COLOMBIA DCA NEGOTIATIONS -- EMBASSY IDEAS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002376

SIPDIS

FOR USSOUTHCOM GEN FRASER AND ASD/HDASA PAUL STOCKTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2019
TAGS: MARR PREL MOPS PGOV MCAP KTIA PTER CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA DCA NEGOTIATIONS -- EMBASSY IDEAS FOR
TRACK II

REF: BOGOTA 1334

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield, Reasons 1.4 (b and d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The GOC expects positive signals soon on Track II
issues as DCA negotiations wrap up. They have repeatedly
stated that satisfaction on Track II is a precondition for
closing out the DCA. Embassy recommends positive responses
without additional commitments, specifically a U.S. Air
Force-to-Colombian Air Force letter offering an air defense
assessment team, an OSD-to-MOD letter offering working level
discussions on stockpile agreement process, and upgrade for
the operating arrangement to the level of SOUTHCOM
Commander-CHOD. END SUMMARY.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS TIED TO DCA
--------------

2. (C) From the inception of negotiations on a Defense
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Colombia, the Government of
Colombia (GOC) has asked for several additional security
assistance-related issues to be addressed in the same
process. They accepted our argument that these issues would
be covered in a parallel, but separate (so-called Track II)
process, and that we would not move forward on them until we
saw light at the end of the tunnel on the DCA negotiations.
With recent high level GOC public support for the DCA, and
considerable progress in the last negotiating round, we now
see that light. Following are Embassy ideas on how to
address Track II. These are suggestions; we acknowledge that
the Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM) are the ultimate decision-makers on these issues.
But we also note that the GOC has said repeatedly they will
not sign the DCA until they have satisfaction on Track II
issues.


3. (C) GOC concerns on Track II have focused on three areas.
First, they are interested in an air defense system tied into
the Cooperative Security Location (CSL) structure. Second,
they want assurances of access to U.S. arms, systems, or
technology in case of a national security emergency in the
region, whether by stockpile agreement or some other process.
Third, they want access to all aspects of the CSL once
operational--including space, intelligence product, and
infrastructure. In each case, the GOC is interested in the
substantive issue itself, but also in being able to transmit
to their public that they obtained benefits connected somehow
to the DCA. Along those lines, Embassy suggests responses
that do not offer everything the GOC has requested, but
enough to allow them to point to progress.

AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
--------------

4. (C) As the GOC looks to Venezuela's acquisition of
sophisticated Russian Sukhoi aircraft, they would love to
have an equally sophisticated air defense system. The
Colombian military views the Sukhoi in Venezuelan hands as a
legitimate threat to national security. This may well be the
case. It is our judgment, however, that the GOC has not even
begun the necessary assessment, analysis, and planning for an
air defense system. We suggest an offer that responds
without making a long term commitment. Specifically, a
mil-to-mil letter--we recommend U.S. Air Force South
(AFSOUTH) Commander to Colombian Air Force (COLAF)
Commander--offering to send an assessment team to Colombia at
an early opportunity. The team would assess current
Colombian capabilities, potential air defense needs,
realistic budget considerations, and options. We would be
clear from the beginning that the team has no authority to
make commitments.

STOCKPILE AGREEMENT
--------------

5. (C) It is our judgment that the GOC has not even decided
if they wish to pursue a stockpile agreement with us. But
since they have raised it in side conversations, we recommend

that we open a dialogue. The device could be a letter from
an appropriate official in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) to an appropriate official in Ministry of
Defense (MOD) (we recommend DASD/HD&ASA/WHA to new Vice MOD
Arbelaez) offering to initiate working level dialogue on the
process to reach a stockpile agreement. As with the air
defense assessment offer, the letter would make no
commitments other than information on the process by which a
stockpile agreement is concluded.

ACCESS TO CSL FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE
--------------

6. (C) In some ways, this is the easiest of the three. Since
the CSL will be on an operational COLAF base, the GOC will
have de facto access anyway. They realize that. But they
want to have something they can show to their public
suggesting they got more than Ecuador ten years ago. The
solution, we suggest, is the mil-to-mil operating arrangement
that is signed following the DCA. Under the Manta agreement,
this document was signed by SOUTHCOM J5 Director and host Air
Force Commander. It lays out operational understandings and
procedures for the CSL. It is not a political or policy
document. We suggest that the operating arrangement be
upgraded to SOUTHCOM Commander-Chief of Defense (CHOD). It
says the same thing. It is still a non-political document.
But it allows them to say they got something more than
Ecuador.


7. (C) GOC negotiators in the next DCA round will realize we
are approaching the endgame in the negotiations. President
Uribe again directed his negotiators on July 23 to conclude
an agreement as soon as possible. They will ratchet up the
pressure and will note that they cannot sign the DCA until
they have understanding on Track II. Embassy recommends that
we have something concrete to say on the subject by the
August 11 negotiating round.
Brownfield

=======================CABLE ENDS============================