CWC BWC CLOSE ALLIES MEETING SEPTEMBER 28-29, 2009

UNCLAS BERLIN 001224

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL, GENEVA FOR BWC DEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC OPCW CBW GM
SUBJECT: CWC BWC CLOSE ALLIES MEETING SEPTEMBER 28-29, 2009

REF: STATE 100317


1. (SBU) Summary: Meetings of Close Allies have always been
valued for providing a useful venue for a frank exchange of
views on, and an opportunity to coordinate approaches to,
biological and chemical weapons-related issues. This meeting
showed the need to re-invigorate the process, from the
perspective of &lighting a fire8 under some of our
counterparts, to employing different approaches to work key
issues, such as the planned in advance &break-out8
sessions on CWC incapacitants, and the scheduled session on
BWC CBMs. Close Allies could also be used to coordinate on
related issues, e.g. BTEX and Global Partnership. Exchanges
on biological weapons demonstrated a shared satisfaction in
the August Meeting of Experts, common objectives for the
December Meeting of States Parties, and common concerns about
the NAM and Iranian Article X proposals (that would mandate
assistance and impact detrimentally on export controls),and
how to handle them. Approaches to BWC CBMs were reviewed and
additional discussions on the margins of the December meeting
were agreed. The UK also advocated initiating Review
Conference planning soon. U.S. recalled BWC policy decisions
to date, made clear opposition to the Iranian and NAM
proposals regarding Article X, and on establishing a
suggested core group for RevCon preparations. On CWC issues,
the critical decision on the future Director-General was
hamstrung by two members having candidates, both of whom
believe they have strong support. Allies shared views on
Iraq, CW destruction, the draft 2010 budget, industry issues,
national implementation, and the future of OPCW with little
new information and few new ideas. Close Allies tentatively
agreed to April 7-8 for the next meeting, to be hosted by the
U.S. in Washington, D.C. End Summary.

BWC Meeting of Experts (August 2009)

2. (SBU) Close Allies agreed that the August 24-28 BWC
Experts Group Meeting exceeded expectations; the linkage
between health and security issues had been undisputed. The
presentations from all quarters were insightful, the number
of delegates sent from capitals with disease surveillance
expertise and the vibrant interaction throughout the week
where direct &assistance8 was being worked out more than
offset Iranian and Cuban (NAM) rhetoric about the need for
greater assistance under Art. X and the need for greater
technology transfer. There is a great deal of substance
coming from the meeting that the December Meeting of States
Parties can draw from for its Final Report, which is
traditionally a set of agreed guidelines based on expert
discussions and a compilation of the ideas expressed that the
BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) distributed at the end
of the Experts Meeting.

3. (SBU) All shared concerns about the NAM and Iranian
proposals regarding Article X (free-flow of S&T transfers)
and export controls, and how to counter them at the December
Meeting (reftel). Dels noted that the Iranians weren,t able
to garner NAM consensus for their paper, which states that
every article of the BWC &bears the same value and
importance.8 U.S. HOD noted the Iranians had attacked
cooperation between States Parties (U.S.) and non-State
Parties (Israel) as a way the non-States Parties &may
strengthen their clandestine biological programs.8 The
Chinese supported the purpose of both papers; there was no
other direct support. German Expert Beck noted the Iranian
complaint about lack of access for researchers and surmised
the &deemed export control8 efforts are having their effect.

4. (SBU) Dels agreed there was a general recognition by the
NAM of the need to strengthen national health infrastructure.
Algeria, India, Kenya, Nigeria, and Pakistan publically
asked for assistance. Unexpectedly, there was little
resistance to the direct linkage to implementation of the
WHO,s International Health Regulations (IHRs). The WHO IHR
Workshop on August 21 and the distributed report was credited
with delivering the necessary background for all BWC dels to
be aware of the intent and timelines for the IHRs. There was
recognition that coordination amongst even the group needs to
be better (e.g., uncoordinated US-Georgia and UK-Georgia
presentations).

