAID's governance program is
planning to establish Justice Houses in Sincelejo, San Onofre
and Carmen de Bolivar in 2009.

Security Challenges Remain
--------------

8. (C) Despite the improvements, security forces, the
community, and Defensoria del Pueblo (Ombudsman) Oscar
Herrera Revollo remain concerned over the emergence of new
criminal groups. Admiral Garcia told us that defeating new
criminal groups, especially Los Paisas (active in Sucre and
Bolivar),was the military's top priority after the FARC.
Colonel Gutierrez explained that his key concern is the
battle between Los Paisas and Daniel Rendon (Don Mario) for
control of the strategic narcotrafficking corridors in the
Montes area and extending to the Gulf of Morrosquillo.


9. (C) Sucre Governor Jorge Carlos Barraza explained that he
believes new criminal group Los Paisas are causing much of
the unrest in the department and are responsible for some of
the reported homicides. He explained that the governor's
office is working with mayors throughout the department to
counter the growing criminal group problem despite MOD Juan
Manuel Santos's recent claim that such groups have been
reduced to 90 percent of their prior presence in the region.
Sucre CNP Commander Colonel Hugo Javier Agudelo told us that
in January 2009 there were reportedly 21 homicides in the
department, up from 9 in January 2008. Agudelo explained
that only five are associated with new criminal groups, but
others are still being investigated. Still, Governor
Barraza's ties to former paramilitary groups--as well as many
local mayors' links to former paramilitaries--raise questions
about their commitment to solving the problem.


10. (C) Jose Gonsalez, a civil society leader in Carmen de
Bolivar, told us that the community also fears the FARC will
regenerate in the region. While he admitted these fears are
mostly based on rumors, he believes they could paralyze the
community and make people more vulnerable to recruiment until
the problems are resolved and opportunities arise. In
addition, there are still active alerts by the Ombudsman's
office for San Onofre and Sincelejo/Toluviejo, as well as
elevated warnings for San Marco and La Union, where recent
homicides have occurred.

Local Corruption Persists
--------------

11. (C) Local corruption continues to plague many of the
municipalities in Montes de Maria. UNDP representative Aldo
Morales explained that there are serious problems with local
officials in Carmen de Bolivar, leading to difficulties with
implementation in the region. The municipality of Carmen de
Bolivar has been the most affected by this problem: recently
elected mayor Galo Torres Serra is suspended due to rumors of
FARC ties and "personality" problems, and acting Mayor Raul
Eduardo Jacome Espinosa is rumored to have paramilitary ties.
Sucre Private Secretary Enrique Fadul explained that San
Onofre and Ovejas have been the two regions most affected by
local corruption with many past government officials charged
or rumored to have paramilitary connections. The current
mayor of Ovejas is also suspended for three months pending an
investigation of paramilitary ties.

IDPs/Retornos Also A Challenge
--------------

12. (C) Sucre and Bolivar Departments, especially the area of
Montes de Maria, are particularly high displacement areas,
with approximately 344,000 people displaced since 1995, most
of them between 2003-2006. Accion Social reports 49,937
people were displaced in Montes de Maria between 2003-2007,
30 percent of which occurred in the municipality of Carmen de
Bolivar alone. The problem now, explained Colonel Colon,
former director of the Fusion Center for Montes de Maria, is
that many want to return but cannot due to lack of access or
ongoing obstacles, like lack of potable water, electricity
and other public services. Garcia said much of the problem
is due to the conditions of roads, which will no longer be an
obstacle once the GOC completes current road projects. That
said, the Bolivar Governor Joaco Hernando Berrio Villarreal
opined that the number of those wanting to return is small,
while human rights organization CODHES reports that only 2-5
percent of IDPs in Colombia want to return.

Social/Economic Factors:
Development, Justice and Land
--------------

13. (C) The people of Montes de Maria are ready for
solutions, stated Sucre Private Secretary Fadul, and local
government is ready to help, but he argued they need
sustainable solutions. 1st Brigade Commander Colonel
Gutierrez explained that the people of Montes de Maria turned
to the FARC and narcotrafficking due to the lack of available
opportunities in the region. In many parts of Montes de
Maria there have been little or no government services,
water, electricity or jobs. Civil society leader Gonsalez
told us that Montes de Maria needs economic development--such
as employment possibilities, roads, infrastructure and
cooperatives--as well as justice in the region.


14. (C) Land appears to be the single most contentious issue
in the area, according to several experts. Oscar Herrera
argues that the lack of land reform in the region is an
obstacle to resolving the problems for the people of Montes
de Maria. Professor Amaranto Daniels, Director of the Montes
de Maria Observatory at the University of Cartagena, claims
that land conflicts could trigger the next round of conflict
in the region. Garcia and Colon concurred with this
assessment. Colon told us that GOC land institutions are not
flexible in responding quickly to solve problems over land.
Finally, speculation over the possibility of petroleum in the
region combined with large agricultural projects in the
region are inflating prices of land and pressuring some land
owners to sell without viable alternatives.



BROWNFIELD