DESERTIONS RISING, OPS SLOWING?: COLOMBIA CONFLICT

S E C R E T BOGOTA 000401

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PTER PHUM CO
SUBJECT: DESERTIONS RISING, OPS SLOWING?: COLOMBIA CONFLICT
UPDATE FOR OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2008

Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer
Reasons 1.4 (b and d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Colombian military did not score any high-profile
tactical wins over the FARC in the fourth quarter of 2008,
leading to a public perception that the GOC lost momentum
following earlier successes. Some officers claimed
commanders had become too cautious after the dismissal of 27
military personnel for their involvement in the Soacha
extrajudicial killings, but our analysis shows the fall in
operations appears to have been a normal, seasonal phenomenon
due to end-of-year command changes and the holiday lull.
Kills and captures continued to drop, but 2008 ended with a
record number of 3,500 demobilized terrorists, mostly from
the FARC. There was an up-tick in FARC attacks towards the
end of the quarter, and extortion bombings in Bogota
continued. The FARC continued to rely on land mines,
snipers, and improvised explosive devices. Estimates vary
widely, but local analysts believe the FARC still has around
9,000 fighters perhaps as many as 18,000 militia. The GOC
said it would target the ELN in 2009, despite charges that
the Colombian military colluded with the ELN to fight the
FARC in Arauca. End Summary.

2008 DEMOBS BREAK RECORD
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2. (C) The GOC reported that a record number of 3461
individuals demobilized in 2008--including 3,027 from the
FARC--an increase of 30 percent over 2007. There was a 31
percent increase in FARC desertions among FARC combatants
with three to five years of experience. Demobilizations were
highest among FARC fronts that lost their commanders or faced
constant military pressure, with more than one third of the
demobilizations this quarter coming from the Eastern Bloc.
The lowest level of demobilizations occurred along the porous
Venezuelan border. The highest profile demobilization was
Wilson Bueno Largo (alias Isaza),who deserted with
"political" hostage and former Congressman Oscar Tulio
Lizcano on October 23 after 12 years in the FARC. Isaza
cited military pressure, exhaustion and supply shortages as
factors in his desertion. The GOC publicized Isaza's
demobilization and his subsequent receipt of political asylum
in France, hoping to attract other FARC members to desert
with hostages.

COLMIL OPS SLOWING?
--------------

3. (S) Some military officers told us that military
operations slowed during the fourth quarter as commanders
became less aggressive following President Uribe's dismissal
of 27 military personnel, including two generals, for their
roles in the extrajudicial killing of unemployed men from
Soacha. A military commission investigating the murders
found that the dismissed personnel failed to follow basic
intelligence, operational and logistical practices that could
have prevented the murders. The scandal tarnished the
military's image, and also led to the November 4 resignation
of Army Commander General Mario Montoya Uribe. Concerns over
alleged previous human rights abuses continue to hang over
the new Army Chief, General Oscar Gonzales Pena, who is
widely considered a Montoya protege.


4. (S) Our analysis does not support some military officers'
assertions that humans rights concerns led to fall in
military operations in the last quarter. Operations in the
fourth quarter were less than in earlier quarters of 2008,
but the drop appears to be a normal, seasonal phenomenon due
to the traditional holiday lull, end-of-year command changes,
and looming budget cuts and fuel shortfalls. Defense Vice
Minister Sergio Jaramillo told us a reduction in the types of
operations that led to the Soacha killings was positive,
noting that there was no drop in actions against the FARC in
key areas such as Meta. However, a planned defense budget
cut of approximately $190 million in 2009 could affect future
military operations, since there will be reduced expenditures
on rifles, ammunition, fuel, rations, uniforms,
communications equipment and infrastructure projects.


