Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BELGRADE506
2009-06-12 13:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

SERBIA: VISA LIBERALIZATION MAY BE PRESSURE POINT

Tags:  PGOV PREL KVIR SR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBW #0506/01 1631358
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121358Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1362
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 0028
RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 000506 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KVIR SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA: VISA LIBERALIZATION MAY BE PRESSURE POINT
FOR PROGRESS ON KOSOVO

REF: A) BELGRADE 306 B) BRUSSELS 809

Classified By: Bradford Bell, Deputy Political Chief; reasons 1.4 (b, d
).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 000506

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KVIR SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA: VISA LIBERALIZATION MAY BE PRESSURE POINT
FOR PROGRESS ON KOSOVO

REF: A) BELGRADE 306 B) BRUSSELS 809

Classified By: Bradford Bell, Deputy Political Chief; reasons 1.4 (b, d
).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The Government of Serbia,s overwhelming desire to
secure visa liberalization with the EU is a pressure point
that could facilitate Serbia,s cooperation on Kosovo issues.
According to EU Special Representative in Belgrade Sorensen,
the GoS had lost its footing on Kosovo as a result of the
EU,s recent tough line on visa liberalization standards.
The GoS is now concerned that unless it is able to show that
Serbia is cooperating fully with the EU Rule of Law Mission
(EULEX),its goal of visa free travel to the EU may be
jeopardized. Serbia now seems to be scrambling to be
cooperative, and is close to signing an MOU on police
cooperation with EULEX, from which other substantive
cooperation could flow. In addition, internal Kosovo
Ministry squabbling is further weakening Serbia's negotiating
position with EULEX. Foreign Minister Jeremic, while still
pushing his international agenda on Kosovo, appears sidelined
on internal Kosovo issues. This may present an opportunity
for progress in Kosovo on police and customs. That trickle
of progress could lead to more cooperation, if the EU is able
to keep its finger on the right pressure point * Serbia,s
access to the EU. End Summary.

Visas: Serbia,s Incentive to Cooperate with EULEX
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Not wanting to jeopardize its goal of visa free
travel to the EU by the end of 2009, the GoS is looking to
cooperate substantively with EULEX. On June 8, Serbia,s
Ministry of Interior presented to EULEX a draft MOU which
would facilitate cooperation between the GoS and EULEX on
police, customs and intelligence sharing. EUSR Peter
Sorensen told us on June 10 that Serbia,s push for this MOU
began in earnest once it realized that without full
cooperation, EULEX would have to report to Brussels that
Serbia was unable to guarantee the security of its border
(which Serbia still considers a boundary line),an important
precondition for Schengen "White List" status and visa free
travel. He expected that EULEX would be able to accept the

MOU with minor changes.

Possible Progress in Police and Customs
--------------


3. (C) Sorensen said he expected that once implemented the
MOU could lead to substantive coordination between EULEX and
the GoS on the ground. The MOU would facilitate the sharing
of intelligence information regarding customs and border
activity. According to Sorensen, customs points in the North
(Gate 1 and 31) would need to be fully operational and EULEX
police would need to have a more robust presence in North
Kosovo in order for Serbia to fulfill its obligations under
the MOU.

Dacic Cooperative, Bogdanovic to an Extent
--------------


4. (C) Sorensen said the Interior Ministry (MOI),led by
Ivica Dacic, appeared willing to cooperate with EULEX and had
appointed Serbia,s Deputy Police Commander as EULEX,s MOI
point of contact. (Per reftel A, Interior Minister Ivica
Dacic of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) has strongly
tied himself to the goal of obtaining Schengen White List
status for Serbia, which involves sorting out the thorny
issue of the issuance of Serbian passports to residents of
Kosovo. Dacic has a strong incentive to cooperate with
EULEX, in part hoping to gain EU flexibility on the passport
issue.) Kosovo Minister Goran Bogdanovic was also playing a
more constructive role out of concern not to be blamed for
losing Serbia,s chance at White List status, Sorensen said.
This concern spurred Bogdanovic to take action in May against
a train which was carrying illicit fuel from Serbia into
Kosovo. Bogdanovic,s definitive action against the train
smugglers lead to threats against his family who still live
in Kosovo, Bogdanovic,s chief of staff Vlada Jovicic told us
on June 4. Sorensen readily admitted that Bogdanovic still
remained uncooperative in other areas, such as his insistence
on traveling officially to Kosovo and his June 3 statements
to parliamentarians that the GoS had not agreed to EULEX,s
partial return to customs posts in northern Kosovo. EULEX
sources, who have apprised us of their ongoing talks with the
Kosovo Ministry on this issue, say that there was mutual
agreement between EULEX and the GoS on the customs issue.


