Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BOGOTA3998
2009-12-15 18:33:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

2009 Colombian Demobilization Rates Down, Yet More

Tags:  MCAP PHUM PREL PTER MOPS PGOV PREF SNAR PM VE PE EC 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #3998/01 3491834
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151833Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1610
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS BOGOTA 003998 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MCAP PHUM PREL PTER MOPS PGOV PREF SNAR PM VE PE EC
BR, CO
SUBJECT: 2009 Colombian Demobilization Rates Down, Yet More
Experienced Insurgents Increasingly Surrendering

Summary

--------------



UNCLAS BOGOTA 003998

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MCAP PHUM PREL PTER MOPS PGOV PREF SNAR PM VE PE EC
BR, CO
SUBJECT: 2009 Colombian Demobilization Rates Down, Yet More
Experienced Insurgents Increasingly Surrendering

Summary

--------------




1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Colombia's robust Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) policy continues to bear fruit late into 2009
primarily due to several years of sustained security operations.
Yet, after high rates in 2007 and 2008, a natural leveling off is
evident with demobilization slowing by more than 20%.
Encouragingly, countermeasures implemented by illegal groups have
not prevented a strong upswing in quality since 2007, with twice as
many mid-level leaders laying down arms. The Ministry of Defense
(MOD) has intensified efforts against illegal recruitment by
incorporating it into the demobilization strategy for
implementation in 2010. MOD budget shortfalls stalled some program
efforts during the first half of the year, but most large,
important contracts have since been awarded through mid-2010.
Efforts are underway to modernize the Programa de Atencion
Humanitaria al Desmovilizado (PAHD) information technology (IT)
infrastructure, analytical capabilities and positive identification
through biometrics. Future DDR success depends largely on
sustaining or improving existing DDR policies and Colombia's
ability to persuade its neighbors to collaborate. END SUMMARY.



52,000 in Seven Years

--------------




2. (SBU) Colombia's DDR policy continues to bear fruit late into
2009, primarily due to several years of sustained military and
police operations under the Democratic Security Policy. Since
2002, the MOD has transitioned 20,398 fighters into society via the
individual demobilization program, PAHD, while using the
information volunteered about illegal organizations to further tear
down such groups. PAHD candidates historically include
paramilitaries from groups like the United Self-Defense Forces of

Colombia (AUC) or insurgents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN). While 31,671
of the AUC demobilized in a collective process under the High
Commissioner for Peace, 3,682 demobilized individually until the
statute of limitations ran out for paramilitary groups in December

2006. The Ministry of Defense welcomes demobilized fighters and
their immediate family to one of 29 homes in six major cities where
they receive meals, new clothes, psychological assistance and a
modest transportation stipend. Once certified by an interagency
committee they transition to the High Commission for Reintegration
(ACR) for continued assistance while participating in reintegration
activities. Assistance includes psychological therapy, education,
job training, small business development and a monthly living
stipend equivalent to Colombian minimum wage.



Down but Not Out

--------------




3. (SBU) The PAHD is experiencing a natural leveling off after the
extraordinarily high demobilization rates in 2007 and 2008,
including a peak enrollment in 2008 when 3,461 insurgents
demobilized. These dramatic increases strongly correlated to areas
under sustained military pressure, especially when combined with
desertion, capture, or death of insurgent leaders. Reduced
pressure and a lack of major psychological blows may lower the


motivation to desert, but a more important factor is an increased
tendency for insurgents to avoid direct contact with security
forces and withdrawal to more remote areas. The COLMIL has had
fewer direct engagements with the FARC, and according to the PAHD
in 2009. One of the most common reasons cited for desertion is
military pressure. The isolation of would-be deserters combined
with less frequent engagements reduces their opportunities to
escape. As of November 30, 2009, the program has demobilized 2,481
individuals. To date, FARC demobilization numbers are short of
last year's total of 3,027, but ELN demobilization numbers are
already a record 470 plus.



Counter-measures Implemented to Prevent Desertion

-------------- --------------




4. (SBU) The MOD has uncovered evidence of demobilization
"counter-measures" through testimony and the examination of
captured FARC computers. Examples of reported counter-measures
include limiting contact with the local populace, separation of
FARC couples, prohibiting the use of radios, and execution of those
caught or accused of attempts at desertion.




5. (SBU) In response to FARC counter-measures, the MOD created
tactical demobilization positions throughout the Joint Task Force
Omega (JTF-O) area of operations and other tailor-made
demobilization initiatives. For example, the Catatumbo region of
Norte de Santander department employs a custom communications
strategy designed to take advantage of a local FARC leader's
tendency to abuse his personnel.



Insurgency Losing More of Its Leaders to Desertion

-------------- --------------




6. (SBU) A steady increase in the quality of demobilization
candidates began in 2007. The number of experienced combatants and
mid-level leaders demobilizing has doubled each year, indicating
more seasoned combatants are no longer convinced that their "cause"
is just and creating a leadership void difficult to fill with
inexperienced recruits. ACR education and training programs have
been refitted to match this increasingly significant demographic.



Anti-Recruitment Efforts to Stem Flow

-------------- --




7. (SBU) The MOD has redoubled efforts against illegal recruitment
by incorporating it into the demobilization strategy and combining
it with communications initiatives as well as special events for
high risk populations. Design, coordination and funding of the
strategy have been accomplished this year and include plans for
full implementation in 2010. Successful anti-recruitment efforts
would potentially break the cycle of violence and prompt arrival at
a post-conflict scenario.


Budget Ready for 2010

--------------




8. (SBU) The PAHD was not immune to large MOD budget shortfalls in
early 2009; however they were able to sustain critical operations
such as humanitarian assistance to the demobilized. Communications
and rewards for information and war material were hit hardest. The
program was unable to execute contracts with private media outlets
for the first half of the year or to pay demobilized fighters for
information and material surrendered in a timely manner. In
anticipation of potential budget shortages in 2010 and the unknowns
associated with an administration change, large contracts for
demobilized housing, psychological assistance and communications
initiatives were awarded through mid-2010.



Database, Biometrics and Analysis Capabilities Upgraded

-------------- --------------
--




9. (SBU) Our efforts to modernize the PAHD information technology
(IT) infrastructure, analytical capabilities and positive
identification through biometrics will be completed in early 2010.
Information from those demobilized is one of the best sources of
intelligence available to security forces, but thus far the volumes
of data have not realized their full potential. In addition to
internal program benefits, such as paperless management processes
and dramatically improved information security, the system will
facilitate a more effective transition from the PAHD to the
Reintegration phase.



Comment

--------------




10. (SBU) Looking ahead two to three years after the demobilization
or displacement of the majority of insurgents in Colombian
territory, the most serious challenges for the PAHD will be the
demobilization of insurgents who have found refuge in neighboring
countries, and the prevention of illegal recruitment by criminal
groups involved in drug trafficking (BACRIM). Two potential
strategies to deal with these problems include a Regional
Demobilization Workshop led by Colombia using cooperation between
the Governments of Panama and Colombia as a model, and dramatically
increased efforts against recruitment by criminal groups
complimented by nation-wide, U.S. supported consolidation efforts
such as the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI). End
Comment.
NICHOLS