BWC Policy Roll-out/Interest in Review Conference Preparations


5. (SBU) UK Rep suggested that Close Allies initiate as
early as December a discussion on preparations for the Review
Conference, recognizing that political maneuvering would
start as early as this year,s Meeting of States Parties. He
also noted that that this year,s topic didn,t address BWC
compliance, an issue raised by others in UK bilats on the
margins of the MXP. In addition, some dels opined that
intersessional issues to date will not provide sufficient
substance for 2011.

6. (SBU) U.S. Rep recalled U.S. policy decisions to date
(shared with Close Allies on margins of August Expert,s
meeting),including a decision not to return to Protocol
negotiations. Drawing on guidance reftel, he elaborated U.S.
concerns with the NAM and Iranian proposals related to
Article X. In response to UK,s suggestion that Close Allies
begin to focus on preparations for the Review Conference,
U.S. Rep also signaled U.S. interest in working with a &core
group.8 It was agreed that this question, among others,
could be discussed at a German hosted close Allies meeting in
December on the margins of the Meeting of States Parties.

December Meeting of States Parties


7. (SBU) Drawing in guidance reftel, U.S. Rep summarized
objectives for the December Meeting. Allies agreed on
desirable outcomes from the meeting, and Germany added
&sustainability8 as a theme. Those States receiving
assistance need to be able to sustain the work initiated.
All also shared concerns about the handling of the NAM
proposals on Article X and Iran,s proposals on Export
Control and Transfer Denials at the December meeting.
Germany recalled that the proposals were outside the 2009
mandate; the agenda item was narrowly circumscribed to
discuss capacity-building in the context of disease
surveillance. Nonetheless, China, the NAM, and Iran all
signaled an interest in export control discussions at the
December meeting. France suggested focusing, as at the
Expert,s Meeting, on concrete proposals and the actual
volume of assistance being offered globally. UK suggested
that the points about export control will require rebuttal at
an appropriate time, and all agreed BWC Chairman Grinius
should be sensitized to problems with the proposals, as
outside the mandated agenda item, and on substantive grounds.
Germany offered to prepare a working paper identifying all
countries with legislation regarding export controls, as a
number of developing nations have now implemented such
legislation. UK also suggested working with developing
nations that are now recipients of assistance, to counter the
more radical proposals.

BWC Confidence-Building Measures


8. (U) CBMs. German Expert summarized the Geneva Forum
August workshop on CBMs, and circulated a matrix capturing
the views of Close Allies on several CBM questions he had
posed some months ago, requesting U.S. views. U.S. Deloffs
recalled the U.S. interest in enhancing participation in the
CBM declarations, noting that it was reviewing ideas related
to making the process of such submissions more user friendly.
Explaining that the U.S. was working on how to make its own
submissions electronic, U.S. offered to work with others on
such a project, which was welcomed. The U.S. hoped to be
able to provide more detailed views on CBMs for the matrix in
the near future. However, the U.S. suggested that before
going too far down the road, it would be useful to know what
views of non-Western delegations were on the CBMs. France and
UK elaborated upon their respective papers. Regarding the UK
suggested &new proposals,8 they explained that they were
brainstorming ideas, rather than advocacy proposals, and
acknowledged that new proposals raise questions of political
feasibility. German Expert cautioned against being overly
ambitious, favoring a modest approach focused on making
submissions easier and clarifying existing CBMs.

9. (SBU) CBM Next Steps: The four agreed to exchange views
on the margins of the December BWC Meeting of States Parties
in Geneva, prior to the second Geneva Forum hosted workshop
on December 12. The U.S. offered a CBMs &break-out8 session
during the Spring Close Allies meeting it will host; others
agreed. Germany will host a third CBM Workshop in Berlin in
late spring/early summer 2010.

