SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 4-5 VISIT TO COLOMBIA OF

UNCLAS BOGOTA 000526

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PTER PHUM MOPS MCAP ECON CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 4-5 VISIT TO COLOMBIA OF
CJCS ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN

Summary
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1. (SBU) We welcome the visit of Admiral Mullen to Colombia,
which comes at a key time in the U.S.-Colombia bilateral
relationship. As you know from previous visits, in ten
years, Colombia has progressed from a near failed state and
terrorist haven to an economic, political, and social leader
in Latin America. Colombia has made major progress in its
fight against illegal armed groups and set records in the
eradication and interdiction of drugs. Murder and kidnapping
rates have dropped dramatically, while rule of law has
strengthened through major judicial reforms. Improved
security and economic reform has grown the economy, reduced
poverty, and attracted record levels of investment. The GOC
has looked to leverage these successes beyond its borders by
offering troops to NATO in Afghanistan and providing
counterterrorism and counternarcotics training to Mexican,
Panamanian and other law enforcement agencies in the region.


2. (SBU) Significant challenges remains--especially related
to human rights abuses within the military. Drug trafficking
organizations and illegal armed groups continue to operate in
large parts of the country, including border areas. Colombia
has over three million internally displaced persons, and deep
social divides still prevent millions of citizens, especially
in rural areas, from benefiting fully from security and
economic gains. Despite progress on human rights, some
elements of the security forces continue to violate human
rights, and the military has been accused of numerous
extrajudicial killings of innocents. We hope you will be
able to reiterate to the military leadership the need for
continued--and significant--progress on these cases and the
importance of human rights. Violence against trade unionists
continues even as the GOC has stepped up prosecutions and
boosted its protection programs for unionists, human rights
activists, and other vulnerable individuals. USG support is
critical to help the GOC confront these persistent
challenges, even as we continue our dialogue on how best to
transfer key security tasks from the USG to the GOC. End
Summary.

Democratic Security Advances
--------------


3. (SBU) Colombia has achieved successes in its fight against
the FARC, National Liberation Army (ELN) and emerging
criminal groups. The rescue of 15 high-profile FARC hostages
in July 2008, including three Americans, and the deaths of
key FARC leaders highlight Colombia's progress in security.
Colombian security forces captured or killed a number of
mid-level FARC leaders, and reduced the space in which
terrorists can operate freely. A record number of FARC
members deserted in 2008--including mid and high-level
commanders. Total demobilizations of illegal armed groups
reached 3461 in 2008--primarily from the FARC--making it the
highest level of demobilizations in Colombia's history.


4. (SBU) With USG help, in 2008, Colombia again set records
in eradication and interdiction of drugs, while further
reducing murder and kidnapping rates. Colombia extradited a
record 208 criminals, narcotraffickers and terrorists to the
United States in 2008, including 15 senior ex-paramilitary
leaders; Colombia has already extradited more than 20
criminals in 2009. The number of homicides fell for the
sixth consecutive year, dropping to 16,140 (or 33 for every
100,000 habitants),45 percent lower than 2002 levels.

Economic Limitations
--------------


5. (SBU) Reacting to a projected economic slowdown in 2009,
the Government of Colombia (GOC) plans to cut the national
budget by $1.4 billion, including a proposed $190 million
reduction to the defense budget. The proposal would likely
reduce future expenditures on ammunition, rifles,
communications equipment, infrastructure projects, fuel,

food, and uniforms. The proposed cuts would not directly
affect defense expenditures funded by the wealth tax, which
is expected to raise approximately $3.7 billion between
2007-2011. Still, the GOC's ability to sustain current
levels of defense spending after 2011, when the wealth tax
expires, is in doubt. Funding for social programs, critical
to addressing many of the catalysts for the conflict, will
also likely suffer due to slower Colombian growth as a result
of the global downturn. The economic downturn could generate
more social unrest, strikes and protests in Colombia in 2009.


Regional Context
--------------


6. (SBU) Colombia sees itself as a key U.S. ally in an Andean
region increasingly hostile to U.S. values and goals.
Ecuador broke diplomatic relations with Colombia after a
military strike in March 2008 against FARC Commander Raul
Reyes's camp just across the border in Ecuador. The GOC
maintains a moderate tone with Ecuadorian President Correa,
despite his often angry rhetoric. Ecuador recently imposed
strict requirements on Colombians wishing to travel to their
southern neighbor.


