Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BOGOTA3621
2009-12-23 21:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

Unfinished Business: Reelection, Prosecutor General, Intel

Tags:  PGOV KJUS PINR PHUM PTER CO 
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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #3621/01 3572123
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 232123Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1815
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC 0001
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003621 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/23
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PINR PHUM PTER CO
SUBJECT: Unfinished Business: Reelection, Prosecutor General, Intel
Agency, Victims, & Political Reform

REF: A) BOGOTA 3485; B) BOGOTA 3593; C) BOGOTA 3283; D) BOGOTA 3035
E) BOGOTA 2065; F) BOGOTA 3408

CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

Summary

-------



C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003621

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/23
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PINR PHUM PTER CO
SUBJECT: Unfinished Business: Reelection, Prosecutor General, Intel
Agency, Victims, & Political Reform

REF: A) BOGOTA 3485; B) BOGOTA 3593; C) BOGOTA 3283; D) BOGOTA 3035
E) BOGOTA 2065; F) BOGOTA 3408

CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

Summary

--------------




1. (U) Although the Colombian Congress managed to pass the national
budget and an extension of the "war tax" before adjourning in
December 2009, the legislative and judicial branches left a number
of important initiatives for the new year. These include: a
Constitutional Court decision on whether the referendum to modify
the Constitution to allow President Uribe to run for a third term
can go forward; the selection by the Supreme Court of one of the
Uribe Administration's three candidates to fill the long-vacant
Prosecutor General position; and laws restructuring the
Administrative Department of Security (DAS) intelligence agency,
providing reparations for victims of organized crime and terrorism,
expanding the scope of the Justice and Peace Law, and implementing
a range of essential political reforms. Legislative inaction
coupled with the continued fallout of the massive parapolitical
scandal (where congresspersons received funding from or
collaborated with paramilitary and other criminal groups) led news
weekly "Semana" to dub this the "Congress of Shame." Congress is
not scheduled to resume until March 16, so most of these essential
initiatives will continue to languish for months. End Summary.



Can Uribe Run for Reelection?

--------------




2. (U) Over two years ago, supporters of President Uribe began
collecting 3.9 million signatures to convoke a referendum to
determine whether the Constitution should be amended to allow him
to run for a third term. The referendum's fate moved into the
hands of the Constitutional Court in September 2009, after approval
by the Congress (ref A). Over the past three months, there has
been rampant speculation as to whether the Court would find a flaw
in the referendum process or allow it to move forward. While Uribe
has several supporters in the Court, it remains unclear whether

there are enough supporters of reelection. The Court adjourned for
the year without a decision, and the Inspector General also left
for vacation without submitting his required report on the matter
to the Court. Uribe also refrained from announcing whether he
intends to run for reelection.




3. (C) Presidential Advisor Jorge Mario Eastman told Polcouns on
December 18 that reelection was increasingly less likely given the
buildup of intellectual opposition, both in the press and in briefs
filed before the Court. He predicted the Court would decide in the
first half of February. However, Vice Minister of Defense Sergio
Jaramillo announced his resignation on December 17, telling the
Charge d'Affaires that Uribe's quest for a third term contradicted
the GOC's Democratic Security program focus on institution building
(ref B). (Note: Coincidentally, Eastman was named Jaramillo's
replacement on December 22. End Note.) An opposition politician
lamented to Poloff on December 5 that, in the end, the Court would
not stand in the way of bringing the reelection question to the
people. If the referendum goes forward, Uribe's 70% approval
rating and December polls on referendum intentions indicate that
the majority would vote in favor. However, the challenge would be
securing the required minimum voter turnout of 7.3 million (25% of
the electorate). Each passing day makes the referendum more
difficult logistically, but Uribe supporters still hope it can be


held on March 13.




4. (C) The uncertainty over Uribe's candidacy has overshadowed
national politics. The opposition does not know whether it will
face the formidable Uribe, so individual candidates are hesitant to
form coalitions at this point. Most pro-Uribe aspirants publicly
state they support his reelection and will not run if he is a
candidate, while they still carry out campaign activities,
conscious that little time remains before the May 30 presidential
elections.



No Prosecutor General

--------------




5. (SBU) The three-year "train crash" between the Uribe
Administration and the Judiciary reached a crescendo this year over
the selection of a new Prosecutor General (ref C). The
Constitution requires the Supreme Court to select a Prosecutor
General from a list of three names submitted by the President. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to select any of President
Uribe's nominees, citing a lack of qualifications or impartiality.
The key position has been vacant since July 31. Uribe replaced two
of the nominees in November, and, during its final session of 2009,
the Supreme Court scheduled their televised hearings for January

21. There are some signs that the branches are moving towards a
truce, including Minister of Interior and Justice Fabio Valencia
Cossio's announcement December 6 that that GOC would agree to an
independent study on the creation of a separate Ministry of
Justice. If all goes smoothly, the new Prosecutor General could
take office by March.




