Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BOGOTA2908
2009-09-09 17:49:00
SECRET
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

VFM FORERO GIVES AMBASSADOR READOUT ON UNASUR MEETING; AGREES TO LOWKEY DCA SIGNING

Tags:  CO HO KJUS KTIA MARR PGOV PHUM PREL VZ XM 
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P 091749Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0574
INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA PRIORITY 
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T BOGOTA 002908 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2029
TAGS: PREL, KJUS, MARR, PGOV, PHUM, KTIA, XM, VZ, HO, CO
SUBJECT: VFM FORERO GIVES AMBASSADOR READOUT ON UNASUR
MEETING; AGREES TO LOWKEY DCA SIGNING

REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 999
B. STATE 89408

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

S E C R E T BOGOTA 002908


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2029
TAGS: PREL, KJUS, MARR, PGOV, PHUM, KTIA, XM, VZ, HO, CO
SUBJECT: VFM FORERO GIVES AMBASSADOR READOUT ON UNASUR
MEETING; AGREES TO LOWKEY DCA SIGNING

REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 999
B. STATE 89408

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

1. (C) Summary: Vice Foreign Minister Forero told the
Ambassador on September 7 that the GOC had achieved its goals
at the UNASUR Summit in Bariloche, defusing the issue of a
Defense Cooperation Agreement with the U.S., by opening all
regional security issues up to scrutiny. Colombia
interpreted Ecuadorian President Correa's remarks laying out
his efforts against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) as a positive shift. She said Colombia had
made progress toward renewing bilateral ties with Ecuador
under The Carter Center's mediation. Forero agreed to a low
key signing of the Agreement once both governments complete
their final reviews. Forero said that the State Council
would begin its review on September 8, and that she thought
it would finish quickly. In other issues, the Ambassador
stressed that the scandals surrounding the Administrative
Department of Security (DAS) made it difficult for U.S. law
enforcement to work with the agency. The Ambassador said he
would more publicly engage on human rights, offering that
though the Department would likely soon certify Colombia's
progress--the GOC would need to make greater progress in the
year ahead. Ambassadors Barco and Brownfield reviewed
proposals to add attaches from the Supreme Court and
Prosecutor General's Office to the Colombian embassy in
Washington to improve coordination on Justice and Peace and
extradition issues. End Summary.

UNASUR Summit a Success
--------------

2. (C) The Ambassador and DCM hosted Vice Foreign Minister
Clemencia Forero and Colombian Ambassador to the United
States Carolina Barco for lunch on September 7. Vice Foreign
Minister Forero said that Colombia viewed the outcome of the
UNASUR summit in Bariloche, Argentina as a success (Ref A),
but noted she had been briefly quarantined and tested for
AH1N1 flu after President Uribe became ill. Forero recalled
that at the end of the UNASUR summit in Quito, Bolivia had
pressed for a special session to look exclusively at Colombia
and Argentina's President Fernandez de Kirchner had offered
to host it. However, Colombia's strategy of expanding the
debate from an exclus
ive discussion of the U.S.-Colombia
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) to a broader discussion
of all military assistance, security, and transnational crime
issues had neutralized the issue. Senior military officials
in the region would not want to discuss their own mil-mil
relationships nor allow inspections of bases and that would
be the end of it, she said.

3. (C) President Uribe's focus on seeking concrete assistance
in Colombia's fight against narco-terrorism, underscoring
that only the United States had provided anything more than
hortatory rhetoric had shifted the debate. It prompted
President Correa to detail and defend Ecuador's actions
against the FARC. His acceptance of the need to help
Colombia fight the FARC changed the debate. Forero said that
the GOC welcomed Ecuador's comments. In response to the
Ambassador's query, VFM Forero said that relations with
Ecuador had improved as a result of The Carter Center's
mediation efforts and a series of meetings at the Foreign
Ministerial level to hammer out a memorandum on
re-establishing bilateral relations. The Ambassador said
engagement with Ecuador would likely throw Venezuelan
President Chavez off balance, and prevents him from drawing
Correa more closely into his camp. Forero agreed that was an
additional benefit to improving the Ecuador relationship.

Chile Helpful, Peru Grandstanding, Venezuela Paranoid
-------------- --------------
4. (C) Forero lamented that televising the UNASUR proceedings
live (at President Uribe's request) had caused some of the
Presidents to grandstand. She expressed particular surprise
at Peruvian President Garcia's critical remarks. Colombia
had expected more support from Peru at the summit. Forero
offered that Chile had played a helpful role at the summit,
despite President Bachelet's concerns about the agreement.
While most of the UNASUR members appeared to accept Colombian
and USG arguments about the DCA, Venezuela's view of the DCA
could only be described as "paranoid," she said.

