LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI WORRIED HAMAS PLANS TO USE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000091

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR I/O PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR YERGER/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE SY IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI WORRIED HAMAS PLANS TO USE
PALESTINIAN CAMPS TO CONFRONT FATAH, ISRAEL

REF: A. BEIRUT 88

B. BEIRUT 77

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador January 21, March 14
majority leader Saad Hariri expressed concern the past weeks'
events in Gaza could lead to Hamas using Lebanon's
Palestinian camps to confront Fatah and Israel. Hariri urged
the new U.S. administration to "do something" about the
Palestinian-Israeli crisis because if left for much longer,
not even moderate Arab governments could afford to intervene,
he believes. Hariri said that while he disagreed with
President Sleiman's attendance at an Arab senior leaders'
meeting in Doha in the aftermath of Gaza, he "respects"
Sleiman's decisions. Hariri downplayed the import of the
meeting between March 14 Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and
Hizballah MP Mohammad Raad (septel),saying it was necessary
to "stabilize" the security situation in Druze districts. On
elections, he admitted that the date of the March 14
convention to roll out its candidate lists and electoral
platform remained undecided. Negotiations continued over
candidate seats in Tripoli, as well as with independent MP
Michel Murr, he said. End summary.

HAMAS PLANNING TO
USE THE CAMPS?
--------------


2. (C) Majority leader Saad Hariri told us January 21 that he
was concerned that Hamas may use several of Lebanon's
Palestinian refugee camps as a base of operations to regroup
and prepare for future conflict with Israel. Hariri
speculated that Hamas might use the Palestinian camps of
Baddawi (in the north, near Tripoli),Sabra and Shatila (both
in the suburbs south of Beirut),and Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) military
camps near the Syrian border to push for an "intifada"
against Fatah. He also speculated that Hizballah was
planning an operation prior to Israel's parliamentary
election on February 10.


3. (C) Hariri repeated several times his concern that the
U.S. needed to "do something soon" to help Abu Mazen regain
credibility and strengthen the Palestinian Authority. He
believed Israeli action in December 2008 had weakened Hamas'
credibility and that Hamas was "finished." However, Iran
would need to find another way to challenge Israel.
Domestically, most Lebanese do not support Hamas but were
"disgusted" by the images coming out of Gaza that they see in
the media, he said. Unless Israel gives up something,
neither Lebanon, nor Saudi Arabia or Egypt, could fight to
keep the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative alive, he continued. At
a subsequent conference in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia had sought to
reconcile with Syria. This reconciliation had "bought time"
for Lebanon as the Syrians had not yet responded and Iran
would wait to see what the Syrians would do, Hariri assessed.

SLEIMAN UNDER PRESSURE, BUT
HARIRI RESPECTS HIS CHOICES
--------------


4. (C) Hariri also asserted that the Gaza crisis created
fissures in Arab leadership, as evidenced by the lack of
quorum for an Arab League summit. When the Qataris called
for an alternative "senior meeting," Hariri advised President
Sleiman not to attend, arguing it would put Lebanon in a
difficult position. In contrast, Sleiman was urged to attend
by members of the opposition. However, Sleiman told Hariri
that because the Qataris had brokered the 2008 Doha Agreement
for the sake of Lebanon, Sleiman believed he should attend as
a show of support. Hariri said that despite the
disagreement, he "respects" Sleiman's decisions, and
continued that were he in Sleiman's position, he probably
would have done the same. The most negative impact of

BEIRUT 00000091 002 OF 002


Sleiman's attendance in Doha was that it gave the appearance
that Sleiman could be pressured by the opposition, including
Hizballah, Hariri lamented.


5. (C) In a separate meeting, MP Marwan Hamadeh, confidante
of March 14 Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, told the DCM that
Sleiman was genuinely "afraid" of the pressure he received
from a variety of pro-Syrian sources to attend the Doha
summit. Furthermore, Sleiman was reportedly concerned that
the pressure would continue and pointed to an increase in the
number of news articles critical of Sleiman coming from
opposition media outlets.

HARIRI DOWNPLAYS JUMBLATT'S
MEETING WITH HIZBALLAH
--------------


6. (C) Hariri downplayed the significance of the meeting
between Jumblatt and a delegation led by Hizballah MP
Mohammad Raad scheduled later the same day. According to
Hariri, the purpose of the meeting was to "stabilize"
security in the Druze areas. Jumblatt discussed the meeting
with him several days ago, Hariri said. (Note: Hariri met
with Hizballah officials for the first time since the 2006
war on October 26, followed by several subsequent meetings
between party officials to discuss overall security. He
speculated that Hizballah wanted to find a way to "save face"
after the May 2008 events. Hamadeh, on the other hand, told
the DCM that he personally disagreed with Jumblatt about the
wisdom of meeting Hizballah. End note.)

ELECTORAL TIDBITS
--------------


7. (C) On March 14's electoral preparations, Hariri said the
coalition would hold a rally February 14 to commemorate the
fourth anniversary of the assassination of his father, former
PM Rafiq Hariri. However, the exact date of March 14's
political convention to roll out its candidates and platform
for the June elections was not yet decided, he said. He
confirmed that negotiations over the candidate lists were
ongoing, including in Tripoli where Hariri is exploring an
alliance with either Najib Mikati or Mohammad Safadi. While
negotiations continued with Greek Orthodox independent MP
Michel Murr, Hariri remained unconvinced that the Armenian
Tashnaq party (Michel Aoun's allies) would embrace the
political program of March 14.


8. (C) Hariri reaffirmed his view that conducting the
elections should remain the number one priority for the
government. While the opposition publicly claims that it
will be victorious in the elections, Hariri believed the
opposition was only posturing and preferred to see the
elections delayed. Syria, he claimed, still had it "its
puppets" in Lebanon and could do anything to interfere.
Although "we are the majority now," he said, if the
opposition "assassinates three or four of us, then what?," he
asked rhetorically.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Saad Hariri's focus on Gaza and the U.S. role in
restoring Palestinian leader Abu Mazen's credibility are
familiar refrains. While the possibility that Lebanon's
Palestinian refugee camps could be used as a base for
confrontation with Israel -- with or without Hizballah
fingerprints -- is real, all signs at the moment suggest the
situation in the camps remains calm (reftels).


10. (C) Meanwhile, Hariri appeared relatively unconcerned
that March 14's candidate lists or convention date were not
yet determined. While Hariri -- and others in the March 14
leadership -- continue to believe they are on track with
their electoral preparations, we note the elections are just
19 weeks away. End comment.

SISON