GERMANY: 2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE MUST SUCCEED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BERLIN 000187

SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/MNSA
GENEVA FOR CD
UNVIE FOR IAEA
USUN FOR POL
USNATO FOR POL
USEU FOR POL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA
IAEA, NPT, GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY: 2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE MUST SUCCEED

REF: A. STATE 6970

B. BERLIN 126

C. MUNICH 20

D. MUNICH 19

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOHN KOENIG. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: There is a great deal of interest in Germany
-- in the government, the Bundestag, the press, and among the
NGO and think tank community -- about the upcoming
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee
(PrepCom) and Review Conference (RevCon). Interlocutors
insist the 2010 RevCon "must succeed" and are pleased the new
U.S. Administration is engaging on this issue so soon after
taking office. Germany, long active on NPT matters, will
actively work to ensure these meetings lead to "consensus on
a substantive document" and a renewed commitment to the
non-proliferation regime. Germany also hopes that the
nuclear states will offer additional reductions to their
nuclear arsenals. German interlocutors also noted a strong
desire to see that nuclear states do more to limit the number
of nuclear weapons, among other steps. Post recommends
frequent, high-level talks on these matters with German
counterparts to ensure maximum cooperation and understanding
for the Administration's priorities, and notes that Director
General for Arms Control and Disarmament Peter Gottwald will
be in Washington February 23-24 for meetings in the
Department and on Capitol Hill. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) PolOff delivered Ref. A points to Stefan Kordasch,
Deputy Head of the Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Division at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
February 12. Kordasch was pleased to learn of the USG's
priorities for and interest in the upcoming NPT PrepCom in
May, noting that "the NPT RevCon must succeed" in 2010. He
said that German officials are encouraged by President
Obama's stance, noting that positive signals from the new
U.S. Administration will "set the tone" for the upcoming
PrepCom. Kordasch offered to provide a working paper which
Germany distributed at the April 2008 PrepCom in Geneva which
highlights a number of the German government's objectives
regarding the NPT. A transcript of that working paper can be
found in paragraph 12.


3. (C) Kordasch began by briefly reviewing the 2005 RevCon,
which he termed an "absolute failure." He acknowledged that
the road ahead will be difficult, noting that it is extremely
difficult to get all 190 nations to agree on an agenda, a
timetable, etc. That said, Germany plans to do everything
possible to ensure that procedural issues are resolved at the
PrepCom. When asked about the importance of the 2010 RevCon,
Kordasch characterized it as "do or die." Many countries are
losing faith in the validity of the NPT, and German officials
fear that another failed RevCon will doom the NPT. "We
really do view the problem as that serious." Germany is
fully prepared to work very closely with the U.S. and other
allies to ensure that the upcoming PrepCom and RevCon are
successful and result in "consensus on a substantive
document." Kordasch, who was active at the 2000 RevCon,
noted that the "Thirteen Steps" established there laid out a
good plan, although the follow-on interpretation of that plan
was problematic.


4. (C) Kordasch said the time had come to strengthen the
overall regime across the board in order to rebuild a "common
purpose" for the NPT. Both non-proliferation and nuclear
disarmament issues must be addressed, and a serious plan by
the nuclear states to review their nuclear posture and reduce
the size of their arsenal would send an important signal --
something he labeled the "irreversibility of nuclear
disarmament." Kordasch mentioned that U.S. ratification of
the CTBT and serious negotiations with the Russians about a
follow-up to the START I treaty would "reinvigorate" the
non-proliferation regime and reduce mistrust among the
skeptical NAM countries and others. He noted that he hopes
the follow-up to (or at least the extension of) START I would
be "serious, verifiable, and legally binding" and include
further reductions in both countries' nuclear stockpiles.

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Kordasch also pointed out that the start of serious
negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva
on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would provide a
good initial signal of intent by the "important powers."


5. (C) Germany will continue to work closely with the U.S.
through the EU3 3 (P5 1) process to pressure Iran to end its
"unacceptable" noncompliance. As this is principally an IAEA
issue, however, it will remain a question of tactics as to
whether Iran should be isolated at the RevCon. In a separate
conversation later that day with German parliamentarian Elke
Hoff (FDP),Hoff mentioned that both IAEA Director General
elBaradei and Iranian Speaker of Parliament Larijani
complained bitterly about the "carrot and stick" terminology,
and Hoff noted her agreement. "The U.S. is now using new
language with Iran to build confidence and urge cooperation.
Different words (to describe incentives and sanctions) would
add to that effort." (NOTE: Mrs Hoff is travelling to
Jerusalem, Tehran and Baghdad from February 22-26. END NOTE).
Kordasch also mentioned that Germany continues to support
the Six Party Talks to resolve the North Korean crisis.


