WITH CABINET NEGOTIATIONS STALLED, HARIRI HINTS AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000973

SIPDIS

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E.O. 1295: DECL: 08/28/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE SY SAIR IS
SUBJECT: WITH CABINET NEGOTIATIONS STALLED, HARIRI HINTS AT
BRINKMANSHIP

REF: BEIRUT 966

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The press and nearly all Embassy contacts have
declared a stalemate in the government formation process,
despite a series of public statements by major political
leaders that briefly indicated a move to break the deadlock.
Notably, wayward Druze leader Walid Jumblatt came out
strongly in support of Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri's
efforts to form a national unity cabinet "to confront any
possible Israeli aggression," which Hariri echoed by
remarking at an iftar, "Hizballah will be in the government
whether the enemy likes it or not," in response to Israeli
threats. Nonetheless, the pundits' pessimism is still
justified. The major internal obstacle is ostensibly the
Free Patriotic Movement's (FPM) General Michel Aoun, though
Hariri's own demands and intransigence may be slowing down
cabinet formation as well. Meanwhile, many still speculate
that no government can be forged without the approval of
foreign powers. As Hariri hints that he is ready to engage
in brinkmanship to get his way, his best tactics may be
direct communication with Aoun -- or simply waiting him out.
End summary.

COMING TOGETHER AGAINST
"THE ISRAELI ENEMY"
--------------


2. (SBU) The week began with headlines proclaiming stagnation
in government formation, as Saad Hariri's Future TV continued
a media blitz against Aoun and Hizballah blamed the
PM-designate for the blockage. Nevertheless, some
politicians began to soften their rhetoric. First, after
weeks of distancing itself from March 14 and Hariri,
Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) issued a
statement August 24 calling on Lebanese leaders to facilitate
Hariri's attempt to form a government, a step which "should
be above the calculations of sons-in-law," a clear reference
to Aoun's demands that his son-in-law Gebran Bassil be
reappointed as Telecom Minister. Jumblatt followed up on
August 25, saying he shares Hariri's view that the new
government "should be a national unity government, in order
confront the possibility of Israeli aggression."


3. (SBU) Hariri picked up Jumblatt's baton of reconciliation
and anti-Israeli fervor by reaching out to Hizballah in an
iftar speech by reaffirming, "I want to confirm to the
Israeli enemy...that Hizballah will be in the government
whether the enemy likes it or not." For its part, Hizballah
reciprocated by expressing its desire for rapid government
formation, articulating its faith in the Hariri, and urging
progress. Hizballah MP Mohammed Raad deflected blame from
Hariri to "outside powers," and resisted criticizing Maronite
Patriarch Sfeir, who had sharply criticized Hizballah while
calling for a majority government. Even FPM MP Alain Aoun,
the General's nephew, issued conciliatory remarks in the
press, lauding Hariri for finally calling off the media blitz
against his uncle. Hinting that the FPM would show more
flexibility if other parties do the same, he called publicly
for a meeting between Hariri and Aoun to settle their
differences.

AOUN THE PROBLEM?
OR HARIRI?
--------------


4. (C) The General does not fold easily, however, and
underscored that his demands are firm and he will not "visit"
anyone, adding cheekily that if "someone" wants to negotiate,
he can visit the broad terrace of Aoun's house. Caretaker
Minister of Culture and Future Party stalwart Tammam Salam

BEIRUT 00000973 002 OF 003


told the Ambassador August 25 that despite being "unstable,"
Aoun is extremely intelligent, a political animal who does
his homework and commits himself to a plan. "Even his allies
can't reel him in," said Salam. "With or without the
blessing of Syria, he will do what he wants." Alain Aoun
explained to PolChief August 26 that the General's obstinacy
was the result of Hariri's marginalizing him (reftel) and
insisted Hariri will need to find a way to meet with the
General in order to move forward.


