LEBANON: JUMBLATT WITH HIZBALLAH: MAJOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000092

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN
NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUMBLATT WITH HIZBALLAH: MAJOR
DIFFERENCES OVER SYRIA, ARMS, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL

REF: 08 BEIRUT 1541

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In his January 21 meeting with Hizballah MP Mohamad
Raad, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt reportedly expressed his
fundamental disagreement with Hizballah over Hizballah's
relationship with Syria, Hizballah's arms, and the Special
Tribunal. As such, he was not interested in a political
relationship that Hizballah appeared to be seeking. While
press portrayed the meeting as "warm," despite disagreements
over Hizballah's arms and Syria, and focused on security
issues, the opposition Druze were disappointed with the
meeting, citing Jumblatt's complete rejection of any efforts
at reconciliation. Jumblatt, at least for the moment,
appears to be firmly wedded to March 14, despite the risks of
further conflicts with Hizballah in the Chouf. End summary.


2. (C) Druze MP Akram Shuhayeb, who attended the much
anticipated January 21 meeting between Hizballah and
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) leader Walid Jumblatt,
briefed Pol/Econ Chief and Senior LES Political Advisor on
January 22. Participants at the meeting included, on
Jumblatt's side, Minister Wael Abou Faour, Shuhayeb, MP Alaa
Terro, and PSP Vice President Duraid Yaghi (the PSP's senior
Shi'a member). The Hizballah delegation, led by MP Mohamad
Raad, also included MPs Ali Ammar, Jamal Taqsh, and Ali
Mokdad, as well as Wafiq Safa, Hizballah's security chief,
and Mohmoud Qmati, a member of Hizballah's politburo.
Lebanese Democratic Party (LDP) and opposition Druze leader
Talal Arslan hosted the meeting, accompanied by Walid
Barakat, the LDP's Secretary General.

JUMBLATT: "I WILL NEVER
SHAKE HANDS WITH BASHAR"
--------------


3. (C) Shuhayeb described the meeting as "okay," noting that
Jumblatt had said he was open to meeting with Hizballah two
months ago, following majority leader Saad Hariri's
conversation with Hassan Nasrallah (reftel). Shuhayeb
believed one of the main objectives of the meeting for
Hizballah and Arslan was to reconcile Jumblatt with the
Syrians. Reading from his notes of the meeting, Shuhayeb
said Jumblatt stated he would never shake hands with Bashar
even if he was left standing alone. To Raad's assertion that
Hizballah operates independent of Syria, Jumblatt reportedly
made it clear that he knew Syria really held the reins.
Shuhayeb remarked that, in contrast to Arslan, Hizballah
never defended the Syrians at any point in the meeting, nor
did it comment on the Special Tribunal, another issue on
which Jumblatt told Hizballah he did not see eye to eye.


4. (C) Asked by Raad whether Saudi King Abdullah had
coordinated his Arab reconciliation efforts in Kuwait with
the Egyptians and Kuwaitis, Jumblatt said he did not know,
but noted that the King was a strong supporter of Arab
solidarity and Lebanon. Lebanon, he added, should not pay
the price for a divided Arab world. Raad injected that,
after what happened to the Palestinians in Gaza, Hizballah
would never accept border demarcation with Syria. Shuhayeb
said no one reacted to this during the meeting, but he
interpreted the statement to mean Hizballah was intent on
preventing any efforts to block its own arms shipments from
Syria.

NATIONAL DIALOGUE MUST
DECIDE ON HIZBALLAH'S ARMS
--------------


5. (C) Agreeing with Raad that Israel was the enemy of all
Lebanese, Jumblatt however stressed that the question was how
to address the problem, through the government or the
"resistance," and that this was for the National Dialogue to

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decide. Raad reportedly stressed that the May 2008 events
were exceptional circumstances and would not happen again.


6. (C) Note: The fourth Dialogue session will take place at
Baabda Palace under President Sleiman's chairmanship on
January 26. Participants agreed at the third session to form
a military committee to study defense strategy suggestions.
In a statement issued January 21, Sleiman said, "At every
session, we write down common points pending political calm
in order to better plan for a national strategy that gathers
and guarantees Lebanon's strength." Shuhayeb did not believe
anything would change at the next session. End note.

