WORRIED GOC ACTS TO SAVE "MEDELLIN MIRACLE"

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000519

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KJUS KCRM CO SNAR
SUBJECT: WORRIED GOC ACTS TO SAVE "MEDELLIN MIRACLE"

REF: A. 09BOGOTA145

B. 08BOGOTA3077

C. 08BOGOTA4442

Classified By: Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The GOC in late January launched a major push in
Medellin to combat the rising rate of violent crime in the
city and nearby areas. Medellin has enjoyed the most
dramatic drop in homicide rates of any major city or region
in Colombia under President Uribe's Democratic Security
policy, making 2008's 35 percent increase in homicides
worrying to local and national officials. The Colombian
National Police (CNP) is surging personnel to Medellin and
targeting the narcotrafficking organizations behind the
violence. Still, organized crime linked to the drug trade,
problems with Medellin's paramilitary reintegration program
and local corruption will hamper the new efforts.


NARANJO INITIATES 'SURGE' AGAINST DRUG-LINKED VIOLENCE
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2. (U) Colombian National Police (CNP) Commander General
Oscar Naranjo temporarily moved his headquarters to Medellin
in late January to spearhead a new effort to counter the
rising rates of violence there and in nearby regions. At a
time when homicides in the rest of Colombia continue to trend
downward, Medellin, surrounding Antioquia, and nearby Cordoba
saw significant upticks in their rates in 2008 (reftel A).
Colombian media also speculated that the GOC's move may have
been motivated by (as yet unconfirmed) reports that narco
kingpin Daniel Rendon (alias "Don Mario") has offered a
reward of 2 million pesos (about $800 USD) to any of his men
who killed a police officer.


3. (U) CNP officials said Naranjo is targeting the drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) behind the spike in
homicides, Rendon's in particular. The effort will involve
bringing an additional 1000 police officers and police
intelligence agents to Medellin, where they will conduct
raids, investigations, and roadblocks aimed at disrupting the
drug trade and its attendant violence. Naranjo also told
leading daily El Tiempo that he aimed to capture Rendon and
other leading narcotrafficking chiefs, tightly control
firearms and motorcycles (which are frequently used by
assassins),and shut down DTO drug distribution centers in
Medellin. The increased operational tempo in the first few
days of the new effort netted over 1500 arrests in Medellin,
according to Colombian press reporting, including 350 arrests
in the dangerous Comuna 13 neighborhood alone.

CRIMINALS, DEMOBILIZATION, AND CORRUPTION BEHIND THE SPIKE
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4. (C) Medellin has seen a 76 percent decline in homicides
(and a significant drop in other types of violent crime)
since 2002, but the 2008 jump has many concerned. Most GOC
sources blame the spike in killings on a combination of
fighting among drug gangs, the large numbers of demobilized
fighters in the city, and corruption in local governments and
security forces. Most of the killings result from infighting
among criminal groups seeking to fill the vacuum left by the
May 2008 extradition of Diego Murillo (alias Don Berna),
whose organization controlled crime in Medellin for years,
according to Medellin Mayor Alonso Salazar and Medellin
Police Commander Dagoberto Garcia (reftel B). Medellin
Secretary of Government Jesus Ramirez also told us that 70%
of those murdered in the city had prior criminal records.


5. (C) Salazar told us that many of the nearly 4300 former
paramilitary fighters (along with 800 ex-guerrillas) in
Medellin's once-highly-touted reintegration program have
joined drug gangs or been killed for refusing to do so.
According to El Tiempo, at least 350 demobilized paramilitary
fighters in Medellin have been arrested, about 200 have been
murdered, and at least 130 have been expelled from the
program and/or rejoined criminal groups. The reinsertion
program itself has struggled to serve its clients amid
political infighting and competition for the program's
lucrative contracts, which for years were controlled by
Murillo's organization through a front NGO, says a recent
study by Corporacion para la Paz y el Desarrollo. Medellin
officials had accepted the arrangement to keep the peace
until it became clear that Murillo's lieutenants--one of whom
was a brother of a Medellin prosecutor--were using the NGO to
continue their criminal activities. The result has made a
return to the lucrative world of crime more tempting for the
demobilized. In addition, according to Salazar and other
officials, corruption and penetration of Medellin's security
forces by DTOs remains a serious problem that has reduced
their ability to fight crime

WILL IT BE ENOUGH?
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6. (C) Medellin CNP Commander Garcia told us the overall
crime rate in Medellin and Antioquia continues to drop, and
Salazar told us that polls show security is less important to
Medellin residents than economic issues--which they say
further shows the violence is largely restricted to the
criminal underworld. Still, GOC and Medellin officials worry
the trend will spread, and it is unclear whether the new
surge addresses the problems underlying the homicide spike.
Naranjo himself suggested in interviews that the problem will
continue until one crime organization consolidates its power
in the city. Salazar in August told us that national needs
have left Medellin with fewer police officers than in 2004,
and that CNP plans to add 500 police officers to the city
would merely cover attrition--not represent a net gain.



BROWNFIELD