Implementation Support Unit


10. (SBU) ISU. France expressed interest in using the ISU to
assist even more with CBMs, perhaps to issue reminders, and
seek clarification regarding CBMs from States Parties. The
UK noted that it had circulated a paper addressing an
expanded ISU role. Germany said that while interested in
addressing the ISU role, it should not be linked with CBMs,
but rather with overall BWC objectives. On the margins,
French Rep asked U.S. Deloff for U.S views on the ISU, and
its possible expansion. U.S. Deloff noted that the U.S. had
yet to address this question, but that the ISU,s roll was,
and should be, directly related to its functions and any
decisions the Parties take at the 2011 Review Conference that
might require the assistance of an expanded ISU. The U.S.
sought a reinvigorated BWC program, which might call for a
small and careful ISU expansion. For now, we were pleased
with the work of the ISU, and with the fact that it works
within its circumscribed mandate.

Universality


11. (SBU) Dels exchanged information on where national and
ISU efforts stand. Despite the fact that all non-States
parties deemed to be capable of joining the BWC have been
divided up between the four, responses to demarches have had
little effect. The real movement is coming from the ISU
efforts on the ground, particularly in the South Pacific
where the Cook Islands accession has motivated the Marshall
Islands, Nauru and Niue to push the accession process. U.S.
del relayed the ISU view that the universality push will
likely bring 5-6 new States Parties on board in the next six
months. The U.S. made contacts with the Tanzanian and
Haitian delegates in August and will follow-through with a
demarche to all countries listed here to provide the
necessary political push to help keep their efforts moving
forward.

Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX)


12. (SBU) Dels agreed on the value of maintaining an active
BTEX process, although Russian push-back and ineffective G-8
Presidencies in the last two years had let the process
stagnate. A policy discussion on the future of BTEX is
necessary; both the U.S. and UK offered to host such a
meeting on the margins of the December BWC meetings. Canada
will become G-8 President in 2010 and may wish to take the
leading role in rejuvenating the process. They are
undertaking a large push for more resources behind the Global
Partnership; this includes on bio. All agreed that expanding
the membership in the group was not helpful, although the
group could certainly do more outreach once the purpose and
goals of this group are more clearly defined. No one
expected bio issues to rise any higher on the agenda of the
Nonproliferation Director,s Group (NPDG) given the plethora
of pressing nuclear issues. (There was no discussion of
moving the group away from the G-8 NPDG process and into
Lyon-Roma, which had been the preferred venue for the Allies
in the past few years.) UK MOD rep (Harrision) pointed to
the overlap between the BWC, BTEX and Global Partnership
where many of the same subjects are being discussed; there
should be an effort to have them work in sync.

13. (SBU) Responding to the U.S. suggestion that more needs
to be undertaken in the prevention side. Beck opined that
protecting the food chain, law enforcement and more emphasis
on how intelligence is used to forecast an event would
certainly be considered in support of national security.
Mikulak asked that all consider the prevention aspects in
prep for a December discussion with the wider group.

Synthetic Biology


14. (U) U.S. Rep (Mikulak) briefed the group in general terms
on the draft U.S. screening procedures for gene synthesis
orders. He noted the complimentarity of customer screening
and sequence screening, as well as the importance of a
government point of contact for companies to call if they
have identified an order of concern. German expert (Beck)
said that German regulations provided a strong foundation,
but that designating a law enforcement point of contact was
problematic in the German federal system. All expressed
interest in receiving copies of the draft procedures when
they are published in the Federal Register in late 2009.

