OPPOSITION CRITICIZES HARIRI'S NEGOTIATION TACTICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000966

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR LE SY
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION CRITICIZES HARIRI'S NEGOTIATION TACTICS

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Although many speculate that cabinet formation is
being held up by external Syrian or Iranian influence,
opposition figures claim that the reason for the delay is
Hariri's refusal to provide a counteroffer to General Michel
Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement's original proposal on the
ministries that it desires. The FPM bitterly complains that
Hariri has used proxies in the media to corner the party
while refusing to engage it in direct negotiations. Although
the technique has been successful in painting controversial
figure (and Aoun son-in-law) Gibran Bassil as the block to
cabinet formation, Hariri has radicalized the dialog and
deeply offended the notoriously stubborn and emotion General
Aoun, Aoun's nephew and FPM MP Alain Aoun told us. Hariri
does not appreciate the stubbornness of Michel Aoun, Alain
insisted, and falsely believes that Hizballah or Syria can or
will force him to concede. All sides are now looking for a
solution that will save face for everyone involved, though
Hariri will likely have to reach out to Michel Aoun
personally to clear the bad blood. While Hariri has
succeeded in cornering the FPM and identifying it as the
obstacle to government formation, it is clear that touchy and
vindictive Michel Aoun has made the once-political dispute
into a personal one, especially since his heir-apparent has
been targeted. End summary.

OPPOSITION CRITICIZES HARIRI'S
CAMPAIGN AGAINST BASSIL
--------------


2. (C) Members of the March 8 opposition coalition tell us
that the delay in cabinet formation is due to Prime
Minister-designate Saad Hariri's refusal to respond to FPM
leader Michel Aoun's proposal for his cabinet bloc. Although
Hariri quickly negotiated ministerial portfolio distribution
with Hizballah and Amal, negotiations with the FPM have been
delayed by the party's elevated demands, starting with
proportional representation in the cabinet based on the
number of seats in the parliament and, once that issue was
shelved, extending to the eligibility of Aoun's son-in-law,
righthand man, and caretaker Minister of Telecommunications
Gibran Bassil to return in the next cabinet. (Note: Hariri's
objection to Bassil, while never publicly stated by him
personally in the press, is that he lost his seat in the
recent parliamentary elections. End note.) The conflict,
once contained behind closed doors, has blossomed into a
full-fledged media war.


3. (C) Although many speculate that cabinet formation is
being held up by external Syrian or Iranian influence, on
August 26 FPM MP Alain Aoun told polchief tat the simple
reason for the delay is Hariri's rfusal to provide a
counteroffer to the FPM's original proposal on the ministries
that it desires. Marwan Kheireddine and Marwan Abu Fadel,
both advisors to Druze opposition figure Talal Arslan, made
the same claim. Alain Aoun bitterly complained that Hariri
has used proxies in the media to corner the FPM while
refusing to engage it in direct negotiations. Although the
technique has been successful in isolating the figure of
Bassil in the public mind as the block to cabinet formation,
Hariri has radicalized the dialog and deeply offended the
notoriously stubborn and emotion General Aoun, Alain
reported. As a result, he said, Aoun will reject any
progress on talks until Hariri achieves a "psychological
breakthrough" with him, preferably with a personal meeting.
Alain Aoun dismissed Hariri's recent public dinner invitation
to the FPM leader because it was accompanied by a
simultaneous indirect media campaign blitz against him.
Hariri does not appreciate the stubbornness of Michel Aoun,
Alain insisted, and falsely believes that Hizballah or Syria
can or will force him to concede. Abu Fadel and Kheireddine
seconded Aoun's assessment that Hizballah cannot now move

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Aoun even if it wanted to do so.

AOUN: HARIRI "TOO SMART"
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4. (C) Alain Aoun displayed dismay over Hariri's negotiation
techniques because he had taken the opposition's good will
and ruined it. According to Aoun, the FPM surrendered its
initial insistence on proportional representation under
Hizballah pressure, thus allowing the 15-5-10 formula to
coalesce. The opposition then proposed to Hariri that the
two sides agree on ministry distribution and only after that
the names of the ministers. This offer was a gesture of good
will, Aoun claimed, and Hariri was "too smart" and botched
the entire process by prematurely objecting to including
Bassil as a minister. Although Hariri had quickly negotiated
with Hizballah and Amal only on portfolios, he changed the
rules for the FPM, Aoun complained, with his campaign against
Bassil even though the FPM never reached the stage of
submitting its list of ministerial candidates. Now
negotiations have reached a "dead end" and what was a local
dispute is being leveraged by regional actors for their
purposes. Abu Fadel claimed that Hariri is not being
proactive and is instead waiting for regional developments,
such as the issuance of summons from the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (STL),to pressure the local opposition. Hariri has
told the opposition, Abu Fadel alleged, that the opposition
should give him the government he wants and in exchange he
will provide regional cover for the opposition vis-a-vis the
STL. The irony, Abu Fadel pointed out, is that Hariri's
strategy is encouraging Hizballah, Syria, and Iran to watch
and wait as well, forcing Hariri to call in Saudi pressure to
resolve what began as mere local issues.

ALL SIDES LOOK FOR AN EXIT
--------------


5. (C) All sides are now looking for a solution that will
save face for everyone involved, Aoun reported. One unlikely
option is to shuffle all of the ministerial portfolios among
the parties and start at the beginning. All of the
opposition parties were content to maintain the portfolio
distribution of the previous cabinet, Aoun reported, but such
a mixing could provide an exit. Another suggestion is for
Hariri to offer the FPM an additional "sovereign" ministry or
to up the number of offered ministries to five from the four
that the FPM is now assumed to deserve (in addition to a
minister of state without portfolio). Were he to do so, both
sides could claim victory because the FPM could drop either
its demand that Bassil return to the Ministry of
Telecommunications or its more recent demand for the Ministry
of the Interior, which is now part of the president's bloc.
In either case, he underscored, Hariri will have to reach out
to Michel Aoun personally to clear the bad blood. Alain Aoun
and Gibran Bassil's ongoing contacts with the PM-designate's
advisor Nader Hariri will not be enough to bridge the
impasse, he judged.

COMMENT
--------------


6. (C) It is unclear whether tight-lipped Hariri misstepped
in his negotiations with the FPM or whether he is purposely
trying to isolate and undermine the party before forcing its
partners to make it concede. While he has succeeded in
cornering the FPM and painting it as the obstacle to
government formation, it is clear that touchy and vindictive
Michel Aoun has made the once-political dispute into a
personal one, especially since his heir-apparent Gibran
Bassil has been targeted. Although being excluded from the
cabinet may play well for the FPM during municipal elections
next spring, opposition sources say that locking the largest
Christian party out of the cabinet would be a destabilizing
factor. At the same time, they concur that external parties,
should they become motivated to prod Michel Aoun to
compromise, may not be a match for his bullheadedness.


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SISON