Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BERLIN580
2009-05-18 13:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:
GERMAN VIEWS ON THEMES FOR THE MAY 29 MEETING OF
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000580
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2019
TAGS: MARR ECON POL EUN GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON THEMES FOR THE MAY 29 MEETING OF
THE PIRACY CONTACT GROUP
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000580
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2019
TAGS: MARR ECON POL EUN GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON THEMES FOR THE MAY 29 MEETING OF
THE PIRACY CONTACT GROUP
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY. Germany agrees that more forces are needed
for counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia, but
feels it is already doing its fair share; others with the
requisite capability who are not yet contributing should
answer the call. Germany welcomes the planned NATO
counterpiracy mission, but plans to keep all of its assets
under the EU Atalanta operation for the time being -- at
least until after the September Bundestag election. Germany
will only bring those pirate suspects here for prosecution
who have directly and adversely affected German interests
(i.e., caused the death or injury of a German citizen and/or
damage to German property). Germany points out that the
impact of requiring German-flagged vessels to undertake
self-protective measures would be very limited since the
number of such vessels is relatively small. The use of armed
guards on board ships for protection is controversial in
Germany and elsewhere in Europe, especially when this task is
performed by private security firms. Germany questions the
usefulness of a working group on tracking and freezing pirate
assets, given that ransoms are paid in cash, and most
Somalian pirates presumably have limited opportunities to use
bank accounts and other traceable financial instruments. END
SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Post delivered reftel points to MFA UNSC Action
Officer Dirk Stockhausen and ESDP Action Officer Stefan
Roessel on May 5. We followed up with them on May 13 to
review reftel's suggested items for discussion at the May 29
meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia (CGPCS).
ADDITIONAL FORCES
3. (C) With regard to assigning additional counterpiracy
forces to the region, they agreed that more were needed.
However, before current contributors like Germany were
pressed to provide more assets, they thought the focus should
be on countries that have the requisite capability, but are
not yet pulling their weight. They noted that only four of
the EU's 27 member states are currently participating in the
Atalanta mission, but acknowledged that many are land-locked
nations without blue sea navies. They indicated that the EU
would do a report at the six-month mark of the Atalanta
mission and that one of the issues addressed would be force
generation.
NATO MISSION
4. (C) Both Stockhausen and Roessel welcomed the planned NATO
counterpiracy mission and thought it would give value added
by providing a framework for non-EU Allies to contribute to
the counterpiracy effort. They indicated, however, that the
German government was unlikely to risk any political capital
in seeking a separate parliamentary mandate for the NATO
mission before German federal elections in September. The
question of joining the NATO mission would probably not arise
until December, when the mandate for the EU Atalanta mission
comes up for renewal. In any case, they saw little point in
dividing German counterpiracy assets between the EU and NATO,
believing that for practical reasons, it made sense to keep
everything under Atalanta for the time being.
PROSECUTING PIRATES
5. (C) On the issue of adopting national policies that will
support detention and prosecution of suspected pirates, both
Stockhausen and Roessel thought the EU hand-over agreement
with Kenya provided a good framework for handling pirate
suspects who might otherwise have to be released. However,
they realize that Kenya is not in a position to prosecute all
of the pirates captured off the Somalian coast, which is why
Germany favors finding other third states in the region to
help shoulder this burden. But when asked what countries
might be good candidates for this, they did not have any
concrete suggestions. They noted that Yemen had been
mentioned early on, but was probably not acceptable, given
its spotty human rights record and the existence of the death
penalty there.
6. (C) Stockhausen and Roeseel emphasized that judicial
authorities in Germany would be reluctant to bring pirate
suspects to Germany for prosecution except in cases where
German interests were directly and adversely affected, i.e.,
the death or injury of a German citizen or damage to German
property. That is why even in the recent case where pirates
attacked a Germany Navy supply ship (apparently mistaking it
for a commercial vessel),German authorities in the end
declined to prosecute. The attack consisted of just three
shots from a handgun at long distance, none of which
apparently hit the ship or its crew. The Germans believe
that they need to be judicious in deciding which pirates to
bring to Germany for prosecution since the suspects are
likely to declare asylum as soon as they arrive and probably
will not be able to be sent back to their home countries.
