MILITARY'S HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES MEET RESISTANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000542

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM MOPS MCAP KJUS CO
SUBJECT: MILITARY'S HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES MEET RESISTANCE

REF: A. 2008 BOGOTA 4165

B. BOGOTA 0401

Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer
Reasons 1.4 (b and d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Defense Ministry (MOD) continues to step up
investigations into reports of murders committed by Army
personnel, and has fired fifty-one officers and enlisted men
implicated in the incidents--including 27 dismissed as a
result of the Soacha murders. The MOD is also working to fix
breakdowns in intelligence, operational planning and
logistics that contribute to human rights abuses, as well as
to implement clearer rules of engagement. Still, some senior
military officials continue to resist the MOD's efforts,
arguing that human rights concerns are overstated and that
the new policies are harming the war effort. Army Commander
General Oscar Gonzalez has impeded investigations of abuses
by limiting the mandate of the Army Inspector General. With
Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos likely to depart soon to
launch his presidential campaign, senior military and
civilian officials say it is key that President Uribe appoint
a Minister equally committed to human rights if the current
progress is to be maintained. End Summary

MOD IMPLEMENTS CORRECTIVE MEASURES
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2. (C) Since October 2008, the MOD has dismissed fifty-one
officers and enlisted men implicated in extrajudicial
killings: 27 Army personnel were fired in October 2008 for
the Soacha killings; 13 more were dismissed in November 2008
for murders in Cordoba; and 11 others were dismissed from La
Popa Battalion in January 2009 for killings in Cesar. In
addition to the investigations, the MOD is implementing the
15-point plan announced by MOD Santos in November 2008 to
improve the military's human rights record and deter abuses
(see reftel A). The MOD is developing clearer rules of
military engagement and is designating those criminal bands
that are legitimate military targets and those that should be
subject to law enforcement action. The GOC also modified an
internal directive regulating rewards payments to informants
to avoid situations such as the "Rojas" case where the GOC
paid for FARC Secretariat member Ivan Rios' hand (and later
his corpse).

IG'S MANDATE LIMITED
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3. (C) Army Inspector General (IG) Major General Carlos
Suarez, who was made IG by MOD Santos with the specific
mandate to investigate extrajudicial killings, told us on
February 13 that he and two trusted members of his team are
the only personnel who investigate alleged murders committed
killings by Army personnel. The investigations follow the
model used by Suarez in investigating the Soacha murders, and
examine the operational, intelligence, logistical and
administrative components of supposed military operations.
Suarez clarified that his role is not criminal or
disciplinary, but rather administrative. He cannot dismiss
any personnel on his own, and can only make recommendations
to the Army Commander, Armed Forces Commander, or the MOD.
For example, he recommended that 28 Army officers and other
personnel be dismissed from the Popa Battalion due to their
alleged roles in killings in Cesar, but Army Commander Oscar
Gonzalez approved the removal of only 11 officers.

PROBLEM WIDESPREAD AND BAD TACTICS
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4. (C) Suarez said the extrajudicial execution problem was
widespread. He stated that the Soacha phenomenon originated
in the 4th Brigade in Medellin (commanded at one time by both
former Army Commander Mario Montoya and current Army
Commander Oscar Gonzalez). The practice later spread to
other brigades and commands in the region, including the
Joint Caribbean Command. Suarez said the insistence by some
military commanders on body counts as a measure of success
despite MOD directives to the contrary--coupled with some
commanders' ties to criminals and narcotraffickers--led to
the specific pattern of murders committed in the Soacha and
other cases. He noted that the body count system--and the
resulting murders--not only undermined the Army's legitimacy,
but also created a false illusion of success. As a result,
the "false positives" diverted resources and attention away
from the main fight against the FARC.

SENIOR LEVEL RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
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5. (C) Suarez said he continues to enjoy the support of MOD
Santos, Vice Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo, and Armed
Forces Commander Freddy Padilla. Still, he faces resistance
from some active duty officers supported by a group of
retired generals and right-wing politicians. Suarez noted
that he was imposed on Army Commander Gonzalez by Padilla,
and that Gonzalez opposes his work. He acknowledged that
Gonzalez tried to intimidate witnesses not to testify about
murders committed by the 11th Brigade in Sucre, and said
Gonzalez tries to limit his office's resources.
XXXXXXXXXXXX echoed Suarez's comments,
noting that Gonzalez has transferred personnel from Suarez's
office, reduced his bodyguard contingent, and tried to
restrict the IG's mandate. Suarez added that his family has
received indirect threats due to his work. His staff is
searching for an email allegedly circulating within the
military which shows photos of the members of the MOD
Commission that investigated the Soacha murders with X's
drawn through them.


6. (C) Beyond the military, Suarez said retired generals such
as Montoya and former 17th Brigade Commander Rito Alejo del
Rio are working with right-wing politicians like former
Minister Fernando Londono to undercut Santos' human rights
initiatives. He cited a February 12 "El Tiempo" Op-ed in
which Londono complained that the dismissals over the
so-called "false positives" had emasculated the military,
leaving officers too scared to conduct operations and
returning the tactical initiative to the FARC. Jaramillo
told us that some officers are mounting a campaign involving
legal action, intimidation, and slander to harass those
officers and civilians committed to cleaning up the Army.
Jaramillo noted that former Colonel Mejia--who faces criminal
charges for his role in the La Popa murders--has filed
complaints with the Inspector General's Office (Procuraduria)
against him and Prosecutor General Human Rights Office
director Sandra Castro for allegedly forcing witnesses to
testify against him.

BATTLE OVER URIBE'S EAR
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7. (C) Suarez observed that President Uribe continues to view
military success in terms of kills, leaving him susceptible
to the arguments of some military officers and politicians
that the MOD's emphasis on human rights is overstated and is
harming the war effort against the FARC. Jaramillo confirmed
that the group's arguments are gaining some traction with
Uribe. Suarez said the President needs to understand that
the previous enemy combat death reports included many
non-FARC, creating a misleading view of progress and
promoting both bad tactics and officers.


8. (C) Suarez and Jaramillo discounted charges that the
Soacha investigations and other MOD human rights initiatives
are discouraging military operations against the FARC, noting
that the Army units which have achieved the greatest results
against the terrorist group were not involved in the murders.
Suarez said Army Operations Chief Major General Carlos
Saavedra agrees that the human rights impact on operations
has been minimal (Embassy's own analysis supports Suarez and
Saavedra's conclusions. See reftel B). Still, Suarez and
Jaramillo said that with MOD Santos likely to depart soon to
launch his presidential campaign, President Uribe's choice of
the next MOD will be key. If the next MOD does not share
Santos' strong human rights commitment, the progress achieved
to date could be reversed.
BROWNFIELD