GERMAN VIEWS ON THE JANUARY 26-27 EU GAERC MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000090

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019
TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV ZL ZI RU UP GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON THE JANUARY 26-27 EU GAERC MEETING

REF: A. STATE 4297

B. STATE 5430

C. BERLIN 88

D. 08 BERLIN 1475

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Germany favors only a general EU statement of
support for the closing of Guantanamo, which would leave
specific actions -- like accepting detainees -- up to member
states to decide. Given the differing views within the
German government on accepting detainees, Chancellor Merkel
has put off making a decision one way or the other until
presented with a concrete request by the new U.S.
Administration. Germany supported the decision to remove
Western Balkans from the GAERC agenda because it feared that
discussion of Montenegro's EU application would precipitate a
more general political discussion about the EU aspirations of
the whole region. Given that the Lisbon Treaty remains in
limbo, Germany wants to put off that discussion at least
until the Gymnich meeting in late March. Germany's position
regarding the OHR in Bosnia has shifted significantly in the
past few months. It now supports moving to an EU Special
Representation Mission soon rather than later, even without
complete fulfillment of the 5-plus-2 agenda. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Post delivered ref A points to MFA Deputy European
Correspondent Thomas Schieb January 16 and followed up with
him January 23 to get his reactions. Post also delivered the
Gaza points contained in ref B and have reported the latest
German views per ref C.

GUANTANAMO


3. (C) Schieb noted that FM Steinmeier had been outspoken in
saying that Germany should be prepared to accept some
Guantanamo detainees to assist in the closing of the
facility. He also conceded that there has been considerable
push-back by other members of the Grand Coalition government,
most notably from Interior Minister Schaeuble, who have
argued that resettlement of the detainees is purely a U.S.
problem. Nonetheless, the official German position, as
articulated earlier this week by a Chancellery spokesman, is
to remain open and to make no decisions or commitments on
this issue until a concrete proposal is received from the new
U.S. Administration. Schieb said Germany does not favor a
detailed or prescriptive EU position on the issue of
detainees, but rather just a general statement of support for
closing Guantanamo, which leaves specific actions up to
individual members states to decide.

WESTERN BALKANS


4. (C) Schieb said that the COREPER had decided yesterday
(January 22) to remove Western Balkans from the agenda of the
GAERC. Germany had supported this move because it did not
feel it was timely to discuss Montenegro's recent EU
membership application, which would have precipitated a more
general political discussion about the EU aspirations of the
entire region. Schieb noted that Germany continued to hold
the view that no further EU enlargement was possible until
the new institutions and procedures provided under the Lisbon
Treaty were in place. Therefore, Germany did not think it
was prudent to take Lisbon Treaty ratification for granted by
plunging into a discussion of further enlargement. Schieb
conceded that a number of other EU members were pushing EU
enlargement to send a positive signal to the region, but
Germany thought it would be better to put off this discussion
until at least the Gymnich meeting at the end of March.


5. (C) On Serbia, Schieb said that Germany favored
implementing the interim agreement with Belgrade, but that
some members state -- particularly the Netherlands --
continued to block in the absence of full cooperation with
the ICTY. Schieb noted, however, that one area where
engagement was going forward was on visa liberalization. The
EU Commission had launched a dialogue with Belgrade on
extending visa-free travel to the Serbs, but the success of
this effort would depend on Belgrade meeting certain
benchmarks, especially on improving rule of law, combating
organized crime, etc.


6. (C) On Bosnia, Schieb noted the sudden departure of HiRep

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Lajcak to become the new Slovak FM had come at an inopportune
time, given the challenges in BiH. Nonetheless, Germany
supported moving sooner rather than later to an EU Special
Representative mission. Offering an EU perspective was the
perhaps best leverage the international community had over
Bosnia. Schieb argued that maintaining the Office of the
High Representative (OHR) no longer made sense, given that
the Bonn Powers were obsolete and could not be realistically
re-imposed. He rejected tying closure of the OHR to
fulfillment of all of the outstanding 5-plus-2 objectives and
conditions. (Comment: This constitutes a considerable change
in Germany's position, which as recently as of October last
year, as reported ref D, still supported maintaining the OHR
until the 5-plus-2 agenda had been completely fulfilled. End
Comment.)

ZIMBABWE


7. (C) Schieb said that EU foreign ministers were expected to
agree on a "slight" expansion of the list of individuals
subject to the EU visa ban and asset freeze.

RUSSIAN-UKRAINE GAS DISPUTE


8. (C) Schieb said this energy and gas would be one of the
main topics during the morning part of the GAERC, and that
relations with Russia and Ukraine would be discussed over
lunch. Schieb thought the gas crisis had helped underline
just how important it was for the EU to make real progress in
diversifying its energy sources as well as its supply routes.
He thought that "neither Russia nor Ukraine had done
themselves any favors" during the crisis. That said, Schieb
did not anticipate any immediate consequences. No one, for
example, was talking about suspending the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) talks with Russia.
Koenig