7. (SBU) Relations with Venezuela are now stable, and have
improved since Venezuela recalled its ambassador following
the Reyes attack. Presidents Uribe and Chavez met in late
January 2009 in Cartagena, announcing several vague economic
cooperation agreements. However, Colombia remains wary of
Venezuelan ties to the FARC, as evidenced in the computers
found in the Raul Reyes camp. Beyond the Andes, Colombia is
helping Mexico to combat terrorism, narcotrafficking and
other criminal activity. Colombia is also working with
Mexico, Chile, Peru and Brazil to promote economic
integration and strengthen democratic institutions in Latin
America. Colombia has also offered to send engineering and
special forces to Afghanistan under NATO auspices, and
contributes troops to the Multi-National Observer Forces in
the Sinai.

Economic Growth and Free Trade
--------------


8. (U) After several years of strong economic growth,
Colombia has begun to feel the pinch of the global economic
crisis. Growth slowed to 3.5 percent in 2008 after record
growth of 7.5 percent in 2007. Colombia remains highly
dependent on commodity exports (petroleum, coal, flowers,
coffee),making it vulnerable to price drops. Colombia cut
unemployment and poverty during the past six years, but those
gains have stalled. The financial sector remains solid --
cushioned to date against the global credit crunch by
conservative lending practices. The slowing economy has led
to growing popular concern over pocketbook issues, and a
pyramid scandal in 2008 cost Colombians an estimated $1
billion in savings. The GOC inked trade deals with Canada,
Chile, Central America and smaller European countries in the
last year. The GOC is now negotiating an agreement with the
EU. The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CPTA)
remains a bilateral priority for the Colombian government and
private sector, and the GOC may consult with you as to how it
can work together with the Congress to promote its passage.

Serious Challenges Ahead
--------------


9. (SBU) Despite advances in security and development,
challenges related to violence, narcotrafficking,
displacement, human rights, labor rights, and minority groups
remain. We estimate the FARC has some 9000 fighters in the
field, and organized narcotrafficking groups continue to
cause violence. Internal displacement due to the armed
conflict remains serious, with three million displaced by
violence since 1995. Deep historical social divides make it
difficult for millions from the Afro-Colombian and indigenous
populations to benefit fully from security and economic

gains. These minority groups suffer from limited education,
health care, and employment opportunities, and
disproportionate forced displacement in the mostly isolated
rural areas where they reside.


10. (U) Colombia has publicly committed to improving its
human rights performance, and we hope you will be able to
reinforce the human rights message with the GOC leadership.
Fifty Colombian military officers were recently dismissed due
to alleged involvement in extrajudicial killings, but such
abuses remain a serious problem. We are working with the
Ministry of Defense to improve rules of engagement, and make
sure that soldiers accused of human rights abuses are
investigated by civilian prosecutors. Labor unionists and
homicides declined 76 percent between 2001-2008, yet in 2008
the number of labor homicides (for all causes) increased from
39 to 46--largely due to a spike in the first
quarter--although still well below the national homicide
rate.


11. (U) Through the Center for Coordinated and Integrated
Action (CCAI),the GOC is recovering territory previously
held by illegal armed groups and establishing government,
state services and securing vulnerable communities. In 2008,
the GOC reestablished a government presence in all 1098
municipalities and all the country's mayors once again
resided within their municipalities. A coordination plan for
Macarena--the historic heartland of the FARC--aims to
establish a permanent military, police and civilian presence
in post-conflict areas--some of which have never seen a
viable GOC presence. Challenges remain, as resource,
security and staffing shortfalls continue to limit the
initiative. The United States, through USAID, MILGRP and
NAS, provides assistance to CCAI.

USAID: Aiding Communities At Risk
--------------


12. (U) Under Plan Colombia, the USG has provided more than
$950 million in economic and social assistance via USAID.
USAID's initiatives have delivered legal jobs, social
services, and development in narcotrafficking and conflict
zones. We are reintegrating thousands of Colombians who have
demobilized, abating child recruitment into armed groups, and
increasing social services for victims of conflict. We are
restoring citizen confidence in governance, improving the
criminal justice system and institutions, increasing the
poor's access to justice, and promoting human rights through
investigation and prosecution of human rights and
labor-related cases. These programs focus on communities at
high-risk of violence, provide legal and psycho-social
assistance, and strengthen key Government oversight and
judicial institutions.