EU Joint Actions


15. (SBU) When queried on details of the BWC and WHO EU Joint
Actions (JA),Beck chuckled and said the BWC JA was a
political and organizational mistake.8 The process of
hiring the two people to implement the BWC JA had consisted
of the European Commission and UN personnel officials going
back-and-forth on who would advertise the positions. The
compromise is that the applications process had been open to
all and EU persons would be chosen. Anyone starting fresh
will need start-up time to learn the intricacies of the CBM
process and national implementation measures before
attempting to promulgate these measures. There will be five
workshops on national implementation and universality in the
remaining months of the JA. U.S. asked which countries had
applied for the eight &scholarships8 having heard from the
Jordanians, Kenyans and Nigerians that they intended to
apply. Dels were awaiting the upcoming &CODUN8 for the
answer from the EC WMD coordinator,s office. U.S.
reiterated its concern over &buying off8 staff to help the
mandated three-person ISU; what is to keep the Iranian,s
from doing the same. The WHO JA will consist of 20 months of
regional workshops on biosafety and biosecurity with
particular focus on South East Asia. Again, specific details
will be forthcoming from the CODUN meeting. EU member states
have been kept out of the loop on EC-WHO and EC-ISU
negotiations.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

DESTRUCTION

16. (SBU) The Quad discussion on CW destruction focused on
how to manage the 2012 deadline and ensure a balanced
approach, the Brazilian proposal for the EC Chairman to have
consultations and report to the February Executive Council
session, and the likelihood of Russia meeting the destruction
deadline.

17. (SBU) Managing 2012: Burkhart stated that any special
Conference of States Parties on destruction will require
advanced planning. The UK agreed and added that in late 2010
State Parties will need to address the issue, in some regard,
in order to determine the budget for 2011. Harrison added
that it is time to have a discussion on 2012. To date the EU
position has been to urge possessor states to destroy CW as
quickly as possible, but he assessed that this position will
only last so long. At some point credibility of the
Convention comes into question. It is clear that Russian and
the United States have made great efforts to accelerate, but
at some point a discussion needs to occur on how to address

2012.

18. (SBU) Brazilian proposal: US HOD noted the recent
Brazilian proposal for the Chairman have consultations on the
feasibility of meeting the destruction deadline. He said the
Brazilian approach seemed a constructive way to hold
discussions; this approach could help prevent a damaging
venting on the issue if discussion was suppressed. He went
on to say that there have been past discussions by some State
Parties to amend the treaty or make a technical change,
neither of which are suitable options. Burkhart agreed that
the Brazilian proposal may be a good mechanism to prompt a
discussion early rather than later. France added that Brazil
probably will raise his proposal at the October EC session
and that there may be discussion of a facilitator.

19. (SBU) Russia: Germany expressed doubt on Russia meeting
its 45 percent deadline on time, adding that it may be a
close call. US HOD said that he thinks Russia will make the
45 percent deadline in December 2009, but then the real
question will be when they acknowledge that they will not
meet their 100 percent deadline. The UK stated that Russia
has consistently had a high level of confidence that they
would meet the 45 percent destruction deadline. He added
that in the Destruction Informals, State Parties only hear
the Russian side of the program and its national position.
The UK proposed having Donor countries provide short
presentations during the Destruction Informals before the EC
session to present a balanced view of what assistance Russia
is receiving at its various facilities. Germany agreed, but
cautioned that Russia may use it as a platform to criticize
foreign aid. The United States fully supported the UK
proposal and added that Russia would blame donors with or
without the presentations. The UK suggested that donors
consult in The Hague prior to the Destruction informals.

IRAQ: Bilateral with Germany


20. (SBU) Before the Quad meeting started, the US Delegation
met with Dr. Andreas Pfaffernoschke (Germany) to exchange
information on U.S. and German CWC-related assistance to
Iraq. After the July Executive Council, GOI approached
Germany on possible assistance pertaining to the Muthanna
Bunkers, particularly on determining the contents and the
condition of the bunkers. GOI sees the bunkers as a priority
in moving forward. Germany expressed concern about Bunker 13
due to its unknown state of its contents, possible rocket
fuel, and unexploded ordinances. As such, the German
proposal to Iraq will consist of equipment and training for
an air quality sampling and air composition assessment. From
there, Germany believes that a proposal could be put together
for robotics to do an interior survey of the bunkers. The
German Rep indicated a number of issues with any German
assistance and future Iraqi efforts: the need to determine
appropriate security (which should be a precondition of any
work); a determination on whether or not work will be done
E
under the supervision of the OPCW; and additional information
on the bunkers, to include where drilling may be possible to
gain air samples and what known conditions exist inside the
bunkers that could prevent robotics from conducting mapping.
Although Germany is willing to develop a plan for an
intrusive survey and provide training to carry it out,
Germany does not intend to offer assistance to conduct the
actual assessment. Pfaffernoschke will meet Iraqi expert
al-Saraa in Amman on October 6 to discuss these issues.

