2009 STALEMATE CONTINUES: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE FOR

S E C R E T BOGOTA 003389

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/16
TAGS: PTER MOPS MCAP ASEC PREL PGOV PREF CO
SUBJECT: 2009 STALEMATE CONTINUES: COLOMBIA CONFLICT UPDATE FOR
JULY-SEPTEMBER 2009

REF: A) BOGOTA 2787; B) BOGOTA 2961; C) BOGOTA 0776; D) BOGOTA 3956

CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Wells, Political Counselor, United States
Department of State, Political Section; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The Colombian military's momentum remained slower in the
third quarter of 2009, with demobilizations, captures and kills of
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) members below 2008
levels. The Colombian military believes the FARC may be planning
to concentrate on Cundinamarca department to disrupt the 2010
elections and discredit President Uribe's democratic security
policy. The FARC announced it considered Colombia's consolidation
projects to constitute legitimate military targets, and was blamed
for an August 19 attack on a USAID-funded civilian justice center
in Cauca department. The terrorist organization continued a
campaign of assassination, kidnapping and intimidation of local
political leaders. Although FARC Secretariat members continued to
elude government security forces, the military enjoyed success
against a string of mid-level FARC commanders this quarter. The
FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and emerging criminal
groups continued to cooperate in some areas of the country while
openly fighting in others. End Summary.

FARC TARGETS GOC CONSOLIDATION EFFORTS
--------------


2. (C) In an August communique released in Narino department, the
FARC announced it would treat all projects developed under
Colombia's National Consolidation Plan (PNC) and the "Strategic
Leap" as legitimate military targets. The Colombian National
Police (CNP) blamed the FARC for an August 19 attack that destroyed
a U.S.-funded justice center in Cauca department. USAID had
invested $150,000 in the new justice house, which was designed to
provide basic legal and social services to the community. Security
at the site was minimal. There are 50 other U.S.-funded justice
houses throughout Colombia (see reftel A).

AND LOCAL LEADERS
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3. (C) Fabio Estrada, President of the Colombian Councilman
Federation, warned that the FARC intended to destabilize Colombia
through a campaign of targeted assassination and intimidation of
local leaders. Estrada noted that as of November 2009, 12 council
members had been murdered, two others had been taken hostage, more
than 30 had been attacked, and more than 2,000 had received
threats. FARC attacks on council members this quarter included:

-- On July 8, the FARC killed Ruben Dario Pena, a community leader
in Neiva, Huila for cooperating with the Colombian military.

-- On September 7, the FARC killed council-woman Mariela Narvaez
Lizcano in Hobo, Huila. Armando Acuna, a councilman for the nearby
town of Garzon, Huila, has been held hostage by the FARC since May

2009.

-- On September 29, German Herrera, the president of the town
council in El Castillo, Meta was gunned down by a FARC member on
horseback.

CUNDINAMARCA IN FARC SIGHTS
--------------


4. (C) Colombian military officials are concerned that the FARC
plans to concentrate forces in Cundinamarca department in an effort
to disrupt the 2010 elections and discredit President Uribe's
democratic security policy. Nearly 30 FARC militia members have
been arrested in or near Bogota in 2009, and the FARC is blamed for
six attacks in Bogota this year (including the January 2009


Blockbuster bomb that killed two). The FARC was routed from
Cundinamarca in 2003-2004 under Plan Patriota, and failed in its
efforts early in 2009 to try to regain a toehold in Sumapaz,
Cundinamarca (see reftel C). A Colombian intelligence official
told us that the FARC would almost certainly retry its approach
under "Black March" -- increasing asymmetrical attacks in major
urban areas during a given time frame in an effort to demonstrate
that the terrorist organization is not defeated and still relevant.
(Comment: No large-scale redeployments of FARC forces have been
observed near Cundinamarca to date. End Comment)

FARC DEMOBS: BELOW 2008 LEVELS
--------------


5. (C) A total of 630 FARC members demobilized in the third quarter
-- down more than 20% from the same period in 2008, but up slightly
(630 versus 512) compared to the second quarter of 2009. Reasons
for the slight quarterly uptick include: 1) the strategic
communications budget for the GOC that had been frozen due to
budget constraints was restored; 2) a group of 24 indigenous
members of the 6th Front and the Jacobo Arenas Mobile Column in
Cauca demobilized; and 3) there was an increase in prisoners who
demobilized from prison under Colombian decree number 1059 of 2008.