They worry about creating perverse incentives to attack
German vessels.
7. (SBU) In the longer run, given the problems that
individual countries have prosecuting pirate suspects, many
senior German officials have already spoken out in favor of
establishing an international tribunal to handle these cases.
The MFA has drafted a non-paper on the issue, noting two
possible ways of setting up such a court: 1) attaching it to
an already existing national court in the region, as was done
in Cambodia (the so-called "Khmer Rouge Tribunal") or 2)
establishing a stand-alone court in the region where there is
already adminstrative and clerical expertise, such as in
Arusha, Tanzania, where the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda is located. The Germans believe these options
should be pursued in close cooperation with the African Union
and the UN, and that whatever option is chosen will probably
have to be codified in a UN Security Council resolution.
They also acknowledge that the countries of the region could
not be expected to bear the costs of the new court alone.
(Note: A copy of the German non-paper has been e-mailed to
EUR/CE and PM/PPA. End Note.)
SELF-PROTECTION MEASURES
8. (C) Noting reftel's call for improving ship
self-protection, we shared with Stockhausen and Roessel the
news that the U.S. Coast Guard had just recently issued a
revised maritime directive that requires U.S.-flagged vessels
to establish an anti-piracy plan to prevent attacks. We
asked if Germany had considered taking similar measures with
regard to German-flagged ships. Stockhausen and Roessel
said, in fact, this was an issue of intense internal debate
on self-protection measures, noting that there were several
different aspects to the issue.
9. (C) First of all, they pointed out that the effect of such
a directive for German-flagged ships would be limited since
only a relatively small number of German-owned commercial
vessels fly the German flag. They typically fly flags of
convenience instead, which allow them to get around strict
German minimum wage requirements and other rules and
regulations. Stockhausen and Roessel thought that similarly
few U.S.-owned commercial ships flew the U.S. flag.
10. (C) While there is little controversy about having
unarmed guards standing watch on a ship, Stockhausen and
Roessel said the use of armed guards is quite controversial
in Germany and the rest of Europe. In fact, the German
Shipowners Association has already come out publicly against
posting armed guards on ships, arguing that this could do
more harm than good and lead to escalation-of-force
incidents. Stockhausen and Roessel noted that once you have
decided in favor of armed guards, then you have to determine
whether they should be private contractors or government
security forces (police or military). Stockhausen and
Roessel thought that after the bad experience with private
security contractors in Iraq, there was relatively little
appetite in Europe for basing such individuals on vessels.
However, they noted that the EU framework decision for the
Atalanta mission explicitly foresees the deployment of
government security forces on commercial and World Food
Program (WFP) vessels (called "vessel protection detachments"
or VPDs).
TRACKING AND FREEZING PIRATE ASSETS
11. (C) With regard to our proposal to establish a fifth
working group to explore the feasibility of tracking and
freezing pirate assets, Stockhausen and Roessel wondered how
we thought this would work in practice. They asked for our
understanding of the financial stream of pirates, given that
ransoms are paid in cash and most Somalian pirates presumably
have limited opportunities to use bank accounts and other
financial instruments.
CGPCS MEMBERSHIP
12. (C) Regarding participation in the CGPCS, Stockhausen
noted that Greece is now threatening to quit the group unless
Cyprus is admitted, even though Cyprus has not formally
applied to be a member. Both Stockhausen and Roessel
expressed hope that a solution would be found soon to this
Turkey-Cyprus issue, which is also blocking the accession of
several applicants to the CGPCS.