21. (SBU) The United States overviewed the upcoming meetings
in Washington with GOI on 8-9 October to exchange information
on GOI,s CWC implementation and to discuss the Muthanna
Bunkers. Particularly, the U.S. DoD Rep highlighted the
presentations that will take place on the bunkers: the
overview briefing on what we assess to be the current state
of the bunkers and bunker contents and general considerations
that could be applied to any intrusive bunker survey. The
German Rep was keen on receiving any information that the
United States deems applicable to the German offer of
assistance. Both countries agreed to exchange readouts of
their respective meetings with the GOI, possibly on the
margins of the October Executive Council meeting.

Iraq: Quad Discussion


22. (SBU) Both Burkhart and Beik commented on GOI,s current
effort in The Hague to solicit support for EC membership
France, followed by other Quad countries agreed that GOI,s
membership is an issue for the Asian Group and not one that
should be left to the Conference of States Parties. France
added that any lobbying they could do would likely be
counterproductive. The UK agreed, adding that the Asian
Group should be ultimately responsible.

23. (SBU) The UK highlighted the National Authority training
that they are co-hosting with the United States in Liverpool
for the GOI. Harrison added that it will be focused on
industrial inspections. The US HOD informed the Quad of the
meetings in Washington next week that will have GOI
representatives from across their interagency. He noted the
communication challenges that we have witnessed between
Baghdad and The Hague.

24. (SBU) The US responded to Burkart,s question on the
South African proposal for a working group on future cases
similar to the Iraq recovered munitions scenario by stating
that it would proceed cautiously and that the objective of
the working group needs to be made clear. The US further
noted that the South Africans will continued to push this
issue at the OPCW.

25. (SBU) In terms of Iraqi assistance, the UK stated they
would be willing to provide training. The US stated they
were asked by the Director General to provide security for
the OPCW delegation,s visit to Iraq but noted they would
only provided security if the request came from Iraq.

26. (SBU) Discussions regarding the letter the from DG noting
past transfers to Iraqi were limited with each participant
stating they were still investigating the issue with the
exception of the UK, which did not receive a letter.

27. (SBU) The U.S. stated they will be advising the Iraqi
delegation on assistance when they visit the United States.
The US also discussed the needed investigation of the bunkers
of Muthana and that a discussion is needed of what needs to
be done there. A report on the recovered munitions is going
to the Executive Council soon.

IRAN


28. (SBU) On Iran, UK Rep Rampling stated that recent events
in Tehran have affected Iranian actions at OPCW. Although
the nuclear and chemical issues should not be mixed, the
broader context of what is happening on the nuclear side will
likely have some impact at OPCW. French Rep Raharinaivo
agreed that we should not mix issues but others may do so.
German OPCW PermRep Burkart noted that there is likely to be
a new Iranian Ambassador in The Hague before the CSP and that
the new Deputy is becoming more active over time.

DG SELECTION


29. (SBU) Discussion centered on process over the next few
weeks and whether the EC will be able to make a single choice
as agreed during the July EC. Rampling raised the question
of Ambassador Dani,s role complicating the process. Mikulak
outlined the Chairman,s plans for a straw poll, or possibly
two, before the EC, but raised the question of what happens
should there still be three candidates at the end of the EC
session. Burkart noted the importance of confidence in the
Chairman and his ability to convince candidates to withdraw.
Raharinaivo noted indications that Dani might consider the
Deputy DG position in withdrawing from the DG race; however,
others noted that decision does not lie with the Council but
with the new DG and that Dani is now known for strong
managerial skills. Rampling emphasized the likely necessity
in the new future of governments approaching the Algerian
government to withdraw Dani, but said that countries with
candidates would not be able to make that approach. As all
eyes turned to the French, Raharinaivo stated that the French
delegation was ¬ best placed8 to do so.

