Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BOGOTA3525
2009-12-09 22:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

Ambassador Discusses Drug Policy, DCA with Polo Democratico

Tags:  PGOV PREL SNAR KJUS MARR CO 
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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #3525/01 3432251
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 092251Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1507
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003525 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/09
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KJUS MARR CO
SUBJECT: Ambassador Discusses Drug Policy, DCA with Polo Democratico
Candidate Petro

REF: BOGOTA 3347

CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

Summary

-------



C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003525

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/09
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KJUS MARR CO
SUBJECT: Ambassador Discusses Drug Policy, DCA with Polo Democratico
Candidate Petro

REF: BOGOTA 3347

CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

Summary

--------------




1. (C) Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA) presidential candidate
Gustavo Petro told the Ambassador December 4 that U.S. drug policy
was mistaken by attacking illegal drug production but not the
political power behind it. Petro argued that land reform was key
to rolling back the regional power that trafficking organizations
had amassed. If elected, he said he would permit extradition to
the United States only if narcotraffickers refused to cooperate
with Colombian justice. Petro thought the Defense Cooperation
Agreement (DCA) unnecessary and suggested that abrogation of the
agreement at a key moment could stimulate peace with Venezuela.
Regarding his candidacy, he held out hope for a vote in March among
Liberal Party and PDA members to elect a unified candidate for the
May 2010 elections. Petro believes the leftward tilt of his
presidency would strip the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) of its ideological arguments for armed struggle and would
leave the group exposed as mere narcotraffickers. End summary.



Fighting the Wrong Drug War

--------------




2. (C) At a breakfast hosted by Ambassador Brownfield on December
4, Senator and presidential candidate Gustavo Petro attributed
Colombia's illegal drug problem to the persistence of "mafias" that
had permeated all levels of the GOC. He acknowledged that the
large cartels that operated prior to Plan Colombia had been
dismantled, but asserted that this had only metastasized the
illegal drug trade throughout Colombia and left the drug industry
without prominent leadership structures. This dispersion had
spread narco-corruption to regional power centers that, he
explained, had overwhelmed the power of the central government to
respond. He noted that in the days of infamous drug lord Pablo
Escobar, only one congressman -- Escobar himself -- had been linked
to narcotics trafficking; today, one third of the Congress is

implicated. He concluded that Plan Colombia had erred in attacking
coca cultivation and cocaine production while permitting the
narco-links to the GOC to go unchallenged. Petro said the mafias'
political power was a much bigger concern than coca production.
The Ambassador pointed out the latest statistics showing reductions
in cocaine production as well as rising street prices and falling
cocaine purity in the United States. He noted that the USG had
since 2008 begun to increase assistance to the justice sector,
which enabled it to investigate narco-ties to politicians.



Land Reform Will Break Narco-Power

--------------




3. (C) Continuing his theme of "mafia" dominance in rural areas,
Petro said the GOC's democratic security policy had allowed
narco-traffickers and their collaborators to amass ten million
hectares of land (compared to five million hectares of total
agricultural land in Colombia). This control of the land
translated into political power for the narco-industry. He argued
for a transitional justice regimen that would expeditiously strip
land from such people and return it to their rightful owners.
Petro said this would not be agricultural reform, but rather the
granting of clemency to criminals in exchange for the criminals
returning land to the government. Since the Congress was in the
criminals' pocket, Petro said he might have to bypass the
legislature to enact by decree the necessary reforms.



Extradition as a Last Resort


--------------




4. (C) Petro said he preferred that narco-traffickers and
demobilized paramilitaries stand trial in Colombia. He said that
if elected he would reserve extradition for those who failed to
cooperate with Colombian justice. He said the current practice
carried out the extradition too quickly, before the defendants
reveal the extent of their involvement with GOC authorities. Petro
raised the issue of access to extradited paramilitaries currently
in U.S. prisons. The Ambassador reiterated the actions taken by
the USG to facilitate such access to Colombian legal authorities.
Petro suggested that the USG also provide visas or refugee status
for close relatives of the extraditees, which he claimed would
stimulate paramilitary participation in the Justice and Peace Law
process.



DCA: Bases are Unnecessary

--------------




5. (C) Petro quipped that the DCA, which grants U.S. access to
seven Colombian bases, was not necessary and represented an error
by the GOC that inflamed tensions in the region. He suggested that
the DCA could serve as a bargaining chip in some future peace
discussions with Venezuela. He explained that just as the
reduction of U.S. assistance in Central America at the end of the
1980s helped pacify that region, an agreement to walk back the DCA
might incentivize Venezuela to strike an agreement regarding its
security relationship with Russia. In response, the Ambassador
walked Petro through the practical effects of the DCA on
U.S.-Colombia bilateral cooperation, pointing out there would be a
minimal change to the U.S. footprint as a result of the agreement.



A Polo-Liberal Alliance?

--------------




6. (C) Asked about press speculation over possible opposition
coalitions against President Uribe (or his preferred successor) in
the May 2010 elections, Petro expressed interest in a
"consultation" vote of PDA and Liberal Party (PL) members, possibly
in March, to pick a unified candidate. He described the PDA as
having the stronger candidate (Petro, who earned the second highest
national vote total for the Senate in 2006 and the highest vote
total for the House of Representatives in 2002) but a weaker
infrastructure. Conversely, he said the PL had the weaker
candidate in Rafael Pardo but possessed the political machinery to
wage a nationwide campaign. He said the PL party congress
scheduled to start in two days was the first step to a PDA-PL vote.
Asked whether the ideologically distinct parties could agree on a
unified campaign, Petro pointed to the Concertacion in Chile as an
example of diverging political movements working toward a common
cause. Petro acknowledged he saw no chance of joining forces with
centrist candidate Sergio Fajardo. (Note: Divisions between
Petro's more moderate faction and Gaviria's more leftist followers
within the PDA have complicated the PDA's efforts to agree on a
platform and to select new party leadership. Petro has very low
favorability and very high unfavorability ratings in the polls, but
consistently places among the top three in voter intent for the May
30 presidential elections -- ahead of Pardo. See reftel. End
note.)



No Friend of the FARC

--------------




7. (C) At a separate event with foreign diplomats on November 24,
Petro expounded on his thinking about the Revolutionary Armed


Forces of Colombia (FARC). He recognized that the public's
association of the PDA with the FARC was an Achilles heel, and that
his disdain for the FARC had repeatedly led to confrontations with
former PDA present Carlos Gaviria. Petro said that under a PDA
government, the FARC would lose its ideological reasons for armed
struggle, so only the elements focused on narcotrafficking would
persist. Like every other leading candidate for the presidency,
Petro said he would not resume peace negotiations with the FARC --
a strategy that proved to be a costly political failure in the
past. Petro would instead support FARC reintegration into rural
society, perhaps even taking advantage of their combat expertise by
incorporating them into a rural National Guard and/or as forest
rangers.
BROWNFIELD