13.(U) USAID's alternative development program is a key
component of our counter-narcotics efforts. It promotes
sustainable economic opportunities in regions vulnerable to
drug production and conflict. These programs create jobs and
economic opportunities in areas recently retaken from illegal
armed groups and build the social infrastructure to mitigate
future conflict. USAID is expanding social and economic
opportunities and improving livelihoods for Afro-Colombians
and indigenous communities disproportionately affected by
conflict. These programs provide jobs, education, health
care housing, and social services for these vulnerable
populations.

DOJ: Providing Justice Reform
--------------


14. (U) The Department of Justice (DOJ) coordinates a
multifaceted program focused on strengthening the Colombian
criminal justice system, its institutions, processes and
personnel. This program involves six major areas:
implementation of an accusatory system; human rights
investigations and prosecutions; Justice and Peace
investigations and prosecutions; complex areas of criminal

law; improved forensics capability; and witness protection.
The bulk of the assistance is provided through training and
technical assistance to the Prosecutor General's Office.

NAS: Eradicating, Training, Nationalizing
--------------


15. (U) We made real strides in battling narcoterrorism in
Colombia in 2008. The most recent U.S. figures for cocaine
production in Colombia show a 24 percent reduction in
production since the peak year 2001. In 2008, Colombian
security forces seized 245 metric tons of cocaine and coca
paste, eradicated 230,000 hectares of coca and destroyed 3667
drug labs. We kept hundreds of metric tons out of the United
States. We have reduced the funds available to the FARC and
other criminal groups for the purchase of weapons and
explosives, corruption of public officials, and coercion of
local populations.


16. (U) We have made progress in eradication. Increased
coordination between manual and aerial eradication improves
our ability to deal with replanting. Much of the success in
battling narcotrafficking and terrorism is due to air
mobility capabilities provided by the United States. Without
helicopters, the GOC could not project force or provide
government presence in a country the size of Texas and
California combined. Colombia is nationalizing our aviation
assets, but still needs some U.S. support. In the last two
years, more than 50 aircraft have been turned over to the GOC
to fund, maintain, and control. Colombia's ability to
confront narcotics and terrorism depends in large part on its
air mobility.

MILGRP: Aiming for Irreversibility
--------------


17. (U) The Military Group (MILGRP) has focused its support
to the Colombian military based upon a three-phased approach.
The first focused on building Colombian military forces,
projecting those forces into ungoverned spaces and securing
those spaces. It also supported offensive operations against
illegal armed groups on a scale never seen before. The
second phase, currently being executed, focuses on securing,
consolidating and sustaining those gains, increasing
offensive operations against illegal armed groups, and
ensuring the irreversibility of those gains. The third
phase, to be initiated in 2011, is to promote a strategic
partnership to sustain key Colombian military capabilities.


18. (U) The MILGRP currently supports eight program areas:
joint rotary wing, ground operations, riverine operations,
governability, airpower, maritime interdiction, joint
intelligence and communications, and joint force initiatives.
Support to these programs is vital in both the short and
long-terms. In the short-term, we will assist Colombia in
controlling illegal armed groups and bringing peace and rule
of law to the Colombian population. In the long-term, we
will focus on building a strategic partnership with
Colombian, and develop key Colombian military capabilities
that can support U.S. national security objectives worldwide.


New Initiatives
--------------


19. (SBU) We are working with the GOC, other governments, and
international organizations to develop an initiative to
consolidate the gains made to date in key conflict areas.
The initiative builds on current and past USG and GOC
programs, and involves close coordination of security,
eradication, alternative development, energy, and
institutional development programs. The initiative's primary
goal is to provide incentives for Colombian citizens to join
the licit economy in the conflict zones plagued by coca
cultivation, narcotrafficking and illegal armed groups.
These targeted regions produce roughly 80 percent of the coca
in Colombia and serve as major trafficking hubs, with a high

incidence of violence and displacement.
BROWNFIELD