6. (C) The United Nations and others are concerned that the lack of
a Prosecutor General is hindering the Justice and Peace process, as
well as full implementation and fine-tuning of the accusatory
system in Colombia's courts. It is possible that the Acting
Prosecutor General and his 22,000 subordinates are somewhat
reluctant to launch high-profile investigations, make difficult
decisions, or enact reforms because of the uncertainty surrounding
the start date and identity of their new boss. However, the
Supreme Court's stance was welcomed by many who fear that the
reelection of President Uribe has deteriorated the balance of
powers among the branches.



Intelligence Agency Yet

to Rise from the Ashes

--------------




7. (C) The media labeled the surveillance of judges, opposition
politicians, journalists, and NGOs by the GOC's Administrative
Department of Security (DAS) the "scandal of the year." The
domestic and international fallout led Uribe to announce in
September that the DAS would be liquidated (ref D). Uribe
submitted a bill to Congress abolishing the DAS (which as a cabinet
level organization cannot be abolished by executive order) and
establishing a new, smaller agency dedicated only to intelligence,
counter-intelligence, and immigration control. Other current DAS
functions are being transferred to the National Police and
Prosecutor General's Office. However, Congress failed to pass the
law this year, due in part to the political costs of affecting the
jobs of DAS' 6,500 personnel months before national elections.


Benefits for Victims

& Demobilized Stalled

--------------




8. (SBU) The GOC and opposition agree that a "Victim's Law" to
compensate those who have suffered death, kidnapping, rape, and the
loss of land and other assets is key to the national reconciliation
process (ref E). However, the issue was put on the backburner
during the recent legislative session due to irreconcilable
differences between the opposition and GOC proposals. The
opposition bill offered substantially more generous financial and
land reparations, and considered all victims to be equal under the
law, regardless of the aggressor. The GOC argued that the
opposition version was financially unfeasible. The GOC bill
deferred land reparation to separate legislation and provided more
limited financial compensation to victims of guerrillas and
paramilitaries -- victims of state agents would only receive
benefits if the perpetrators were convicted in court. Legislative
leaders on both sides vowed to take up the issue next year, but
differences are likely to be intensified by the campaign season.




9. (SBU) For the demobilized, the GOC submitted a bill seeking to
modify the 2005 Justice and Peace Law to increase the scope of
persons eligible for reintegration benefits. Under the original
text, only acts prior to July 25, 2005 were covered. The new
proposal covers any act prior to the individual's demobilization
and would add 25,000 former paramilitaries and guerrillas to those
receiving benefits. High Commissioner for Reintegration Frank
Pearl publicly lamented the delay saying it will hinder
reintegration, a key element of the peace process. Meanwhile,
opposition politicians complain that more criminals would receive
assistance instead of victims who await reparations. Senate
President Javier Caceres said there was no vote on the bill in
order to allow Senators time to analyze its scope and content in
more detail. The media cites fears that demobilized criminals
would reveal ties to legislators as the real reason for Congress'
inaction.



Toothless Political Reforms

--------------




10. (SBU) The Congress' biggest failure this year was its inability
to pass the implementing law for political reforms approved earlier
in the year. While the original law made a few improvements, the
implementing law was necessary to establish penalties for
candidates and parties who receive support from criminal groups, to
reform campaign finance rules (including increasing transparency),
to clarify state funding of campaigns, to regulate lobbying, and to
establish quotas to increase women's participation (ref F).
Largely due to the high rate of absenteeism in the Congress and the
apparent reluctance of legislators to penalize themselves, the
deadline passed for the reforms to apply to the March 14
congressional elections. Minister Cossio said the GOC did
everything in its power to advance the legislation and warned
political parties that "all of the sanctions" would be in force for
the next elections, including loss of official status and state
funding for parties that endorse candidates who are found to
collaborate with illegal armed groups. However, without clear
legislation, any action taken by the GOC to impose sanctions would
likely face lengthy court challenges. Criminal influence and
avoiding a repeat of the parapolitical scandal are the top concerns
going into the March congressional elections. Hopefully, the
Congress will act in 2010 so that the reforms will apply to the
2011 local and regional elections.
BROWNFIELD