30. (SBU) UK and German dels exuded confidence in their
respective candidates and in private conversations with U.S.
and French dels dismissed suggestions that they &work out a
deal.8
BUDGET:

31. (SBU)Burkart reported that in the first wrap-up meeting
for the budget held the day before, the only apparent
stumbling block remains the number of Other Chemical
Production Facilities (OCPFs). UK Rep Foggo noted the strong
defense that the DG had made for his inspections proposal,
the same proposal he had made for the 2009 budget and so not
one that he considers an increase in inspections, and
therefore not requiring discussion in the industry cluster.
U.S. Delrep Beik said the budget meetings had an air of
&dj vu8 from the previous year, with virtually the same
budget and same contentious items. Mikulak noted that the
Chinese had taken a new tack in his meeting the week before,
stating that destruction would need to be completed before an
increase in industry inspections. Raharinaivo noted that the
increase is only two inspections and thought there was not
much to fight over.

INDUSTRY ISSUES


32. (SBU) All Quad participants expressed frustration over
the stalemated negotiations which have been underway for a
decade. Mikulak suggested putting the negotiation on hold
for a couple of years if a resolution could not be reached by
the end of the year (when the facilitator,s term will end).
Foggo (UK) considers that the Canadian proposal injected new
energy into the discussions, that the UK can support the
proposal, and that the UK sought the Quad,s views on it.
Ruthe (DE) and Raharinaivo (FR) consider the Canadian
proposal less than perfect. In particular, Pellay (FR) noted
that French law would probably have to be amended to
implement. (In a side bar conversation, Pellay also
commented that the Canadian proposal was illogical.) Mikulak
said the Canadian effort, and that while the U.S. is taking a
serious look at the Canadian proposal, the U.S. situation is
similar to that of France. Furthermore, the proposal has no
concentration threshold, which will result in each relevant
facility having to track its production levels (unlike all
other declaration regimes) to determine whether to declare.
Therefore, this proposal is not as simple as a straight
concentration threshold. The discussion ended with Foggo
(UK) noting that the Italian facilitator had not scheduled
any further sessions after next week,s industry
consultations and won,t unless a compromise looks possible.

FUTURE OF THE OPCW


33. (SBU)At Mikulak,s suggestion the Quad agreed it was a
good idea to individually approach the Director General in
regards to the DG creating and circulating a &legacy paper8
that would detail strategic issues States Parties should
consider for the OPCW,s future. This paper would assist in
initiating discussions among States Parties on the direction
of the OPCW. France noted that the turning point for the
OPCW,s focus to transition from destruction to
nonproliferation is nearing and the Quad needed to manage the
transition. Mikulak stated that this transition will impact
upcoming budgets and there needs to be a mechanism for
discussing strategic directions. The UK listed their focus
for the 2010 CSP which included: Science and technology (as
it relates to the TS),Training and Preparation for
Inspections of Alleged Use, and Experience within the TS.

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION


34. (SBU) The U.S. had added this item to the agenda, Mikulak
said, to stress its ongoing importance and encourage the TS
and governments to assist States Parties in their
implementation efforts. Burkart noted that the new
facilitator should be encouraged to draft a decision for the
CSP, as it was the last decision that resulted in the recent
comprehensive report by the TS to the Council on progress
made by countries working on legislation and establishing
procedures. Rampling agreed that the issue needs to be given
the prominence it deserves, and that a decision by the
Conference that makes permanent the requirement for an annual
TS report. Raharinaivo recalled the difficulty in getting a
decision on Article VII at last year,s CSP but agreed that
it is important to work toward that end.

