Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BERLIN227
2009-02-24 16:43:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN GENERAL AGREEMENT ON

Tags:  PARM PREL GM BWC 
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VZCZCXYZ0028
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #0227/01 0551643
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 241643Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3390
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9607
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0179
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1181
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1440
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0684
UNCLAS BERLIN 000227 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL GM BWC
SUBJECT: UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
OVERSIGHT OF THE DNA SYNTHESIS INDUSTRY

REF: A. 08STATE 127980

B. STATE 4627

UNCLAS BERLIN 000227

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL GM BWC
SUBJECT: UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
OVERSIGHT OF THE DNA SYNTHESIS INDUSTRY

REF: A. 08STATE 127980

B. STATE 4627


1. Summary: The German government is approaching oversight of
the DNA synthesis industry by relying on the Industry
Association for Synthetic Biology (IASB) to develop and
promote voluntary self-regulation. The proposed IASB
oversight mechanisms are very much in line with the USG
policy framework on this issue. While Germany has not
specifically regulated the DNA synthesis industry, existing
German genetic engineering regulations effectively require
many of the screening and record keeping components of the
proposed USG framework and IASB recommendations. Germany
also has regulations that provide additional oversight
mechanisms not present in the United States, especially in
the area of personnel reliability. The U.S., Germany, and
IASB also have similar views on the scientific and software
challenges that need to be resolved for effective technical
screening. Law enforcement in Germany, however, is largely
implemented by the Laender (states),providing challenges for
international law enforcement cooperation.


2. The United States and Germany agreed to meet again in
person in three or four months, and possibly earlier via
teleconference. Future meetings will be to share future USG
developments on technical and customer screening, record
keeping, and communication between law enforcement and DNA
synthesis providers. The United States and Germany agreed to
work together to promote a screening framework in the
international community, utilizing various multilateral fora,
as a screening will only be effective if harmonized
internationally. End Summary.


3. Based on recommendations from the National Science
Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB),the USG is currently
developing a framework for screening of commercial orders for
gene synthesis. The United States and Germany are the two
most active countries in this new and fast growing field of
DNA synthesis, but many other countries are involved. As the
USG begins to work out the parameters of these guidelines, it
seeks to coordinate efforts with other important players to
ensure consistent international practices.


4. The USG requested a meeting with the German government
(Ref. A) to bring together representatives of the relevant
federal agencies in both countries to share current policy

views and practices in this area. The proposed agenda is
contained in Ref. B.


5. The first round of discussion took place on Feb. 23, 2009,
in Berlin. Six USG representatives from the Departments of
State (ISN/CB),Commerce (BIS),Homeland Security (S&T),
Health and Human Services (ASPR),and Justice (FBI) attended.
German attendees included representatives from counterpart
agencies in the German government as well as the Ministry of
Education and Research, and representatives of the Industry
Association for Synthetic Biology (IASB; soon to be renamed
the International Association for Synthetic Biology),the
major industry consortium of DNA synthesis providers.


6. The USG representatives provided presentations on an
overview of USG activities with respect to dual-use life
science research, a summary of the USG policy framework for
addressing government oversight of DNA synthesis orders, and
a review of the dialogue between the FBI and major DNA
synthesis providers. German representatives presented
existing German and EU laws and regulations that provide
mechanisms that effectively provide oversight of dual-use
biological research. IASB representatives presented an
industry perspective on DNA screening of synthesis providers.
Discussion focused on understanding the legal and regulatory
frameworks in each country and identifying commonalities in
approaches and issues for future collaboration.


7. Risk and Technological Change: The Germans do not see a
high-level or near-term risk, but agree that DNA synthesis
requires oversight. In response to the suggestion by one
industry representative that consideration be given to
registering high throughput DNA synthesizers, there was some
inconclusive discussion about whether or not monitoring
synthesizers was useful. Both sides agreed that regulatory
frameworks need to be adaptive in light of the rapid rate of
increase in DNA synthesis capability by both gene foundries
and desktop synthesizers.


8. Extant German Legal Frameworks: Germany has several
regulatory mechanisms that implicitly provide oversight of
the DNA synthesis industry. The relevant regulations include
genetic engineering regulations, codes of conduct affecting
grant proposal preparation and review, personnel reliability
practices for working in BSL-3/4 laboratories, and licensing
of life scientists working with specific pathogens. Current
German research funding practices, however, do not allow
funding to be tied to a requirement to buy only from
companies that screen orders.


9. Law Enforcement: Germany is very interested in U.S.
efforts to provide guidance to industry on reporting
suspicious orders and would like followup information as
policies evolve. Personnel reliability is enforced through
multiple mechanisms: life scientists are licensed for working
with specific pathogens and BSL-3/4 workers require security
clearances. Items checked include criminal history,
financial history, mental health status, and personal
interviews. Germany has challenges in providing a single
point of contact for suspicious orders because of the
dominant role of the Laender in law enforcement. Germany
does not appear to have considered how to handle company
concerns regarding suspicious orders. Also, there currently
does not appear to be a mechanism to allow the United States
to alert Germany about suspicious orders.


10. Technical Challenges to Be Resolved: The German
government, German industry representatives, and the USG have
common views on the technical challenges for implementing a
screening framework, particularly on an international basis.
These issues include database content and annotation of
sequences for both pathogenicity and housekeeping, access
control for both modifying and using content, and whether or
not a database should be centralized or distributed.
Responsible parties for maintenance and curation need to be
designated.


11. Strategy for International Engagement: The United States
and Germany agree that broad international adoption requires
early engagement of key developing countries in addition to
key developed countries. Promoting global adoption of
screening will also require engaging multiple multilateral
fora including OECD, WHO, BWC, Australia Group, and other
nonproliferation venues. The IASB can also play a pivotal
role in reaching out to gene foundries in developing
countries. It is critical that the developing countries not
perceive this effort as being pushed on them by the developed
countries, but buy into it as industry "best-practice."


12. Future Discussions: German government and industry
representatives readily agreed to the US suggestion to hold
another face-to-face meeting once US studies of technical
aspects of order screenings were better-developed. US also
suggested that a video conference in April might be useful.
US and German representatives agreed to jointly brief other
close allies at a planned meeting in Paris on March 4, 2009.


13. Comment: IASB representatives were much more engaged in
the discussions than those from the German government (apart
from Foreign Ministry technical expert Volker Beck).
Clearly, the German government is generally content to let
industry take the lead. While Germany will be supportive,
they are not inclined to be particularly energetic in seeking
adoption by other governments. The industry association, on
the other hand, may be a very active partner. In future
bilateral discussions, participation of German industry
should be continued. End Comment.


14. Members of the U.S. delegation have cleared on this cable.
Koenig