GERMANY OFFERS TO HOST PRE-MEETING
13. (SBU) Stockhausen noted that Germany would offer to hold
a Quad pre-meeting at its mission in New York on May 28, to
help prepare for the May 29 CGPCS.
Koenig
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2019
TAGS: MARR ECON POL EUN GM
SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON THEMES FOR THE MAY 29 MEETING OF
THE PIRACY CONTACT GROUP
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 (
B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY. Germany agrees that more forces are needed
for counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia, but
feels it is already doing its fair share; others with the
requisite capability who are not yet contributing should
answer the call. Germany welcomes the planned NATO
counterpiracy mission, but plans to keep all of its assets
under the EU Atalanta operation for the time being -- at
least until after the September Bundestag election. Germany
will only bring those pirate suspects here for prosecution
who have directly and adversely affected German interests
(i.e., caused the death or injury of a German citizen and/or
damage to German property). Germany points out that the
impact of requiring German-flagged vessels to undertake
self-protective measures would be very limited since the
number of such vessels is relatively small. The use of armed
guards on board ships for protection is controversial in
Germany and elsewhere in Europe, especially when this task is
performed by private security firms. Germany questions the
usefulness of a working group on tracking and freezing pirate
assets, given that ransoms are paid in cash, and most
Somalian pirates presumably have limited opportunities to use
bank accounts and other traceable financial instruments. END
SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Post delivered reftel points to MFA UNSC Action
Officer Dirk Stockhausen and ESDP Action Officer Stefan
Roessel on May 5. We followed up with them on May 13 to
review reftel's suggested items for discussion at the May 29
meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia (CGPCS).
ADDITIONAL FORCES
3. (C) With regard to assigning additional counterpiracy
forces to the region, they agreed that more were needed.
However, before current contributors like Germany were
pressed to provide more assets, they thought the focus should
be on countries that have the requisite capability, but are
not yet pulling their weight. They noted that only four of
the EU's 27 member states are currently participating in the
Atalanta mission, but acknowledged that many are land-locked
nations without blue sea navies. They indicated that the EU
would do a report at the six-month mark of the Atalanta
mission and that one of the issues addressed would be force
generation.
NATO MISSION
4. (C) Both Stockhausen and Roessel welcomed the planned NATO
counterpiracy mission and thought it would give value added
by providing a framework for non-EU Allies to contribute to
the counterpiracy effort. They indicated, however, that the
German government was unlikely to risk any political capital
in seeking a separate parliamentary mandate for the NATO
mission before German federal elections in September. The
question of joining the NATO mission would probably not arise
until December, when the mandate for the EU Atalanta mission
comes up for renewal. In any case, they saw little point in
dividing German counterpiracy assets between the EU and NATO,
believing that for practical reasons, it made sense to keep
everything under Atalanta for the time being.
PROSECUTING PIRATES
5. (C) On the issue of adopting national policies that will
support detention and prosecution of suspected pirates, both
Stockhausen and Roessel thought the EU hand-over agreement
with Kenya provided a good framework for handling pirate
suspects who might otherwise have to be released. However,
they realize that Kenya is not in a position to prosecute all
of the pirates captured off the Somalian coast, which is why
Germany favors finding other third states in the region to
help shoulder this burden. But when asked what countries
might be good candidates for this, they did not have any
concrete suggestions. They noted that Yemen had been
mentioned early on, but was probably not acceptable, given
its spotty human rights record and the existence of the death
penalty there.
6. (C) Stockhausen and Roeseel emphasized that judicial
authorities in Germany would be reluctant to bring pirate
suspects to Germany for prosecution except in cases where
German interests were directly and adversely affected, i.e.,
the death or injury of a German citizen or damage to German
property. That is why even in the recent case where pirates
attacked a Germany Navy supply ship (apparently mistaking it
for a commercial vessel),German authorities in the end
declined to prosecute. The attack consisted of just three
shots from a handgun at long distance, none of which
apparently hit the ship or its crew. The Germans believe
that they need to be judicious in deciding which pirates to
bring to Germany for prosecution since the suspects are
likely to declare asylum as soon as they arrive and probably
will not be able to be sent back to their home countries.