FEWER DEMOBS CITE MILITARY PRESSURE
--------------


6. (C) Demonstrating the slowdown in military operations in 2009,
the number of FARC members who cited military pressure as the
reason for their demobilization dropped by 20% in the third quarter
-- accounting for only 6% of all demobilizations. Still, the
quality of demobilized members remained relatively high --
demobilizations of FARC members with more than 5 years of
experience accounted for more than half of all demobilizations in

2009. There was also a 9% increase in demobilizations of FARC
militia members this quarter.

8,500 FARC FIGHTERS REMAIN
--------------


7. (C) Colombian security officials estimate that the FARC has
8,500 fighters at the present time, down by around 3% from 2008
levels. In addition, GOC officials believe the FARC has between
3,000-4,000 militia members spread throughout the country, although
many have been pulled in to replace demobilized or killed fighters.
Colombian officials continue to complain that significant numbers
of FARC fighters have sought refuge in Venezuela and Ecuador -- and
that without these refuges, the FARC's strength would be further
reduced.

INCREASED RECRUITMENT OF MINORS
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8. (SBU) As its overall numbers have decreased, the FARC has turned
to forced recruitment to strengthen its ranks. Colombian weekly
"Cambio" reported in July that more than 500 minors have been
recruited by force in rural areas of Meta, Guaviare, Putumayo,
Caqueta, Arauca, and Vaupes departments in the past year.
Christian Salazar, director of the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, observed that the
average recruiting age is dropping to below 12 years of age.
Salazar noted many rural families are leaving their home towns in
an effort to keep the FARC or other criminal organizations from
forcibly recruiting their children -- increasing the total number
of displaced.

ELN DEMOBS: ABOVE 2008 LEVELS
--------------


9. (C) A total of 116 ELN members demobilized in the third quarter
of 2009, representing a more than 50% increase over the same time
frame in 2008. ELN demobilizations remained highest in the


southwest area of the country due to military pressure and fighting
with the FARC and other criminal groups. However, the pace of
demobilizations in the southwest slowed by more than 10% in the
third quarter, due in part to non-aggression pacts between criminal
groups in the region. ELN demobilizations attributed to military
pressure were down by 20% this quarter compared to the second
quarter.

CAPTURES AND KILLS OF FARC DOWN
--------------

10. (C) The military's momentum continued to slow during this
quarter, leading some analysts to conclude that the conflict has
effectively reached a stalemate in 2009 -- although others argued
that the GOC was slowly grinding the FARC down in a war of
attrition. The operations tempo is expected to slow further into
the fourth quarter due to scheduled military changes of command
that occur at the end of the year. FARC captures by the Colombian
military decreased by 15% in the first nine months of 2009 compared
with the same time frame in 2008, while FARC kills by the military
were down by 54% and ELN kills were down by 82% during this time
frame. Conversely, killings of public forces by the FARC and ELN
have increased by around 20% in 2009 (from 293 to 353).

(Comment: One factor in the decreased operational tempo is that
commanders are acting more cautiously in the wake of the "false
positive" scandals. Colombian military officials are also
reportedly wary about exploiting tactical intelligence from
recently captured enemy combatants due to legal concerns. Another
reason for the lower levels of success against the FARC is that the
overall number of FARC members have declined, and the remaining
fighters are under orders to avoid direct engagement with Colombian
forces. Despite having implemented a "balanced scorecard" approach
designed to de-emphasize body counts, the Colombian military
leadership reportedly continue to react very negatively to lower
numbers reported by subordinates. End comment.)