6. (C) The lack of universality of the NPT remains a key
stumbling block and Kordasch said that discussions should
occur -- either at the PrepCom or through other venues --
about ways in which the international community can bring the
"Big Three" -- India, Pakistan, and Israel -- closer to the
NPT system by getting them to adhere to as many
non-proliferation instruments as possible. He noted,
however, that we should discuss these issues productively and
constructively with these countries, rather than following
the usual route of simply "badgering them." The past
practice of "naming names" was unhelpful in his view and that
of other interlocutors.


7. (C) Kordasch noted that Germany views "with interest"
ideas about the automatism of sanctions should violations to
the NPT occur and was pleased that Congresswoman Ellen
Tauscher raised the issue at the Munich Security Conference
(Ref. C). Strengthening Article X will definitely be on the
agenda in 2010 and Kordasch urged considering the
incorporation of UNSCR 1540 into the NPT as a further way to
discourage withdrawal. Germany also strongly supports the
universality of NPT safeguards agreements and the Additional
Protocol, and Kordasch welcomed the United States' adoption
of the Additional Protocol in December.


8. (C) German Foreign Minister Steinmeier has been actively
pushing the idea to establish an international nuclear fuel
reprocessing facility under the IAEA. Kordasch noted,
however, that this could be a "hard sell" with the NAM
countries who may distrustfully view the creation of such a
fuel bank as an attempt to detract from their Article IV
rights. Kordasch also noted the EU and Russia have also been
engaged on this issue. When asked about ways to allow for
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with the
Treaty's non-proliferation obligations, Kordasch noted that
this must be coupled with the Article III verification
requirements.


9. (C) Kordasch emphasized that transparency on the part of
the nuclear weapons states with regard to their nuclear
weapons forces and policies was desirable and important,
while recognizing the limits. He said that conversations
about these and other disarmament issues could also be held
at NATO, where all Allies could coordinate an overall
strategy. He noted an upcoming NAC Reinforced meeting in
Brussels where arms control was on the agenda.


10. (SBU) German press reported broadly on the recent Munich
Security Conference (Ref. D) and former Secretary of State
Kissinger's call for "Global Zero." A number of German
politicians have expressed their support for the total
elimination of nuclear weapons, and the anti-nuclear movement
in Germany remains strong. Depending on ideology and party
affiliation, members of the German parliament (Bundestag)
advocate approaches ranging from a German total abdication
from nuclear burdensharing to a "go slow" approach to ensure

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the "world is safe without the security provided by the
nuclear umbrella." Oliver Thraenert, Senior Research
Associate for Security Policy at the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs (a top German think tank)
repeatedly noted that "American leadership" is the most
important input to ensure a successful RevCom.


11. (U) As noted in Ref. B, the key points of contact for
NPT-related issues in the German MFA are Arms Control and
Disarmament Office Director Nikolai von Schoepff
(240-RL@diplo.de) and his deputy Stefan Kordasch
(240-0@diplo.de). Both can be reached at 49-30-5000-4268.
According to von Schoepff, Director General for Arms Control
and Disarmament Peter Gottwald is likely to lead the German
delegation to the PrepCom meeting in May, reflecting the high
priority Germany places on this event. Gottwald will also be
in Washington February 23-24 for meetings in the Department
and on Capitol Hill, including with Rep. Tauscher. Post
believes frequent talks with German interlocutors in the
run-up to the May 2009 PrepCon will ensure maximum
cooperation and understanding for the Administration's
priorities. Post stands ready to assist in any way possible.


12. (U) Begin text of German working paper submitted at the
April 2008 NPT PrepCom in Geneva:

Working Towards A Successful 2010 NPT Review Conference --


A. The failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference to arrive at
an agreed result has been perceived as evidence that the
nuclear non-proliferation regime is in a state of crisis and
that it faces the risk of erosion. To avert an erosion, every
effort needs to be undertaken to maintain and strengthen the
integrity and authority of the NPT. The current review
process must be the focus of our attention towards that end.


B. The Second and Third Session of the Preparatory Committee
must be made best use of for preparing the ground for a
successful 2010 Review Conference. To this end, it is of
utmost importance to rekindle a sense of common purpose in
the international community. The credibility of the NPT
requires that all States Parties join forces and closely work
together on the basis of a shared respect for the fundamental
bargain underlying the treaty, i.e. the firm relationship
that the treaty establishes between nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation. Indeed, seen from a purely practical point
of view, there is a clear interdependence between
non-proliferation and disarmament: proliferation threats
reduce the prospect for progress on disarmament whilst at the
same time a lack of disarmament momentum is liable to boost
proliferation risks.


