COLOMBIA IN THE POLITICAL DOLDRUMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 003405

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/17
TAGS: PREL PGOV KJUS CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA IN THE POLITICAL DOLDRUMS

REF: REF: A) BOGOTA 3373; B) BOGOTA 3347; C) BOGOTA 3271
D) BOGOTA 3335; E) BOGOTA 3043; F) BOGOTA 3145; G) BOGOTA 1506
H) BOGOTA 1975

CLASSIFIED BY: Brian A. Nichols, Deputy Chief of Mission; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)

Summary

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1. (C) Colombian politics have entered a holding pattern while
President Uribe awaits the next step of his quest for a third term.
Scandals over agricultural subsidies and illegal surveillance have
slightly tarnished Uribe's popularity but public concern over
Venezuela's saber-ratting may bump him back up. Arrayed against
Uribe's formidable popular support are the weak but not irrelevant
political opposition, the media and intelligentsia, and the
politicized Supreme Court. This stifled political debate on
succession will continue until it is clear that Uribe can and will
seek reelection. End Summary.



Elections, Interrupted

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2. (C) As Colombia waits for the Constitutional Court to rule on
legislation for a referendum to permit a third term for Uribe, the
May 2010 presidential election campaign lacks a clear picture of
candidates and platforms. Since the Constitutional Court may take
until March 2010 to decide on the legality of a referendum (REF A),
pro-Uribe candidates cannot develop their constituencies or flesh
out their platforms (REF B) without being seen as disloyal to the
president. Public support for Uribe's ideology means that
opposition candidates' messaging receives little attention or
support. With Uribe as the presumptive frontrunner, no challengers
can break away from the pack.




3. (C) The timing of the Constitutional Court's opinion is critical
for Uribe's strategy. Most consider the Court's approval an
inevitability, but a minority opinion holds that the Court may rule
too late to permit a referendum. The anti-reelection crowd will
continue to raise legal and procedural objections in hopes of
running out the clock on the referendum.



Some Chinks, But Uribe's Armor Still Shines

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4. (C) Looming over this political twilight is Uribe's high
popularity, which tends to vary between 65 and 70% depending on
current events. The clear majority of Colombians prefer Uribe for
his focus on security and his steady hand at the helm. Uribe
equals certainty for most Colombians. However, scandals continue
to plague the President and may continue to shave some points off
his approval ratings. The most immediate scandal concerns rich
Colombians receiving subsidies from a Ministry of Agriculture
program, though former agriculture minister and current
presidential candidate Andres Felipe Arias seems fated to bare the
brunt. The revelation of illegal surveillance and wiretaps of
political opposition by Uribe's intelligence service, the
Administrative Department of Security (DAS),continues to unfold,

albeit more quietly in recent weeks (REF C). Nevertheless, the
ongoing crisis with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez will likely cause
Uribe's poll numbers to rebound.
A Loose Anti-Uribe Alliance

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5. (C) In Uribe's worldview, he is a political outsider from
Medellin whose hard-line security policies are coming under attack
from Bogota's elite, who, lacking popular support, have resorted to
lobbing potshots from the media, the courts, and other state
institutions. For some in the opposition, Uribe represents the
tyranny of the "Paisas" (as the Texan-like inhabitants of Antioquia
are called). For an even smaller and more extreme group, Uribe is
surreptitiously legalizing the remnants of the Medellin drug cartel
(REF E). These are gross simplifications, but there is a
noticeable disconnect between Uribe's popularity and the media's
increasingly critical handling of the referendum (REF F).
Undeterred, Uribe circumvents the Fourth Estate by holding weekly
town hall meetings throughout Colombia. And, Uribe's critics
charge that the GOC is pushing pork barrel spending behind the
scenes to support his reelection efforts.



The Supreme Court: Opposition Redoubt

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6. (C) While not identified with any opposition political party,
the Supreme Court has emerged as an ally of those who oppose
reelection. The Court is wary of Uribe's influence increasing the
longer he remains in office. They are also bitter over years of
public sparring with Uribe, made worse by allegations that Uribe
advisors were pushing DAS to investigate certain magistrates for
ties to narco-trafficking (REF G). The Supreme Court has no role
in the referendum process but can and is aggressively investigating
criminal acts allegedly carried out by Uribe allies in the Congress
(REF H).




7. (C) Additionally, the magistrates have effectively co-opted the
supposedly independent Prosecutor General's Office by refusing to
select an Uribe candidate from a three-name list. Keeping the
Prosecutor General in an interim state, and filling his
organization with officials from the court system, has allowed the
Court to focus the Prosecutor General on key investigations against
Uribe and the government. For example, the Prosecutor General's
Office is pressing ahead on the DAS scandal investigation, may
bring indictments related to Uribe's first reelection bid, and has
even revived a 1990s case against Vice President Francisco Santos
for alleged meetings with paramilitaries.



Comment: Waiting for the Cloudburst

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8. (C) The ambiguity of the current political landscape will
continue until it becomes clear whether Uribe is able to and will
seek a third term, a determination that may not come until March

2010. We cannot discount that legal objections to the referendum
process will cause enough delay to derail the process. Once
determined, however, Colombia will either have to rush through a
referendum/election process with Uribe or an abbreviated
presidential campaign among the remaining contenders. End Comment.
BROWNFIELD