JOINT TASK FORCE OMEGA UPDATE
--------------


11. (S) The Joint Forces Decisive Action Unit (FUCAD) and the Rapid
Deployment Force (FUDRA) were still co-located in the JTF-Omega
area during this quarter to pursue FARC Secretariat member alias
Mono Jojoy. However, a component of the FUCAD (the 18th Mobile
Brigade) was relocated to the Nudo de Paramillo region of
Antioquia. The operations tempo in JTF-Omega remained relatively
high during this quarter, although units remained reliant on U.S.
helicopter and fixed wing flight hour support for logistics
resupply operations.

CONTINUED MID-LEVEL SUCCESSES
--------------


12. (S/NF) Several FARC high value targets (HVTs),including FARC
leader Alfonso Cano, are believed to be located in the "Canon de
las Hermosas" region of Tolima department -- a mountainous, 2000
square-kilometer area with access to Huila, Valle de Cauca and
Cauca. The FARC Secretariat members reportedly operate at high
altitude where Colombian airlift is limited, avoid radios and
instead use human messengers, and are constantly on the move in
rugged terrain. (Note: The Colombian military do not currently
have any helicopters that can operate effectively at high altitudes
and low temperatures. End note). Although FARC Secretariat
members continued to elude Colombian forces, the Colombian military
and police continued to kill and capture a string of mid-level
commanders. Successes this quarter include:

-- On July 19, police captured Luis Rojas Maldonado, a leader of
the FARC's 33rd Front in Sardinata, Norte de Santander.

-- On July 23, the army attacked a FARC camp in Puerto Rico, Meta
and killed 16th FARC members (including Mono Jojoy confidantes
alias "Negro Alberto," alias "Nacho" and alias "Arnoldo").


-- On August 23, Bogota national police reported the capture of
Jose Armando Cadena Caberera (alias "Bronco") in Cundinamarca.
Alias Bronco was believed to have participated in the murder of
U.S. citizen Thomas John Jannis and Luis Alcides Cruz after their
aircraft crashed in Caqueta, Colombia on February 13, 2003. He was
a member of the FARC's Teofilo Forero Castro Mobile Column.

--On August 31, police in Santander arrested Jose Javier Hernandez
Castillo (alias "Nixon"),the deputy commander of the FARC's 10th
Front in Arauca.

-- On August 27, FARC captured Fidel Camilo Villarraga (alias
"David"),second in command of the FARC's Antonio Narino Urban
Front in Bogota. He is accused of perpetrating numerous attacks in
Bogota over the past decade.

--On September 3, the Colombian Air Force confirmed the killing of
Luis Baron Sanchez (alias "Nacho"),commander of the FARC's 43rd
Front. The second in command, Luis Antonio Mosquera Ruiz was also
killed.

-- On September 2, Bogota police apprehended Alberto Chaparro
(alias "the Butcher of Landazuri"),leader of the FARC's 23rd
Front. He reportedly specialized in landmines and was believed to
be responsible for the deaths or injuries of more than 150
Colombians in Landazuri municipality, Santander.

-- On September 13, Colombian police captured eight members of the
FARC's Southern Bloc, including Nubia Cabrera, sister of the FARC
Southern Bloc deputy commander Fabian Ramirez. The individuals
were believed to be managing more than three million dollars in
assets for the FARC Southern Bloc.

-- On September 25, Marco Leon Jimenez (alias "Morocco"),nephew of
senior FARC commander Jorge Briceno Suarez (alias "Mono Jojoy") was
found buried following a Colombian air strike in Meta department.
He was killed along with 15 other FARC members in operation
"Jupiter" by the Omega Joint Task Force in July 2009.

-- On September 30, a major Colombian air raid in central-western
Tolima killed approximately 15 FARC members. Arquimedes Munoz
Villamil (alias "Jeronimo Galeano") -- a 30-year veteran of the
FARC, a member of the joint central command and a confidante of
Alfonso Cano -- reportedly survived the attack but his son was
killed. The FARC's 66th Front Commander was also killed in this
operation.

