Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BERN397
2009-09-18 14:33:00
SECRET
Embassy Bern
Cable title:  

IRAN: SWISS DEPUTY FM ADVOCATES BILATERAL TRACK

Tags:  PARM KNNP MNUC PREL IR SZ 
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VZCZCXRO9227
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHSW #0397 2611433
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181433Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6071
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2896
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0101
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0341
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0251
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0132
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T BERN 000397 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P, T, ISN, NEA, AND EUR/CE (Y.SAINT-ANDRE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2024
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC PREL IR SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN: SWISS DEPUTY FM ADVOCATES BILATERAL TRACK
TO REINFORCE P5-PLUS-1 APPROACH

REF: A. STATE 95073

B. BERN 363

Classified By: Ambassador Donald S. Beyer; reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T BERN 000397

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P, T, ISN, NEA, AND EUR/CE (Y.SAINT-ANDRE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2024
TAGS: PARM KNNP MNUC PREL IR SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN: SWISS DEPUTY FM ADVOCATES BILATERAL TRACK
TO REINFORCE P5-PLUS-1 APPROACH

REF: A. STATE 95073

B. BERN 363

Classified By: Ambassador Donald S. Beyer; reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S) Ambassador conveyed the message in reftel A in a
September 14 meeting with Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs (FDFA) State Secretary (Deputy FM) Michael Ambuehl.
Referring to news reports that the P5-plus-1 planned to meet
with Iranian representatives on October 1, Ambuehl termed the
P5-plus-1 "very important." He confirmed that Switzerland
would continue to use both public and private opportunities
to call on Iran to meet its international obligations and to
take advantage of the P5-plus-1 offer. Notwithstanding the
importance of the P5-plus-1 approach, and echoing comments we
heard recently (reftel B) from Swiss Ambassador to Tehran
Livia Leu, Ambuehl went on to emphasize that a U.S. approach
to Iran on a bilateral track -- discussing discrete topics
(e.g., civil aviation issues) -- still appeared indispensable
to a successful outcome with Iran.


2. (S) Ambuehl commented that the inherently difficult
multilateral coordination required for the P5-plus-1 to
formulate its positions gave the Iranians a certain
negotiating advantage. He also reiterated the oft-heard
Swiss view that the Iranian government is most interested in
dealing with the USG, not the P5-plus-1. Ambuehl further
suggested that an additional, simultaneous multilateral track
approach can be used to discuss such topics as Afghanistan
with Iran, in broad gauged settings, such as international
conferences. He suggested that the various potential tracks
-- particularly the bilateral -- would be mutually
reinforcing in dealing with Iran.
BEYER