SWISS VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND

S E C R E T BERN 000371

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/RA (M.BEDKE/J.DANIEL) AND EUR/CE
(Y.SAINT-ANDRE); UNVIE FOR IAEA DEL (D.PAPPAS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2024
TAGS: PARM KNNP IAEA MNUC PREL SY IR SZ
SUBJECT: SWISS VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND
SYRIA

REF: STATE 91633

Classified By: Acting POLE Counselor Chris Buck; reasons 1.(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Swiss share our general analysis of the
IAEA reports on Iran and Syria. They are curious to know how
the recent P5-plus-1 Political Directors meeting and
"package" proposal announced by Tehran might affect the
calculus with Iran. The main point of contact for IAEA
issues at the Swiss Federal Department for Foreign Affairs
(FDFA) expects that the Swiss government will make statements
at the September 7-11 IAEA Board of Governors (BoG) meeting,
but was not yet able to confirm the details of the content of
those statements. His comments on the latest IAEA reports on
Iran and Syria suggest the Swiss statements at the September
7-11 IAEA BoG will be generally in line with their more
recent, firmer pronouncements. End Summary.


2. (C) Acting POLE Counselor presented U.S. views (reftel) on
the latest IAEA reports on Iran and Syria on September 3 to
Jean-Daniel Praz, Deputy Head of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Section at the FDFA, and the FDFA's main point of
contact on IAEA issues. Praz appreciated the information,
and concurred generally with the U.S. analysis. He said that
he expects that the Swiss government will make statements at
the September 7-11 IAEA BoG meeting addressing Iran and
Syria, but was not yet able to confirm the overall content of
those statements.

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IRAN
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3. (C) Praz said that his first reading of the IAEA report on
Iran left him with the impression that Iran had demonstrated
some limited, but meaningful cooperation with the IAEA.
Nevertheless, upon further consultation with Swiss technical
experts regarding the details of the report, Praz said that
he was less impressed. For example, Praz noted that the
expansion of IAEA monitoring capacities at Natanz was nothing
more than what is required under safeguards, given Iran's
continued expansion of the Natanz facility. He agreed that
the IAEA's visit to Arak, absent further access and design
information, also was less forthcoming than it appeared.


4. (C) Praz inquired about the September 2 P5-plus-1
Political Directors meeting in Frankfurt, as well as the
USG's reaction to the latest "package" proposal recently
announced by Iran. A/POLE Counselor responded that he had no
readouts or assessments to share regarding the Frankfurt
meeting or reports regarding a new Iranian package. A/POLE
Counselor cautioned Praz that Iran had a history of
announcing vague initiatives in advance of BoG meetings, in
order to try to relieve some of the pressure it will face in
Vienna. Maintaining a firm, united front remains the most
promising path to convincing Iran to meet its international
obligations.

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SYRIA
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5. (C) Praz highlighted the IAEA's assertion in its Syria
report that the Agency's access to a site (in this case,
al-Kibar) cannot be limited simply because the site may be
military related. He said that he expected the Swiss
statement on Syria would underscore this point. As regards
the IAEA's investigation into the traces of undeclared
uranium found at Syria's Miniature Neutron Source Reactor,
Praz said that "we are in a wait and see" posture.

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COMMENT
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6. (S) In recent BoG meetings, the Swiss have made firmer
statements on Iran then during Switzerland's early tenure on
the Board. In Switzerland's early days on the BoG (late 2007
and most of 2008),the Swiss were still attempting to inject
themselves into a mediator role between Iran and the
P5-plus-1, and thus were careful not to criticize Tehran too
harshly in public settings. With Iran's continued
recalcitrance, however, Switzerland began to lose patience.
Even so, the Swiss are predisposed to place a premium on
dialogue, and are vulnerable to interpreting half-steps as
meaningful overtures by the Iranians. Though not directly
related, in terms of the general atmosphere, the harsh

response by the Iranian government to the demonstrations in
Iran following Iran's June elections should serve to temper
the Swiss reflex to give Tehran the benefit of any doubt.
Praz's comments to us regarding the IAEA reports on Iran and
Syria, while not definitive, suggest the Swiss statements at
the September 7-11 IAEA BoG will be generally in line with
their more recent, firmer pronouncements.
BEYER