5. (S) The Colombian military failed to kill or capture any
high value targets (HVTs) in the fourth quarter, with several
factors likely to blame. After Operation Jaque, the FARC
Secretariat ordered personnel to stop using signal
communications, opting instead for hand-delivery of encrypted
messages. This has reduced the number of actionable SIGINT
hits, but has also further disrupted the FARC's internal
communications. Another factor limiting HVT successes is the
GOC's reliance on precision guided munitions that require the
target's precise coordinates. In the absence of SIGINT
hits, obtaining this information requires human informants to
infiltrate FARC camps.


6. (S) There are unconfirmed reports that FARC military
commander Jorge Briceno ("Mono Jojoy") may be operating in
the border area between Tolima and Meta, and that FARC leader
Guillermo Saenz ("Alfonso Cano") may be operating in the
Tolima/Cauca regions. Both are reportedly constantly on the
move in high altitude areas with rugged terrain, where
helicopters find it difficult to operate and mobility is
limited. The Joint Forces Decisive Action Unit (FUCAD) may
be relocated in the near future to pursue Mono Jojoy.


7. (S) MOD Santos is pressing the COLMIL for results ahead of
his planned departure from the Ministry--in addition to
helping his political aspirations, another HVT kill or
capture would help the military regain some of the momentum
lost since Jaque and other Secretariat kills earlier in 2008.
Despite the lack of HVTs, the following mid-level commanders
were captured or killed this quarter:

-- Alvaro Serpa Diaz ("Felipe Rincon") was killed on October
30 in a Colombian air strike along the Caqueta/Meta border.
He had 33 years of experience with the FARC, and was
reputedly a leader of the FARC militia in Bogota.

-- Jose Marvel Zamora Antonio Narino ("Chucho," or "El
Profe") was captured by the Colombian Army on October 30 in
Coyaima Municipality, Tolima. He allegedly coordinated
terrorist attacks on Bogota, and had been sentenced to a
25-year prison term for terrorism.

-- Rolando Antonio Pelaez Velez ("La Muerte") was arrested in
Cali on December 18. He was implicated in the kidnapping of
12 Cauca Assemblymen, eleven of whom were later executed, and
in 11 other terrorist attacks, including the August 31 attack
on the Cali Palace of Justice building.

-- Englio Gaona Ospina ("Bertil"),commander of the FARC's
25th Front and a FARC fighter for over 25 years, was killed
on December 2P}Q/QLertil's girlfriend was
arrested in Bogota on November 27 for extortion.

NUMBERS, A TRICKY BUSINESS
--------------

8. (C) Current estimates of active FARC fighters range from
5,000 to more than 10,000. FARC militia estimates vary
widely, but assuming 9,000 fighters and using a fairly
conservative two-to-one fighter/militia ratio, the FARC could
have as many as 18,000 militia members, including both
"popular" (untrained) and Boliviariano (trained). This would
give the FARC more than 25,000 potential fighters. This
could explain how the FARC has been able to replenish their
forces despite the toll taken by combat deaths, captures and
record demobilizations--the FARC is reportedly drawing on
militia members to replace losses in the field.


9. (C) In a December 2008 report titled "Where is the war
going?," local analyst Leon Valencia claimed that the FARC
was regaining strength, pointed to "alarming" data such as in
Bajo Cauca, where the FARC had allegedly gone from only 100
to close to 600 fighters. Other prominent analysts
(including Jorge Restrepo, Roman Ortiz and Alfredo Rangel)
disagree with these figures, and maintain that counting
fighters is unreliable guesswork. These analysts argue that
the only empirically accurate way to track the conflict is to
measure acts of violence. Under this approach, they say
Colombia has become significantly more secure by nearly all
indicators, particularly decreasing homicide numbers.

UP-TICK IN FARC ATTACKS
--------------

10. (C) FARC attacks increased in the last part of the fourth
quarter and into the first quarter of 2009, likely to
demonstrate continued resilience in the face of devastating
losses earlier in the year:

-- On December 7, the FARC attacked a humanitarian caravan
led by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute in Caqueta
Department with a roadside bomb, killing two health care
workers. The FARC later apologized for this "accident" in a
December 26 communique, wherein they advised civilians to
avoid contact with the Colombian military for their own
safety.