ASYMMETRICAL ATTACKS CONTINUE
--------------


13. (C) The FARC continued to utilize improvised explosive devices
(IEDs),ambushes and land mines to inflict casualties -- the
majority of casualties suffered by Colombian forces are the result
of land mines. The FARC are operating in smaller teams of three to
five men, making them much harder to detect and defend against.
There were more than 100 security force deaths in 2009, and more
than 400 injuries attributable to IEDs and land mines. Manual
eradication deaths from bombs and snipers during manual coca
eradication operations and attacks per hectare eradicated have
increased over last year's rates (from 26 deaths in 2008 to a
reported 40 deaths in 2009 -- see reftel D). Other FARC attacks
this year included:



-- On July 19, FARC members from the 6th Front attacked a Colombian
police station in Corinto, Cauca, killing two officers and injuring
fifteen civilians.

-- On July 27, the FARC ambushed manual eradicators with rifle fire
and fragmentation grenades, killing five in Medio San Juan


Municipality, Choco.

-- On July 30, FARC members of the 16th Front attacked army units
in Vichada, wounding several officials.

-- On August 9, FARC members of the Teofilo Forero Castro mobile
column killed two police officers in Caqueta with small arms fire.

-- On August 12, FARC members attacked police officers and
prosecutors in Tumaco, Narino, wounding two.

-- On August 25, a FARC bomb in San Vicente del Caguan killed two
and wounded 19 civilians in the middle of a local market place.

-- On September 16, FARC members killed the commander of Solita
Police station in Caqueta.

-- On September 17, FARC militia members threw hand grenades into a
police checkpoint, injuring one civilian and two police officers
near the Buenaventura port in Valle del Cauca.

-- On September 30, the FARC ambushed security forces in Antioquia,
injuring three.

RELATIONS AMONG FARC, ELN AND BACRIM
--------------


14. (C) The FARC, ELN and emerging criminal groups (BACRIM)
continued to fight each other in some areas while cooperating in
others. Groups under the "Rastrojos" banner worked in conjunction
with the FARC in southern Narino and northern Ecuador to traffic
cocaine to the Pacific for export, while other Rastrojos groups
fought with elements of the FARC in northern Narino. Fighting
between groups affiliated with the "Rastrojos" and "Aguilas Negras"
criminal groups in Narino was blamed for more than 40 deaths in
Narino in the month of August alone. Colombian National Police
(CNP) chief General Oscar Naranjo recently said that the drug trade
accounts for around 80% of the FARC's finances, but observed that
they do not have the capacity to control international drug routes.



15. (C) Colombian security analyst Alfredo Rangel told us the
violence is growing fiercer as there are fewer drug profits to go
around among criminal elements. Rangel dismissed the notion that
the emerging criminal groups could be even more dangerous than the
FARC, noting that unlike the FARC, they do not have designs on
national political and territorial control and are only concerned
with profit (although they are responsible for corrupting local
officials). He acknowledged that the homicide rates in some areas
of the country are worrying -- but argued they are well below
previous levels and mostly reflect violence within and between drug
traffickers and other illegal armed actors. Organization of
American States/Mission for the Accompaniment of the Peace Process
(OAS/MAPP) Country Director Marcelo Alvarez argued, however, that
even the murders of criminal elements have long-term detrimental
effects on communities. Alvarez said that relatives of victims
suffer social, psychological, and financial impacts that can often
perpetuate violence and other social ills in the community.

COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) Following the GOC's landmark successes against the FARC
leadership in 2008, the conflict in 2009 has effectively turned
into a stalemate -- with the FARC carrying out asymmetrical attacks
on selective soft targets as the Colombian military tries to grind
them down in a slow war of attrition. Several analysts have argued
that to regain momentum, the Colombian military apparatus needs to
undertake a tactical shift -- with smaller, more flexible units and
increased reconnaissance missions. Still, many agree that the
killing or capture of Secretariat members Mono Jojoy or Alfonso
Cano could represent a watershed event that may greatly increase


the pace of FARC demobilizations. End comment.
BROWNFIELD