JUMBLATT OBSESSED WITH AVERTING DRUZE-SHIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000972

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR LE
SUBJECT: JUMBLATT OBSESSED WITH AVERTING DRUZE-SHIA
CONFLICT AND SEEKS POLITICAL RELEVANCE

REF: A. BEIRUT 914

B. BEIRUT 426

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Druze leader Walid Jumblatt's close advisors, as well
as his Druze competition, believe that Jumblatt is obsessed
with averting a Druze-Shia conflict. Contacts suggest that
one-third of the Druze "like" Jumblatt personally and will
follow (some say "obey") his lead; one-third support Jumblatt
out of fear; and one-third do not believe they have any other
alternative. To protect the Druze community following the
May 7, 2008, flash of violence between the Shia and Druze and
to maintain his own political relevance, Jumblatt has made
successful overtures to Hizballah to tamp down any lingering
tensions. However, there is a growing consensus that
Jumblatt harbors deep fears of what danger to the Druze
community could result if the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
implicates Hizballah in the assassination of Rafik Hariri.
Others point to the political debut of Jumblatt's son Taymur
"through the doors of the Shia," as evidence of Jumblatt's
calculations. Jumblatt's August 2 pronouncement that his
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) was withdrawing from the
March 14 coalition has been nuanced by his publicly declared
support to Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri, but it is
further evidence of his courting the Shia. It is unrealistic
to expect Jumblatt will take any action that does not address
his primary goals of protecting Druze existential interests
and satisfying his quest for continued political relevance.
End summary.

PROTECTING THE DRUZE BY TAMPING
DOWN DRUZE-SHIA TENSION
--------------


2. (C) Jumblatt's obsession with calming Druze-Shia tensions
drove his exit from the March 14 coalition, according to
Druze MP and close advisor to Jumblatt Akram Shehayyeb.
Shehayyeb acknowledged to poloffs August 20 that Jumblatt
(who inherited his position after the assassination of his
father, Kamal, in 1977) had made some mistakes throughout the
years, notably precipitating the May 2008 crisis that led to
violent clashes between Druze and Shia in the Druze homeland
region of the Chouf. The Druze community has suffered as
result of the crisis and cannot bear another conflict, he
argued. In recognition of the potential peril to the
community, since that time, Jumblatt mended his relationship
with rival Druze leader Talal Arslan and is opening up
towards Hizballah, the dominant Shia group, Shehayyeb
reported.


3. (C) In any future conflict the Druze -- who number
approximately 150,000 -- would be outnumbered quickly,
asserted Shehayyeb. In a crisis, he continued, the Druze
would not be able to smuggle in enough weapons or ammunition
to defend themselves because they now live "in a sea of
Shia." In an August 28 visit to his Mukhtara estate in the
Chouf, Jumblatt echoed Shehayyeb by matter-of-factly pointing
out to the Ambassador that the mountains to the south are
controlled by Hizballah, while Syria controls the mountains
to the west and north. Druze journalist Suleiman Takieddine,
meanwhile, concurred that the spectre of Druze-Shia conflict
was driving Jumblatt's behavior. When asked about the Druze
community's support for Jumblatt, Takieddine assessed that
the community was both worried and afraid that Hizballah was
gaining power, Syria was regaining influence, and the
possibility of a new civil war erupting was increasing as
sectarian tensions deepened. However, he characterized the
Druze community as grouped into thirds: one-third who support
Jumblatt out of fear; one-third who would "obey" Jumblatt and
follow blindly; and one-third who do not believe they have
any alternative but to support Jumblatt.


BEIRUT 00000972 002 OF 003


NEITHER HIZBALLAH NOR
SYRIA TRUST JUMBLATT
--------------


4. (C) Takieddine accused Jumblatt of supporting Hizballah
and reconciling with the Shia because it was "less
dangerous." Shehayyeb confirmed as much when he boasted that
Druze-Shia relations "on the mountain" (in areas such as the
Chouf, Aley and Baabda) are generally better at all levels,
although some problems still exist in the villages where
Druze and Hizballah fighters clashed in 2008, such as
Choueifat. However, while Jumblatt's relations with
Hizballah and its regional ally Syria have ostensibly
improved, contacts tell us that neither Hizballah nor Syria
fully trusts Jumblatt because of his perceived ambiguity.
Many contacts also assess that the Syrian regime will never
forgive Jumblatt for his harsh defamation of Syrian President
Bashar al-Asad, and some say that he is actually under
greater threat of assassination now because his opening to
Syria means that he is under no one's protection and subject
to everyone's threats.


