Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BERLIN1569
2009-12-10 10:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

GERMAN-HOSTED CFE SEMINAR FORESHADOWS MAJOR PUSH

Tags:  KCFE PARM PREL MARR NATO GM RU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6032
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1578
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0436
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001569 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL MARR NATO GM RU
SUBJECT: GERMAN-HOSTED CFE SEMINAR FORESHADOWS MAJOR PUSH
ON CFE AS FOLLOW-ON TO START AGREEMENT

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR GEORGE GLASS. REASONS: 1.4
(B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001569

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: KCFE PARM PREL MARR NATO GM RU
SUBJECT: GERMAN-HOSTED CFE SEMINAR FORESHADOWS MAJOR PUSH
ON CFE AS FOLLOW-ON TO START AGREEMENT

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR GEORGE GLASS. REASONS: 1.4
(B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The German MFA hosted on November 25-26 a
seminar on conventional arms control in Europe (CFE),
continuing a series of Berlin seminars that are ostensibly
designed to stimulate creative thinking about how to overcome
the current CFE stalemate. This seminar drew representatives
from more than 30 countries and organizations, including NATO
and the OSCE, but a few key countries, most notably Turkey,
were not present. The seminar speakers this time around were
mostly academics and researchers, several of whom
provocatively asserted that it had been a serious mistake to
link resolution of "local conflicts" (i.e., Georgia and
Moldova) to implementation of a "strategic agreement" like
the Adapted CFE Treaty. While the German MFA certainly
supports finding some way around the Istanbul commitments to
get the Russians back on board with the CFE regime, Arms
Control Commissioner Peter Gottwald generally hewed to the
NATO line in his closing statement, underscoring that the
Parallel Actions Package "as it was agreed by all NATO Member
States and the Russian Federation" remains the best way to
achieve a breakthrough. END SUMMARY.

GERMAN PROVOCATEURS


2. (C) Among the more provocative speakers was Wolfgang
Richter of the German Institute for International and
Security Affairs (SWP),who in giving an historical analysis
of the security situation in Europe from the creation the
CSCE to the end of A/CFE negotiations in 1999, criticized the
linkage inherent in the 1999 Istanbul commitments. He
claimed that this linkage had allowed two "small regional
conflicts" to dictate the fate of a much more important
strategic agreement. He argued that arms control agreements
should stand on their own and not be used a lever to achieve
other political goals. No one would have ever suggested
linking implementation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) to fulfillment of human rights obligations, but this

was exactly the kind of linkage the Istanbul commitments had
made. He was similarly critical of flank limits, claiming
that the U.S. Congress had insisted on these, thereby
reducing USG flexibility. Richter said while the CFE had
been adapted several times during the 1990s, that process had
regretfully stopped after 1999.


3. (C) Continuing in the same vein as Richter, Hans-Joachim
Schmidt of the Frankfurt Peace Research Institute argued that
going forward with ratification of the A/CFE would improve
security and confidence in the South Caucasus and the Moldova
by providing greater information and transparency on Russian
forces. Even more explicitly than Richter, he called for
ending the linkage between Georgia/Moldova and CFE, arguing
that it would end up "destroying" the arms control regime.
In a later panel, Lithuanian MFA Policy Planning Director
Robertas Rosinas countered the German line of argumentation
on the overriding importance of CFE, noting that arms control
should be a means to an end and not an end in and of itself.
Without naming names, but clearly referring to Russia, he
also said that arms control should also not be used "to
acquire new or maintain old spheres of influence."

THE RUSSIAN LINE


4. (C) Giving a surprisingly balanced view, Andrej Zagorski
of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations
pointed out CFE is no longer serving the purpose it was
created for -- namely, preventing a large-scale surprise
attack -- since almost every CFE state, including Russia, is
far below the ceilings for treaty-limited equipment (TLE).
He acknowledged that the other important purpose of the
treaty -- providing transparency through information exchange
-- was being severely limited by the Russian suspension. He
said he was "increasingly pessimistic" about saving CFE since
none of the conceivable options seemed viable. He did not
think provisional application of the CFE would pass muster
with the U.S. Congress and even if it did, this would not
fully satisfy the Russians, whose "wish list" goes beyond
that (i.e., eliminating flank limits, etc.). Like other
speakers, Zagorski suggested one potentially promising way
forward would be to flesh out the commitment in the 1997 NATO
Russia Founding Act not to deploy additional "substantial
combat forces" and make it applicable to Russia as well.

BERLIN 00001569 002 OF 002




5. (C) During his main intervention at the end of the
seminar, Anton Mazur, Head of the Russian MFA Conventional
Arms Control Division and the highest ranking Russian
government representative present, underscored a number of
well-known Russian positions. Regarding flank limits, he
argued that Russian objections were not just political, but
practical -- they would keep Russia from deploying sufficient
counterterrorism forces to the North Caucasus. On TLE, Mazur
said Russia was not demanding strict parity with NATO, but
complained that NATO countries all together were now entitled
to 25,000 tanks, more than four times Russia's ceiling. He
complained that Russia had tabled a proposal more than a year
ago on negotiating a definition of "substantial combat
forces," but that only one partner had responded. He also
noted that the Russian aide-memoire circulated earlier this
year had outlined in detail Moscow's views and ideas for
moving ahead. "We are prepared for a detailed discussion on
each of these issues," he said. "The problem is that our
partners are not." He pushed for the Joint Consultative
Group (JCG) in Vienna to discuss these issues, and not to be
relegated to handling technical questions. He emphasized
that "time was ticking" to save the treaty and that Russia
was "getting used to" living without it.

GERMAN OFFICIALS HEW TO NATO POSITION


6. (C) In prepared remarks to conclude the seminar (full text
emailed to EUR/RPM),Gottwald argued against seeing the CFE
Treaty just from an historical perspective, noting that the
CFE is "still very much needed today" because it "provides
the only legally binding information, verification and
limitation system we have in Europe." He also made a
connection between conventional arms control and substrategic
nuclear weapons, noting -- clearly with Russia in mind --
that "a perceived conventional inferiority may nourish claims
to seek compensation with substrategic nuclear weapons." He
generally hewed to the agreed NATO line on promoting the
Parallel Actions Package, but also called for a "creative and
flexible approach" in finding a way out of the CFE crisis.

COMMENT


7. (C) Germany appears to be ramping up for a major push on
CFE early next year to take advantage of the good will and
momentum expected from successful completion of START
negotiations. The Germans sincerely believe that CFE is the
cornerstone of European security and that its passing would
be a major blow to arms control -- even though almost all the
CFE signatory states are already far below their TLE
ceilings. The Germans value CFE for its information-sharing
and verification provisions, and also see it as critical for
realizing their ambitions on nuclear arms control. They
believe that once the CFE regime is back in place, it will
create transparency and confidence, thereby decreasing
Russian incentives to maintain its large stockpile of
tactical nuclear weapons. That in turn, they believe, will
make it much easier to get NATO concurrence on withdrawal of
remaining NATO tactical nukes in Germany, a key goal of the
new coalition government.
MURPHY