C. In order to bring about the required sense of common
purpose, it seems of particular importance to develop a joint
vision and to reassert the commitment to the ultimate goal of
a nuclear weapon free world. This vision was also conjured up
in the influential Wall Street Journal op-eds that George P.
Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn
published on 4 January 2007 and 15 January 2008.
Realistically, this vision can only be realized through an
incremental process, which will require patience and time.
And as rightly pointed out in the 2007 Wall Street Journal
op-ed: "Without the bold vision, the actions will not be
perceived as fair and urgent. Without the actions, the vision
will not be perceived as realistic or possible."


D. At the fist session of the Preparatory Committee in 2007
it was possible to take necessary procedural decisions for
the review process. However, despite a constructive and
conciliatory tone, the positions reflected in the substantive
debates often seemed to be entrenched along familiar lines.
Setting our eyes on the 2010 Review Conference, we now need
to adopt a result orientated approach. Such an approach
should recognize the results of and confirm the commitments
undertaken at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. These
commitments must continue to be considered as relevant and
binding; failure to do so would call into question the very
sense and purpose of review conferences and undermine

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confidence in the good faith of states parties and in the
viability and dependability of multilateral agreements. At
the same time, however, it would be nave and unrealistic to
ignore the developments since 2000. Merely dwelling on past
disappointments and deploring shortcomings in the
implementation of past agreements does not provide guidance
for the way forward. Instead our efforts should be focused on
developing a forward looking approach, to establish a "New
NPT Implementation Baseline."


E. The "New NPT Implementation Baseline" should consist of a
comprehensive but at the same time realistic double track
approach, reflecting the fundamental bargain underpinning the
NPT. It should be geared towards, on the one hand,
strengthening the non-proliferation commitment of the NPT
and, on the other hand, instilling a new momentum into the
process of nuclear disarmament. The approach to be taken
should be ambitious but not too ambitious. To build
confidence and to testify to a common sense of purpose it
should also provide for the reaffirmation of guiding
principles and basic commitments pertaining to the NPT (i.a.
recognition of the NPT providing the normative basis for all
non-proliferation and disarmament efforts; acknowledgment of
the interdependence between the NPT's three pillars;
commitment to the equal rights and obligations paradigm and a
joint vision).


F. The NON-PROLIFERATION TRACK could include the following
tasks and objectives:
(i) a clear commitment to compliance and determined support
for the diplomatic efforts aimed at solving the pressing
regional proliferation risks, in particular Iran and North
Korea;
(ii) improvement of verification, in particular through
making the IAEA Additional Protocol the new verification
standard of the NPT;
(iii) effective prevention of any misuse of civilian nuclear
programmes for military ends, in particular through a
solution to the risks posed by the nuclear fuel cycle;
(iv) development of a joint understanding on "withdrawal"
(Article X of the NPT);
(v) incorporation of UNSC Res. 1540 into the NPT context
("institutionalizing of 1540") defining obligations and best
practice guidelines as well as committing i.a. to assistance
regarding the establishment of effective national export
controls, the safeguarding of nuclear materials and the
adoption of national implementation laws with a view on
preventing terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons
and fissile materials;
(vi) strengthening the role of the UN Security Council as the
final arbiter on the consequences of non-compliance.


G. The SECOND TRACK regarding nuclear disarmament should in
particular include endeavours to:
(i) overcome the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament
and restart substantial work on various items on its agenda
(including negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
- FMCT; a stepping stone towards the commencement of FMCT
negotiations could consist of a political declaration of all
nuclear weapon states, de facto nuclear weapon states and
important non-nuclear weapon states, which have the capacity
to produce weapons usable materials; such a declaration would
include a fissile material cut-off commitment and a
commitment to enter into negotiations on a treaty);
(ii) provide an impetus for the continuation of the dialogue
between Russia and the United States on strategic nuclear
weapons and a follow-up to the START I and SORT treaties;
(iii) promote and establish an incremental arms control
approach to non-strategic nuclear weapons;
(iv) promote the early entry into force of the CTBT and
reaffirm the maintenance of a complete moratorium of nuclear
weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions,
pending the achievement of the entry into force of the CTBT
(realistically interim solutions should be explored like a
commitment by all NPT partners to sign the CTBT and a formal
endorsement of the CTBTO verification system);
(v) establish other commitments in implementation of the
"cessation of the nuclear arms race"-obligation contained in

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Article VI of the NPT (e.g. establishment of accountability
and reporting obligations, capping of nuclear arsenals);
(vi) recommit to existing security assurances and explore
ways for formalizing them; pursue determined efforts to
bringing all existing NWFZ into force.

End text of German working paper.


13. (U) Political Officer Ken Kero is Embassy Berlin's main
point of contact on NPT issues (keroka@state.gov, tel.
49-(0)30-8305-2180). His back-up is
Political-Military/External Affairs Chief Bill Moeller
(moellerwe@state.gov, tel. 49-(0)30-8305-2173).
Koenig