5. (C) Hariri has remained stoic in his responses to Aoun's
recent rants, winning praise from his allies, including
Salam, who assessed that his performance has been "perfect"
to date. Nonetheless, Hariri's attempts to isolate Aoun have
brought criticism from the opposition (reftel). Opposition
MP Yassine Jaber, who is closely allied to Nabih Berri's Amal
party, suggested Hariri should have started negotiating with
Aoun from the beginning instead of expecting Hizballah to
push him. Indeed, Raad has insisted consistently in his
public comments that Hizballah is Aoun's ally, but not his
mediator.

HARIRI'S UNSPOKEN DEMANDS
--------------


6. (C) While Hariri's maneuvering has made Aoun appear to be
the only remaining obstacle to government formation, Hariri
himself has been silent on his cabinet demands, which may
also be slowing the process. In an August 25 meeting with
the Ambassador, Mazen Hanna, Hariri's chief economic advisor,
said Hariri intended to focus his reform efforts as PM on
electricity, information technology, environment, traffic
management, poverty alleviation, and streamlining business
practices. When asked if Hariri had approached opposition
parties whose ministers might be involved in these areas,
Hanna was adamant: "We cannot wsldtQ=V2Q(oQs]2ajority might explain his hardball
tactics with the FPM.

HARIRI TO TAKE
RADICAL MEASURES?
--------------


7. (C) Hariri, still smarting from Aoun's brusque rejection
of his invitation to dinner at Qoreitem, refuses to yield to
Aoun's insistence that any negotiations between the two of
them happen at Aoun's home in Rabieh. With negotiations
therefore blocked, Hariri told the Ambassador at his August
27 iftar, "There are things we can do," and indicated he may
simply take his cabinet proposal directly to President Michel
Sleiman, without further consultations. This would
presumably occur after a meeting of the 71 majority MPs to
consolidate their position and present a united front, an
event that Lebanon First Sunni MP and caretaker Minister of
Economy Mohammed Safadi told the Ambassador will take place
on August 31. Jumblatt told the Ambassador August 28 that
his bloc of 11 MPs will attend the event, which he said is
not definitively scheduled, but when asked what progress
would happen afterwards, he replied, "Nothing." Meanwhile,
Jumblatt advisor Marwan Hamadeh downplayed the significance
of the PSP joining March 14 MPs at such a meeting, noting
that other "independent" MPs would attend as well, including
Christian strongman Michel Murr and Tripoli Sunni Najib
Miqati.


8. (C) Safadi reported that President Sleiman had indicated
he still wanted to work for cabinet formation through
"consultation and consensus," making it doubtful that Sleiman
would accept Hariri's cabinet proposal if it does not have
broad agreement from across the political spectrum. If
Hariri fails to form a government this way, the process would

BEIRUT 00000973 003 OF 003


go back to square one. Hariri's cousin and advisor Nader
Hariri told the Ambassador, "We need an action-forcing event."

OUTSIDE FORCES
--------------


9. (C) Many contacts still contend that the Hariri-Aoun spat
cannot be the only thing holding up the government and that
outside pressures are the real source of stalemate. Salam
suggested that Syria, working from a strengthened regional
and international position, must be working to freeze the
process. Jaber assessed that the Egyptians had been
interfering in Lebanon's cabinet formation to serve its own
regional interests. Numerous Embassy interlocutors insist
that nothing can move forward in Lebanon until the Saudis and
Syrians return to the negotiating table. The mood of many is
summed up by Jumblatt's comment to the Ambassador that
Lebanon cannot form a government "while Saudi Arabia and Iran
are fighting from Yemen to Iraq."

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Although contacts from all the political blocs
(except for the FPM and Kataeb) indicate they have come to
agreement with Hariri on their ministerial allocations,
Hariri has kept his cards close to his chest with Aoun. With
Aoun playing hardball in respose to Hariri's tactics, Hariri
seems to be ready to use brinkmanship to bring things to a
head and get his way. Given the President's desire for
consensus and Aoun's intransigence, this tactic could very
well backfire. While Hariri's differences with Aoun appear
very personal and possibly irreconcilable, some believe the
most effective way for Hariri to handle the current situation
is to sit down with Aoun -- the consummate political animal
-- personally. Barring that, he may do well to heed the
advice Jumblatt told the Ambassador he would offer Hariri:
"Wait. They are waiting for you to be impatient and make a
mistake."
SISON