Colombia Briefed Brazil Beforehand
--------------

5. (C) The Secretary's letter to UNASUR foreign ministers on
the eve of the summit (Ref B) had done much to ease many of
the countries concerns, Forero stressed. Forero continued
that she had provided the Brazilian ambassador to Colombia
with the text of DCA Article III, Paragraph Four which
explicitly calls upon the parties to comply with the DCA in a
manner consistent with principles of territorial integrity
and non-intervention in the affairs of other sovereign
states. The Ambassador said he had also briefed the
Brazilian ambassador on that point. He suggested that
Brasilia has clearly received the assurances that it had
sought on the DCA in the form of the Secretary's letter and
the letter from Colombian Foreign Minister Bermudez and has
seen the relevant part of the text. The Ambassador said that
the GOC should encourage Brazil to "take yes for answer" on
the assurances. On the issue of the Air Mobility Command
Global En Route Strategy White Paper, the Ambassador said
that the USG might be able to provide a letter to the GOC
stating that the White Paper was not decisional and not a
policy document. VFM Forero said that such a letter would
be valuable for the GOC to defuse the remaining issues
surrounding the DCA, if the GOC could share it with other
UNASUR members.

GOC Supports Quiet Signing Ceremony
--------------

6. (C) The Ambassador laid out the remaining steps for USG
approval of DCA: 1) final revision of the English and Spanish
texts; 2) the Secretary's approval of Circular 175 Authority;
3) instructions to a USG official to sign the
agreement--likely the Ambassador. In response to Ambassador
Barco's query, the Ambassador said the Department would
continue to brief and engage interested Members of Congress
on the DCA. He reiterated that the USG preferred a very low
profile signing with whomever the GOC designated--presumably
FM Bermudez or VFM Forero. The Vice Foreign Minister asked
if the USG would agree to Defense Minister Gabriel Silva
signing the agreement. The Ambassador replied that while
the GOC could decide who should sign on its behalf, having
MOD Silva do so might send an unintended message to others in
the region. Forero took the point.

7. (C) VFM Forero explained that the GOC would formally
provide the DCA text to the State Council on September 8,
though it has already carried out informal consultations on
the Agreement. Because the DCA is a "non-binding" agreement
under the Colombian constitution neither the State Council,
nor the Congress need give their consent. She continued that
the GOC must seek the opinion of the State Council, but is
not obliged to follow that opinion. She hoped that the GOC
could sign the DCA by the week of September 14. VFM Forero
said that she had briefed National Customs and Taxes (DIAN)
Director Nestor Diaz Saavedra on the provisions of the DCA,
which had assuaged his concerns on tax, toll, and duty issues.

8. (C) Regarding the Track II basket of issues
(implementation agreement, stockpile access agreement, and
air defense study),the Ambassador said that he had provided
three letters to MOD Silva that addressed the issues
(septel). Forero agreed that the GOC and USG should proceed
slowly and quietly on Track II.

Additional Attaches to U.S. to Work on Extradition
-------------- --------------

9. (C) Turning to extradition matters, Ambassador Barco
reviewed joint efforts to address the Colombian Supreme
Court's concerns regarding access to extradited former
paramilitary leaders. Ambassador Brownfield told Forero that
the USG would welcome a GOC decision to assign an auxiliary
magistrate of the Court at the Colombian Embassy in
Washington. The auxiliary magistrate would serve as the
Supreme Court's representative, particularly in sensitive
Justice and Peace process cases. Supreme Court President
Augusto Ibanez had expressed initial support for the idea.
Acting Prosecutor General Guillermo Mendoza had reacted more
cautiously to the idea of assigning a Justice and Peace unit
prosecutor to Washington, but the Ambassador judged that
Mendoza had been surprised by the issue and would agree to at
least a trial period to see if it resolved the issue of
access and improved cooperation by former paramilitary
leaders. (Note: In a follow-up conversation on September 8,
Mendoza maintained his caution, but
agreed to consider assigning a prosecutor to Washington on a
trial basis.) The Ambassador also offered that the USG might
devote greater resources to justice and peace coordination
through increased staffing in DOJ's Office of International
Affairs.