Chemical Incapacitants


35. (SBU) As a follow-on to discussions, begun at the
previous meeting, about how best to address chemical
incapacitants within the context of the CWC, the allies
focused their attention on the overall threat of such
chemicals and those countries that may be pursuing research
and development efforts. The United States presented a
briefing entitled &Incapacitant Proliferation and Threat
Overview,8 which provided key points on the growing interest
in fentanyls and a country specific overview. The U.S.
briefing (given by Scott Brittain of DIA) concluded that
chemical incapacitants are currently not a threat to U.S. or
allied forces and are unlikely to be used in traditional
battlefield scenarios. Worldwide interest in fentanyls,
however, as evidenced by research publications will continue
to increase.

36. (SBU) German expert Beck, inquired about the increase in
publications on incapacitants (i.e., fentanyls),noting that
such chemicals have been known for decades. The German and
UK dels further noted the legitimate, medical uses for such
chemicals, albeit in smaller quantities. Delegations agreed
that the potential military interest in incapacitants in some
instances remain a serious issue that information should
continue to be monitored.

37. (SBU) UK MOD expert Harrison also read a short statement
that mirrored many of the U.S. observations and conclusions.
Although allies agreed that we should stay clear from trying
to define the term incapacitants or attempt to define the
scope of the term &law enforcement8, the UK did provide a
definition for the purposes of their presentation and
highlighted many of the same points in the U.S. presentation
and further noted that such chemicals were currently not a
threat to UK forces as well.

38. (SBU) The French delegation also welcomed the U.S.
presentation but admittedly had not looked closely at other
countries, interests. Rahanaivo was reluctant to give too
much significance to open source publications, which are
generally tied to commonly known applications (i.e.,
pharmaceutical). He further noted the need for the group to
continue to coordinate on this issue.

39. (SBU) The UK delegation noted inquiries made by their
Parliament on the issue of incapacitants. They also pointed
to studies by UK academics and the British Medical
Association as evidence of interest in the UK.

40. (SBU) Allies noted the value of these small group
discussions and agreed to continue to work closely together
to be prepared to manage this issue in the OPCW. UK expert
Harrison offered to prepare a brief paper on potential
options for transparency measures for the next close allies
meeting in Washington in April 2009.

Delegates


41. (U) France: Mr. Jacques Raharinaivo, MFA; MFA; Mr.
Frank Tecourt, MFA; Ms. Marie-Gaelle Robles, MFA: Mrs. Raja
Rabia,Deputy Representative, Permanent Representation to the
OPCW; Mr.Augustin Baulig, MOD; Mr. Delapschaidieu,MOD.

42. (U) Mr. Chris Rampling, FCO; Mr. Steve Crossman, FCO;
Mr. James Harrison, MOD; Dr. Jim McGilly, MOD; Dr. Lorna
Miller, MOD; Mr. Clive Rowland, MOD; Mr. John Foggo, DECC (NA
for the CWC); Mr. Karl Rodrigues, DECC.

43. (U) USA: Dr. Robert Mikulak, DOS; Ms. Jennie Gromoll,
DOS; Mr. Johnathan Beckett, DOS; Mrs. Janet Beik, Permanent
Representation to OPCW; Ms. Katharine Crittenberger, DOS; Mr.
Doug Brown, DOS; Mr. Damon Prather, DOS; Mr. Scott Brittain,
Defense Briefer; Mrs. Sarah Rodjom, DOD; Mr. Hugo Guevara,
U.S. Embassy Berlin.

44. (U) Germany: Ambassador Peter Gottwald, FFO; Mr. Roland
Grafe, FFO; Amb Werner Burkart,Permanent Representative to
OPCW; Dr. Holger Ruthe, FFO; Ms. Juliane Thummel, FFO; Dr.
Volker Beck, FFO; LtC Ewald Helmut Nau, MOD; LtC Nicholas
Keen, MOD.
Murphy