Jeremic Absent from Issue
--------------


5. (C) Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic appears to have removed
himself from internal Kosovo issues, choosing instead to
travel the globe beating his anti-Kosovo recognition drum and
harping on Serbia,s International Court of Justice strategy.
In the interim, Jeremic has left internal Kosovo issues to
his advisor Damjan Krnjovic-Miskovic, who appears to be
coordinating with Bogdanovic to make certain EULEX
cooperation moves ahead. Sorensen also said he received on
June 9 a commitment from Krnjovic-Miskovic that UNMIK no
longer needed to be present in EULEX and GoS meetings.
Jovicic told us on June 4 that the Kosovo Ministry had no
concerns about meeting alone with EULEX ) as they had done
in the past. Sorensen was optimistic that this would give
EULEX greater freedom to deal with the Serbian ministries
directly responsible for cooperation with EULEX, particularly
Interior and Justice.

Progress on Police, Customs, Then What?
--------------


6. (C) After securing greater cooperation on police and
customs through the MOU, judiciary would be the next area for
progress, but Sorensen was more sober and pragmatic on what
could be accomplished in that regard. Without a clear
understanding of the applicable law issue (whose law to
apply: Kosovo, UNMIK, or Serbian) it would be difficult to
move beyond removing the administrative backlog of cases in
Mitrovica. Looking even further down the field, Sorensen did
not see what incentive Serbia would have to cooperate on
other pending issues, such as decentralization or local
elections, which are scheduled for later this year.
Bogdanovic, however, realized Serbia must engage on
decentralization or the GoS could be further marginalized in
Kosovo, Sorensen said. Bogdanovic remained unwilling or
unable to meet with International Civilian Representative
Feith, Sorensen said.

Kosovo Ministry: Internal Divisions
--------------


7. (C) Internal divisions within the Kosovo Ministry have
also caused Serbia to lose its footing on Kosovo. Jovicic
told us that the divide between Minister Bogdanovic and State
Secretary Oliver Ivanovic continued to grow. Ivanovic was
making things difficult both within the Ministry and between
Serbia and the international community, Jovicic said.
Ivanovic,s frequent off the cuff remarks to the media had
eroded support from the international community, he added.
Jovicic admitted that the Ministry had little control over
Ivanovic, saying he did not know "what exactly Ivanovic was
up to." Sorensen said Ivanovic,s recent decision to
politically align himself with Nebojsa Covic of the
newly-resurrected Social Democratic Party had further
isolated Ivanovic, making DS and SPS the powerbrokers in the
Kosovo Ministry. Sorensen believed these mixed signals from
Belgrade could work to the advantage of institutions in
Kosovo, if Kosovo Serbs get sick of looking to the MoK for
guidance and chose instead to engage directly with the
Pristina government or the International Civilian Office.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Although Sorensen,s optimism may be premature, it
appears the EU may have found the right pressure point to
obtain greater cooperation from Serbia on Kosovo issues. The
GoS,s willingness to conclude this MOU, particularly Dacic's
interest, is an indication that Serbia,s political leaders
may now fear the inability to deliver visa free travel to
Serbian citizens more than they fear appearing "soft" on the
Kosovo issue. The EU may have finally seized upon a useful
carrot and stick, but even this tool has a limited lifespan.
Serbia will expect to be rewarded for its cooperation, and
will be bitterly disappointed if its flexibility on issues
such as police cooperation with EULEX does not lead to
flexibility from the EU on concerns about passport issuance.
Lack of success on the visa issue, a gut issue for many
Serbs, will leave the "For Europe" coalition, headed by
President Tadic, with little to show on progress toward
European integration. Tadic,s main political rival Tome
Nikolic, head of the Serbian Progressive Party (which broke
from the Radicals last year),already has told us this
"failure" will be his main campaign issue as he calls for new
elections. End Comment.

BRUSH