RETHINKING U.S. FORCES REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000935

NOFORN

SIPDIS
OSD FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY VERSHBOW
STATE FOR EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY GORDON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2019
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PINS PREL PTER XG GM
SUBJECT: RETHINKING U.S. FORCES REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE:
MISSION GERMANY'S PERSPECTIVE

REF: USNATO 329

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ROBERT A. BRADTKE. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AN
D (D).


1. (S/NF) Mission Germany strongly endorses the call by
USNATO (reftel) to give careful reconsideration to the
planned continued draw-down of U.S. forces in Europe. If the
draw-down continues as scheduled, two of the three remaining
U.S. Army brigade combat teams in Germany will be withdrawn
by 2012/13, leaving a skeleton force of less than 30,000 U.S.
Army soldiers here. Similarly, the planned withdrawal of an
F-16 squadron from Spangdahlem in 2010 will reduce the
current number of U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft based in
Germany by almost 50%.


2. (S/NF) Given that up to half of the U.S. forces assigned
to Germany are deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere
outside of Europe at any given time, it is already difficult
for U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and U.S. Air Force Europe
(USAFE) to maintain minimum ties with long-standing
traditional Allies like Germany, much less build relations
and capabilities among the 12 new Allies that have joined
NATO since the end of the Cold War, or to productively engage
with the dozens of countries in the Alliance's Partnership
for Peace (PfP). It will be practically impossible to
conduct this vital theater security cooperation if the
draw-down continues its present course. As USNATO points
out, building partnership capability among our friends and
allies is a critical investment in our own national security
-- assuming, of course, that we want their help in dealing
with the myriad of 21st century threats we face.


3. (S/NF) We would also point out that Germany offers the
U.S. unparalleled stationing rights and privileges, and we
should be careful about giving up additional garrisons and
bases that we almost certainly will never get back again.
Once we draw down, it will be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to build back up. If there was any question
about Germany's unique reliability as a strategic staging
ground for projecting our forces around the world, these were
dispelled early in the Iraq War. Despite unequivocally
opposing the war and refusing to send its own troops, Germany
did not attempt to control or limit in any way the transit of
U.S. troops or the deployment of German-based U.S. forces to
Iraq and the rest of the region. In fact, to the contrary,
the Bundeswehr deployed its own security forces to guard U.S.
installations throughout Germany, freeing up thousands of
critical U.S. Army military police to deploy to Iraq.
Germany continues to play a critical role in supporting our
deployments in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of
responsibility. Thousands of seriously wounded U.S. service
members needing emergency treatment have been cared for at
the U.S. Army Hospital in Landstuhl, while half a million
U.S. soldiers going to and returning from the region transit
through the civilian airport in Leipzig-Halle every year.



4. (S/NF) We believe that Germany's willingness to offer this
kind of assistance in our hour of need -- notwithstanding
clear political differences over our chosen course of action
-- was based on the extremely close working and social ties
that three generations of American service members stationed
in Germany have built up over the past 60-plus years. By
continuing to reduce our presence in Germany below already
low levels, we are threatening to un-do one of the most
productive and special alliances we have in the world today.
We are also reducing our ability to shape whether (and how)
the Bundeswehr transforms itself from a purely territorial
military into an expeditionary fighting force. This unique
relationship cannot be sustained by CONUS-based forces. We
need to be here in sufficient numbers in order to maintain
these critical ties. Fortunately, this is something that
Germany wants as well. In a May 29 letter to Secretary
Gates, Defense Jung referred to the ongoing Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) and said he wanted to "emphasize once

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again Germany's special interest in a substantial and
permanent presence of U.S. troops in Germany as a visual
symbol of our outstanding relationship."


5. (S/NF) Finally, we agree with USNATO that current U.S.
troop levels in Europe are already near the minimum we need
in order to maintain leadership within NATO and to reassure
Allies in the face of a resurgent Russia. This leadership
and reassurance are especially important in the context of
the upcoming negotiation of the new NATO Strategic Concept.
Last summer's war in Georgia was a reminder -- especially
from the European point of view -- that while NATO must be
equipped, trained and ready to deal with security threats in
far-flung places like Afghanistan, its goal of creating a
Europe whole, free and at peace with itself remains
incomplete. U.S. leadership will be indispensable for
ensuring that this goal is finally and irreversibly achieved.
Bradtke