They worry about creating perverse incentives to attack
German vessels.
7. (SBU) In the longer run, given the problems that
individual countries have prosecuting pirate suspects, many
senior German officials have already spoken out in favor of
establishing an international tribunal to handle these cases.
The MFA has drafted a non-paper on the issue, noting two
possible ways of setting up such a court: 1) attaching it to
an already existing national court in the region, as was done
in Cambodia (the so-called "Khmer Rouge Tribunal") or 2)
establishing a stand-alone court in the region where there is
already adminstrative and clerical expertise, such as in
Arusha, Tanzania, where the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda is located. The Germans believe these options
should be pursued in close cooperation with the African Union
and the UN, and that whatever option is chosen will probably
have to be codified in a UN Security Council resolution.
They also acknowledge that the countries of the region could
not be expected to bear the costs of the new court alone.
(Note: A copy of the German non-paper has been e-mailed to
EUR/CE and PM/PPA. End Note.)
SELF-PROTECTION MEASURES
8. (C) Noting reftel's call for improving ship
self-protection, we shared with Stockhausen and Roessel the
news that the U.S. Coast Guard had just recently issued a
revised maritime directive that requires U.S.-flagged vessels
to establish an anti-piracy plan to prevent attacks. We
asked if Germany had considered taking similar measures with
regard to German-flagged ships. Stockhausen and Roessel
said, in fact, this was an issue of intense internal debate
on self-protection measures, noting that there were several
different aspects to the issue.
9. (C) First of all, they pointed out that the effect of such
a directive for German-flagged ships would be limited since
only a relatively small number of German-owned commercial
vessels fly the German flag. They typically fly flags of
convenience instead, which allow them to get around strict
German minimum wage requirements and other rules and
regulations. Stockhausen and Roessel thought that similarly
few U.S.-owned commercial ships flew the U.S. flag.
10. (C) While there is little controversy about having
unarmed guards standing watch on a ship, Stockhausen and
Roessel said the use of armed guards is quite controversial
in Germany and the rest of Europe. In fact, the German
Shipowners Association has already come out publicly against
posting armed guards on ships, arguing that this could do
more harm than good and lead to escalation-of-force
incidents. Stockhausen and Roessel noted that once you have
decided in favor of armed guards, then you have to determine
whether they should be private contractors or government
security forces (police or military). Stockhausen and
Roessel thought that after the bad experience with private
security contractors in Iraq, there was relatively little
appetite in Europe for basing such individuals on vessels.
However, they noted that the EU framework decision for the
Atalanta mission explicitly foresees the deployment of
government security forces on commercial and World Food
Program (WFP) vessels (called "vessel protection detachments"
or VPDs).
TRACKING AND FREEZING PIRATE ASSETS
11. (C) With regard to our proposal to establish a fifth
working group to explore the feasibility of tracking and
freezing pirate assets, Stockhausen and Roessel wondered how
we thought this would work in practice. They asked for our
understanding of the financial stream of pirates, given that
ransoms are paid in cash and most Somalian pirates presumably
have limited opportunities to use bank accounts and other
financial instruments.
CGPCS MEMBERSHIP
12. (C) Regarding participation in the CGPCS, Stockhausen
noted that Greece is now threatening to quit the group unless
Cyprus is admitted, even though Cyprus has not formally
applied to be a member. Both Stockhausen and Roessel
expressed hope that a solution would be found soon to this
Turkey-Cyprus issue, which is also blocking the accession of
several applicants to the CGPCS.
GERMANY OFFERS TO HOST PRE-MEETING
13. (SBU) Stockhausen noted that Germany would offer to hold
a Quad pre-meeting at its mission in New York on May 28, to
help prepare for the May 29 CGPCS.
Koenig