DAS Wiretap Scandal Unacceptable
--------------

10. (C) More broadly on the issue of human rights, the
Ambassador underscored his deep concern about public reports
of the Administrative Department of Security (DAS)
wiretapping of various political figures as well as Supreme
Court magistrates. The week before local media aired the
Embassy Judicial Attache's conversation with a magistrate,
which had leaked to the press. The continued problems with
the DAS made it very difficult for the Embassy to deal with
GOC's lead agency on immigration, transnational crime, and
intelligence matters. Recognizing that DAS Director Felipe
Munoz has tried to reform the agency, the Ambassador warned
that, if confirmed, further illegal behavior by the DAS would
make it impossible for U.S. law enforcement agencies to
cooperate with the organization. The Ambassador added that
he would more forcefully deliver the message of the
importance of human rights in his public remarks, echoing his
long-standing private comments to the GOC.

11. (C) VFM Forero said that Vice President Santos and DAS
Director Munoz planned to travel to Washington on September
14 for meetings with the OAS. (Note: Both have since
cancelled their trip.) The Ambassador replied that ordinarily
the USG would take advantage of such a trip to meet with
Munoz, but now such a meeting would not be appropriate.
Ambassador Barco offered that the issue had become very
sensitive in Washington for her and that she would meet with
Munoz later that day to get the details on his efforts to
reform the organization. She also noted that former
president and Liberal party leader Cesar Gaviria had harshly
criticized the DAS earlier that morning.

12. (SBU) The Ambassador noted that the Department would
likely certify Colombia on human rights in the coming days,
allowing 30 percent of FMF and INCLE assistance to go
forward. The certification did not mean that human rights in
Colombia were perfect but rather that improvements continued.
In order to certify in the future, the Colombian government
must make further improvements. In the future, certification
would be more complicated, not less.

GOC Worries about BRV Activities in Colombia
--------------

13. (S) VFM Forero lamented that the DAS had failed to
provide her with adequate intelligence on Venezuelan official
activities in Colombia. Venezuelan officials had become
increasingly aggressive in their activities and appeared to
be coordinating more closely with the Cubans. A Venezuelan
diplomat named "Lugo" had ceased his normal duties and
dedicated himself entirely to meddling in Colombian politics.
Forero feared that the Venezuelans had gotten out of control
and the GOC did not have a handle on their activities. The
Ambassador observed that the scandals at DAS had damaged the
key agency to deal with such problems and coordinate
intelligence sharing. Forero asked for U.S. help in
assessing Venezuelan activities in Colombia. (Note: Embassy
will arrange for an appropriate briefing in the near future.)

Colombia Unlikely to Engage on Honduras
--------------

13. (C) The Ambassador said that the USG would welcome
Colombian encouragement to the de facto government in
Honduras to sign the San Jose Accords, or at minimum move
toward President Arias' proposed solution. The Ambassador
conceded that, so far, President Uribe had not wanted to
engage with de facto President Micheletti on the matter. VFM
Forero said that de facto Foreign Minister Carlos Lopez
Contreras had worked closely in the mid-1980s with then
Colombian Foreign Minister Augusto Ramirez Ocampo to resolve
the maritime border dispute between the two countries. Many
of Colombia's best contacts in Honduras had ended up in the
de facto regime, she said, making it difficult to engage on
the issue. The Ambassador said that the USG had revoked the
visas of key members of the de facto regime and would
continue to raise the pressure systematically on the regime
to press them to accept the San Jose Accords. At some point,
he opined, the de facto regime would calculate that the risk
to them of ousted President Zelaya returning was lower than
the cost of keeping him out. VFM Forero agreed but said that
Colombia was unlikely to actively press for Zelaya's return.
The Ambassador cautioned that engagement that did not
advocate for the San Jose Accords would not be welcomed in
Washington.

GOC Still Seeks MCC Compact, but Chances Slim
--------------

14. (SBU) Ambassador Barco said that she had met with
Millennium Challenge Corporation officials on September 2 and
hoped to find a way to deal with Colombia's graduation from
lower-middle income to upper-middle income status. She said
that the various accounting factors contributed to the jump
and did not reflect the reality of Colombia. Barco hoped
that an MCC compact directed at the Pacific region would
target the poorest part of the country. Ambassador
Brownfield replied that the MCC could not pursue a compact
under current law, but had sought a legislative fix to allow
for a more gradual, sliding scale assessment of income growth
among threshold countries. The MCC would look at Colombia's
statistical concerns, but cautioned that either fix was a
long shot.


Brownfield