JUMBLATT REJECTS POLITICAL DEAL
--------------


7. (C) Shuhayeb concurred that Hizballah "basically wanted a
political deal" with Jumblatt, adding that Raad had said
Hizballah's primary goal was not just to keep things calm on
the ground, but to develop a "relationship" with Jumblatt.
However, he did not believe Jumblatt ever would ally with
Hizballah because of its relationship with Syria. He
believed Hizballah's motivation stemmed from fears that an
Israel-Syria agreement would be at its expense. He noted
again that Hizballah did not once defend Syria during the
meeting. Furthermore, as local reaction to the January 8 and
14 rocket attacks against Israel demonstrated, the Shia in
southern Lebanon did not want to be dragged into another war,
and Hizballah knew Israel would retaliate strongly against
any attack by Hizballah. The situation with the Christians
also was very sensitive, and Hizballah did not want to hurt
Aoun, he said.

JUMBLATT - NASRALLAH MEETING UNLIKELY
--------------


8. (C) According to Shuhayeb, Arslan, stressing that he was
entrenched in the opposition, said he wanted to keep the
security situation calm, and declared himself a mediator
between Hizballah and Jumblatt in the meeting. Arslan was
trying to show the Syrians and Hizballah he was defending
their interests in Lebanon and showing Hizballah he could
"deliver" Jumblatt, in Shuhayeb's view. Jumblatt preferred
any future meetings to be directly with Hizballah (i.e.,
without Arslan),Shuhayeb said, although he did not believe
the Syrians would ever allow Hizballah Secretary General
Nasrallah to meet with Jumblatt.

JUMBLATT DEFENDS MARCH 14 ALLIES
--------------


9. (C) Responding to Raad's attempt to criticize Jumblatt
ally Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces, Jumblatt
fired back with his own attack on Hizballah ally Michel Aoun,
leader of the Free Patriotic Movement. Both leaders had
their histories, he said, but Geagea was now a positive
factor in Lebanese politics.


10. (C) Jumblatt also warned Hizballah against Aoun's efforts
to encourage smaller confessional groups to ally against the
Sunnis. For example, rather than seeking the support of
small groups like the Alawites and feeding on alliances of
minorities, Hizballah should embrace Lebanon's pluralistic
society and seek broader support. Citing the recent U.S.
elections, Jumblatt praised the U.S. style of democracy, even
if one did not always agree with its policies.

OPPOSITION DRUZE DISAPPOINTED
--------------


11. (C) Arslan advisor Marwan Abu Fadel, who was not/not
present at the Jumblatt meeting, described the meeting as
"cold," complaining to Senior LES Political Advisor on
January 22 that Jumblatt was completely negative. Jumblatt
was unreceptive to any attempts at reconciliation with Syria,
refused any sort of political alliance with Hizballah, and
attacked Hizballah's arms, he said. Furthermore, Jumblatt
refused Arslan's request to have one of his candidates in
Baabda. (Shuhayeb reported that Jumblatt also told Arslan he

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could not give him a seat in Aley, but would help him with a
ministerial position in the next government.)


12. (C) In Abu Fadel's opinion, Jumblatt was firmly grounded
in March 14. He opined that Jumblatt was making a mistake,
given the current Arab reconciliation between Saudi Arabia
and Syria, and claimed Bashar would go to Saudi Arabia next
week. Abu Fadel also said he intended to brief Aoun on the
Jumblatt meeting later the same day.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) Although the purported reason for the January 21
meeting between Jumblatt and Hizballah was to maintain calm
in the Chouf and other predominantly Druze areas, it seems
clear Hizballah was testing the waters for a possible
political alliance with Jumblatt, a la 2005 quadripartite
agreement. In a separate meeting with Pol/Econ Chief and
Senior LES Political Advisor on January 21, Arslan advisors
Abu Fadel and Marwan Khaireddine claimed Jumblatt had told
Arslan during their January 5 dinner that the Druze should
not pay the price for his mistakes, and that he had chosen
the "losing camp." Jumblatt himself told us on January 14
that Hizballah was on the "winning side."


14. (C) The account of the January 21 meeting with Hizballah
suggests, however, that Jumblatt has not thrown in the towel.
Furthermore, his staunch defense of Geagea and overt support
for the U.S. during the meeting indicate that he remains
wedded to March 14. If Jumblatt sticks to his guns (and we
see nothing at this stage to indicate he won't),he may be
setting himself (and the Druze) up for more conflict in the
Chouf. For the moment, however, his adherence to principles
appears to be overriding any fears he may have of Hizballah.
Ambassador will meet with Jumblatt next week to follow-up on
these issues.

SISON