5. (C) Supporters of Arslan share a similar view of
Jumblatt's motives (ref A). Arslan's advisors Marwan
Khaireddine (a Druze businessman) and Marwan Abu Fadel (Greek
Orthodox and a possible cabinet minister) assessed August 26
that Jumblatt was afraid of what charges might come out of
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon tasked with investigating
the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
If the Tribunal implicates Hizballah or Syria, Jumblatt
fears that the Shia will take advantage of the situation to
initiate a new conflict and take revenge on the minority
Druze community, Khaireddine explained. Therefore, Jumblatt
is seeking not only to protect the community but to protect
himself, Khaireddine and Abu Fadel theorized.

TAYMUR'S POLITICAL
DEBUT THROUGH THE SHIA
--------------


6. (C) In a move that Khaireddine and Abu Fadel believe was
intended to ingratiate himself further with Hizballah, Walid
arranged for the political debut of his heir, Taymur, to
occur through "the doors of the Shia." Taymur's political
coming-out is tied to the twin Shia events of the year: he
took a place of honor at Hizballah's celebrations marking the
end of the 2006 war on August 14 and is expected to attend
the Amal party's commemorations for the missing Imam Musa
Sadr on August 31. Shehayyeb, who accompanied Taymur to the
August 14 event, described the PSP participation as marked by
Hizballah's solicitous and welcoming treatment of its Druze
guests, even though Shehayyeb is held responsible by
Hizballah for the murder of Shia civilians in Choueifat
during the May 2008 conflagration.

JUMBLATT: A RECKLESS
POLITICAL CHAMELEON?
--------------


7. (C) Walid Jumblatt's August 2 declaration that his party
would no longer be part of PM-designate Saad Hariri's March
14 coalition was a "shock," said Takieddine. However, PSP
spokesperson Rami Rayes downplayed the move saying the
repositioning would allow the PSP to "return to its
(socialist) roots." Rayes defended Jumblatt's speech at the
August 2 PSP annual conference, arguing that its date had
been set in December 2008 -- "long before the June 7
parliamentary elections and before anyone would have
predicted that a government would not yet be formed." The
reactions to the announcement were "disproportionate" from
both March 14 coalition members and opposition Christian
leader, Michel Aoun, Rayes added.


8. (C) Jumblatt has not shied away from rhetorical turnabouts
in the past. During the May 2008 crisis, for example, it was
Jumblatt who pushed Lebanon beyond the brink, and only after

BEIRUT 00000972 003 OF 003


four days of heavy losses in the Druze community did he
recant his position, forced by his Druze supporters to
reconcile with Hizballah-aligned Arslan and make overtures
towards he Shia. During his most recent move away from
March 14, Jumblatt suggested that the coalition had fostered
a polarizing attitude in the country, particularly against
the Shia. Many contacts assess that Jumblatt was surprised
by the sharp reaction of Hariri who, in the words of March 14
Secretary General Faris Souaid, "kicked him out." Since
Hariri's sharp reaction and repeated visits by Saudi Minister
of Culture Khoja, Jumblatt has moved back toward Hariri and
on August 25 issued strong statements in support of the
PM-designate. MPs from the PSP assure us, though, that
Jumblatt cannot return the PSP to the March 14 Secretariat
but will support from the outside on issues of common
interest.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Jumblatt, although known for his political shifts, by
most accounts considers himself a strategist and is regarded
as such by most Lebanese. Between May 2008 and August 2009,
Jumblatt's political instincts have caused more problems for
the Druze community than they have solved. Positioning
himself and his political heir, Taymur, to receive the
protection of Hizballah while also keeping his party in Saad
Hariri's parliamentary majority (though not in March 14)
lessens the Shia threat against the Druze community and
builds Jumblatt's political cache as a swing vote. His
defection from March 14, rumored since early April (ref B),
became a reality in August contrary to the natural
inclinations of his followers. In the days following his
August 2 speech, we believe Jumblatt intentionally nuanced
his withdrawal from March 14 and reiterated his continued
support for Hariri to retain his position of political
relevance with the power to sway decisions, especially
related to the still-pending government formation.
SISON