Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BERLIN1455
2009-11-17 08:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

GERMANY: CAMPAIGN AGAINST NON-STRATEGIC NUKES TO

Tags:  PREL MNUC MARR PARM NATO KNNP KACT GM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0149
PP RUEHSL
DE RUEHRL #1455/01 3210818
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 170818Z NOV 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5789
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1486
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001455 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019
TAGS: PREL MNUC MARR PARM NATO KNNP KACT GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY: CAMPAIGN AGAINST NON-STRATEGIC NUKES TO
CONTINUE; SUPPORTS CFE CONCESSIONS

Classified By: Pol M/C George Glass for reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001455

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019
TAGS: PREL MNUC MARR PARM NATO KNNP KACT GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY: CAMPAIGN AGAINST NON-STRATEGIC NUKES TO
CONTINUE; SUPPORTS CFE CONCESSIONS

Classified By: Pol M/C George Glass for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary. On November 10 MFA Arms Control Chief Peter
Gottwald told the Ambassador that Germany would continue to
engage with Belgium and the Netherlands in advance of a
broader NATO discussion over the removal of non-strategic
nuclear weapons from Germany. Gottwald insisted that
tactical nukes in Germany were of no practical value and
that, if efforts through NATO stalled, FM Westerwelle might
feel pressed to nudge the process along via public comments.
On CFE, Gottwald said Russia was no longer willing to make
major concessions to secure full ratification of the Adapted
CFE Treaty. In order to make progress, he called on NATO to
reconsider CFE cornerstones such as the Istanbul Commitments.
Specifically, Gottwald said Germany would continue to insist
on "core elements" of the Istanbul Commitments but would
support breaking any direct linkage between these and A/CFE
ratification. End summary.


NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS
--------------


2. (C) Gottwald insisted that Germany was not "on a
missionary campaign" against non-strategic nuclear weapons
and was not pushing others in Europe to remove these from
their territory. Moreover, Germany did not want to undermine
NATO solidarity with regards to Article 5; however, Gottwald
said that, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, it was
increasingly difficult to justify Germany's nuclear share to
the general public. He claimed that all political parties
were willing to pursue a removal of nuclear weapons from
Germany but reiterated that officials would press for this
within NATO and not act unilaterally.


3. (C) Gottwald said FM Westerwelle's first talks in
Washington regarding NSNW had gone very well, but that the
MFA recognized the need to also broach the issue repeatedly
with other allies. He predicted that Turkey might be most

averse to Germany's push, but believed that Belgium and the
Netherlands would be sympathetic -- though Gottwald said he
did not expect these to be at the forefront. Germany, he
said, would continue discussions with Dutch and Belgian
officials as well as undertake talks with Poland -- which
could feel particularly affected by the removal of NSNW from
Germany. Within NATO, Germany would push to revisit the
issue of Europe-based nuclear forces in the new NATO
Strategic Concept.


GERMANY'S WAY FORWARD ON CFE TREATY
--------------


4. (C) Gottwald re-emphasized that Germany wants to regain
traction on the CFE treaty which, he complained, had been
stagnant for a decade and severely undermined by Russia's
near two-year suspension of information exchange. In order
to kick-start the process, Gottwald said NATO should
reconsider the traditional cornerstones of our CFE
negotiations -- specifically with regard to Russia's
implementation of its Istanbul commitments. For its part,
Germany would continue to insist on "core elements" of the
Istanbul Commitments -- Gottwald did not specify which ones
-- but would stop linking these to ratification of the
Adapted CFE Treaty. Gottwald emphasized that Germany had, so
far, only discussed its revised approach with USG officials.


5. (C) Germany wants to see successful U.S.-Russian
negotiations on a post-START agreement this December in hopes
that it could spur progress on CFE. Gottwald said that we
should press Russia to show some good will by resuming its
information exchange responsibilities. In return, he said
the allies could offer Russia a discussion to define the term
"substantial combat forces" in the Adapted CFE Treaty.
Gottwald told us that Germany is allowing for a reflection
time on its proposed way forward but plans to start engaging
more actively in December.


6. (C) Gottwald was disappointed that Germany was not able to
build much momentum behind CFE after the MFA-organized
conference in June. He reminded us that Germany has
organized an experts meeting in late November to keep the
discussion going and exchange thoughts on key issues such as
the CFE flank regime.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Gottwald's assertion that "all" political parties

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would pursue the removal of nuclear assets from German soil
glosses over the fact that Chancellor Merkel's Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) has been a traditional proponent of
Germany's nuclear share. Nevertheless, CDU politicians have
been notably quiet on this front -- first, out of caution
about supporting a policy that could be changed in the
ongoing Nuclear Posture Review and secondly, on the
expectation that NATO allies -- most notably the U.S. -- will
eventually pull FM Westerwelle back into line, assuming the
current policy remains unchanged. In that sense, Gottwald's
point is correct since, for now, politicians are aligning
into two camps: those actively opposed to the continued
deployment of nuclear weapons in Germany, believing that the
winds of change are blowing their way, and those willing to
stay clear of the debate in hopes that outside forces will
intervene. End comment.
MURPHY