-- On December 8 the FARC blew up a bridge near San Jose de
Guaviare.

-- On December 22, the FARC took 10 hostages in Cubarral
municipality, Meta but released them several weeks later.
Military intelligence sources later suggested that they were
used as cover to halt military operations while the FARC
moved one of its leaders from the zone.

-- On December 3Q the FARC detonated a roadside bomb in
Caqueta, injuring three civilians and three soldiers, and
damaging power lines.

-- On January 14, the FARC attacked a police station in
Narino using gas cylinders filled with explosives, killing
four children and one adult.

-- On January 16, the FARC detonated a car bomb in Neiva,
damaging some 400 nearby businesses.

-- On January 27, the FARC militia was blamed for a
Blockbuster video store bombing in the heart of Bogota that
killed two people.

ASYMMETRICAL ATTACKS
--------------

11. (C) Colombian analysts generally agree that the FARC is
becoming more regionalized (due to difficulties with command
and contro2:$%ourth quarter, Colombian
military and police recovered several hundred mortar tubes
reportedly destined for the FARC. Still, GOC sources
speculated that the source responsible for the intelligence
leading to the recovery was likely fabricating and planting
the tubes to collect the reward money. Police deactivated
more than 40 explosive devices in Bogota in 2008, as well as
seven car bombs that were reportedly destined for Neiva and
Florencia.

BOGOTA EXTORTION
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12. (C) Leading daily "El Tiempo" reported on January 29 that
there were 102 cases of extortion in Bogota in 2008, compared
to 166 reported cases in 2007. GOC officials attributed most
of the bombings in Bogota during this quarter to FARC
extortion attempts, including a December 30 explosion in
Bogota which used approximately one and a half kilos of
pentonite in a shopping center near a bus station. The FARC
was also blamed for a larger attack on a Blockbuster video
store in North Bogota on January 27, 2009 that killed two and
injured twenty -- the bomb appears to be extortion-related,
although it attracted additional attention due to its force
and location in the heart of the city's wealthiest district.

BORDER AREAS
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13. (S) The GOC continues to complain about the lack of will
the Panamanian border to avoid military operations. The GOC
has been cooperating with Panamanian military forces and has
offered to provide cross-border military assistance if
requested.

ELN IN COLMIL SIGHTS
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14. (C) The ELN was estimated to have between 2,000 and 3,000
men organized in 6 fronts, down from more than 4,500 in the
year 2000. The group continued to maintain a low profile,
aside from a much publicized ambush on December 6 in Arauca
that killed 9 policemen, and its leadership (COCE) remains
intact. Senior GOC officials have stated that they have the
ELN in their sights for 2009. Colombian National Police
Chief General Oscar Naranjo praised a recent U.S. request to
extradite ELN commander Carlos tated
intention to go after the ELN in 2009 and the Arauca attack,
there are public reports that some military commanders have
colluded with the ELN in Arauca to fight the FARC, allegedly
sharing both intelligence and operational details.

UNHOLY ALLIANCES
--------------

15. (C) The ELN, FARC and criminal groups continued to jockey
for control of territory and lucrative drug trafficking
routes. Some FARC fronts cooperated with criminal groups
headed by Daniel Rendon ("Don Mario") in northwest Colombia
and Pedro Guerro ("Cuchillo") in Colombia's eastern plains.
The FARC has reportedly been relegated to providing coca base
to these drug groups. In other areas, the groups were in
open conflict, as evidenced by continued clashes between the
FARC and the ELN in Narino department. Combat between the
FARC and the ELN in Arauca reportedly left 60 civilians dead
in 2008. There were also reports that the FARC may be using
criminal gangs to help it carry out bombings in urban areas.
BROWNFIELD